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I
INTRODUCTION
The new wave of "social" regulation that Congress enacted in the early 1970's
struck the chemical industry with particular force. Untouched by the economic
regulation that constrained the transportation, communications, and utilities
industries, the chemical industry's contact with the federal regulatory establish-
ment was limited to clearing products such as drugs and pesticides with old-line
federal agencies. By the end of the 1970's, the chemical industry was laboring
under a wide variety of regulatory constraints on its emissions of chemical by-
products into the workplace and the environment, and further limitations on the
ultimate disposal of hazardous chemicals were still germinating.' At the same
time that Congress imposed substantial new requirements on the chemical
industry, it created new regulatory agencies to administer the new statutes. 2 As a
result, the chemical industry is rapidly becoming one of the most heavily regulated
industries in the United States.
The new health and environmental statutes generally adopt one or both of two
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1. Congress also enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), in 1976.
This comprehensive regulatory statute was aimed directly at the chemical industry. The Toxic Substances
Control Act more closely resembles a more traditional product licensing statute than the other environ-
mental statutes of the 1970's. In effect, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is given limited
powers to compel a product manufacturer to test its products and report to the EPA on their possible
adverse effects. The EPA may then choose from among specified regulatory options when it finds that the
risks for a particular use of the product outweigh the benefits. Since the regulatory section of this risk-
benefit product licensing statute has not yet been implemented, it will therefore not be discussed further in
this article.
2. This article will focus primarily upon two agencies, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) and EPA. The EPA was created pursuant to congressional authorizations by President
Nixon in Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C. app. 1132 (1982), and it is therefore not strictly
a creature of Congress.
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approaches toward the content of regulations that the implementing regulatory
agencies must promulgate. The "media-quality-based" approach focuses upon the
quality of the receiving media (usually air or water) and requires the agency to
promulgate and enforce regulations capable of rendering the media acceptably
"safe" or "clean" without regard to the costs or technological feasibility of
reaching that goal. The "technology-based" approach focuses upon the control
technologies that are available to industrial entities and requires the agency to
promulgate and enforce regulations capable of ensuring that regulated firms adopt
the appropriate cleanup technology without regard to the quality of the receiving
media. 3 Between these two extremes is a "balancing" approach that weighs
media-quality considerations against technological and economic considerations in
determining the amount of pollutant a source may discharge into the environment
or the workplace. The balancing approach is usually associated with product
licensing statutes such as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 4 the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 5 and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 6
that require an affirmative governmental decision before society can be exposed to
the risks of a product or its by-products. Although the major environmental stat-
utes do not often prescribe a balancing aproach, many policy analysts (especially
from the economics profession) strongly advocate broadening the role of cost-ben-
efit balancing beyond the product licensing context. Nevertheless, Congress has
until now rejected the balancing approach in favor of media-quality-based and
technology-based approaches, both of which reduce cost considerations to a secon-
dary or even less consequential status. 7
This article will examine these three fundamental regulatory techniques in the
context of health and environmental regulation. The article will argue that Con-
gress has wisely rejected the balancing approach for a host of practical reasons and
because the approach, as applied by most practitioners, is fundamentally flawed as
a theoretical matter. Briefly, when applied to matters of intense personal interest,
such as credible risks to life or risks to very highly valued environmental entities,
the Kaldor-Hicks formulation of the balancing approach, which is almost exclu-
sively relied upon by balancing proponents, cannot yield a "correct" answer to the
question how much risk is too much. The "willingness to purchase safety" test for
3. A statute can, of course, mandate a combination of approaches. For example, the Clean Water Act
adopts a technology-based approach but backs it up with a media-quality-based approach. Under the first
approach, the agency prescribes technologies without regard to the quality of the receiving media. States,
however, may promulgate water quality-based standards that must be met in addition to the technology-
based standards. Hence, if implementation of the technology-based standards does not produce water of
sufficient quality, the media-quality-based standards take precedence.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
7. Similarly both approaches may be implemented by a variety of regulatory tools, including the
traditional standard-setting tools and more esoteric tools such as effluent fees and marketable permits. This
article will examine the comparative merits of the two approaches within the context of traditional stan-
dard-setting since that is the universal implementation tool adopted by Congress in the existing statutes.
However, when one approach may be more effectively implemented through some alternative tool, such as
marketable permits, it will be considered with the appropriate caveat concerning the political feasibility of
enacting that tool into existing statutes.
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the value of safety-enhancing technologies is not on theoretical grounds preferable
to the "willingness to sell risks" test for the value of those technologies. Yet, policy
analysts almost invariably adopt the former test, which is, as the article will show,
biased strongly against the adoption of health and environmentally-oriented
technologies.
While both the media-quality-based and technology-based alternatives to the
balancing approach are heavily weighted with problems of their own, this article
will suggest that the general preference of Congress and especially of implementing
agencies for the technology-based approach in the context of the chemical industry
is warranted by an almost universal recognition that citizens of this country have a
"right" to a healthy environment and workplace, at least insofar as the societal
pursuit of that right is not technologically impossible or prohibitively expensive.
Finally, this article will suggest a mixed strategy that rejects the balancing
approach but attempts to arrive at an acceptable (if not "optimal") level of health
and environmental protection and to encourage research on protective control
technologies. 8
II
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
For purposes of health and environmental regulation, three characteristics of
the chemical industry distinguish it from other manufacturing industries. These
three characteristics might impel the policymaker to treat the chemical industry
differently from other industries in promulgating health and environmental
regulations. 9
The chemical industry is extraordinarily varied and complex. A glance at the
Standard Industrial Classifications for the chemical industry reveals an enormous
variety of finished products ranging from soap deodorizers to acetone.10 Not sur-
prisingly, the chemical industry produces an equally heterogeneous variety of
unwanted by-products." A given plant may manufacture dozens of different
8. This article will focus upon only one dimension of health and environmental regulation--vk , the
nature of the immediate regulatory goal. It will examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of a
regulatory focus on technology, media quality or some combination of these two considerations, in pur-
suing health and environmental objectives. The problem can be viewed along other dimensions as well.
For example, one can focus on the nature of the regulatory statement. On one extreme of that dimension is
the regulatory command; on the other extreme is the economic incentive. One could likewise focus upon
whether the regulatory statement is source-oriented or receptor-oriented and whether it is promulgated on
a generic or case-by-case basis. See McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulatton of Emergbng Geneti Technologies, 36
VAND. L. REV. 461 (1983).
9. For example, some of the writers on "charges" as alternatives to standards seem to sidestep the
problem of toxics, pointing out that strict prohibitions may be more appropriate for such discharges. See F.
ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS
THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as F. ANDERSON]. At other times, charge
proponents have maintained that the toxic problem is solvable if the charge is merely set at a high enough
level. Id at 88-89; Ruff, Federal Environmental Regulaton, in COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251, 342-343 (1979). All charge propo-
nents, however, acknowledge that toxic substances must be treated differently.
10. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL I l l-
26 (1972).
11. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Development Document for Proposed Effluent
Page 159: Summer 1983]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
products and generate hundreds of different by-products. This bewildering com-
plexity can easily hamstring any strategy of health and environmental regulation
that requires a detailed understanding of the industry being regulated.
Many of the products and by-products that the chemical industry produces are
hazardous at relatively low exposure levels. While some chemical products, such
as pesticides, are intended to be toxic to living organisms, toxicity is an undesirable
but inevitable characteristic of most chemical products. Some chemical products
and by-products are quite acutely toxic to man and environmental organisms,
while others pose long term carcinogenic, mutagenic, or reproductive hazards.
The toxicity of many by-products of the chemical industry is, therefore, quantita-
tively and often qualitatively different from the toxicity of conventional by-prod-
ucts given off by other manufacturing processes. Moreover, large uncertainties
often cloud attempts to assess the long term risks that the products and by-prod-
ucts of the chemical industry pose to humans and the environment.' 2 Thus, while
the costs of regulatory mistakes are likely to be higher for the chemical industry,
the probability of making mistakes is also higher.
Finally, the sources of any individual toxic product or by-product of the chem-
ical industry are not likely to be ubiquitous. Most of the very toxic products and
by-products of that industry come from very few sources at discrete locations.
Hence, monitoring of complex waste streams is simplified by the fact that the
waste stream for a particular toxic chemical from an individual plant will rarely
overlap with the waste stream for the same chemical from another plant.' 3 Like
all generalizations, this characteristic has its limitations for some chemicals, such as
the phenols, and some sites, such as hazardous waste disposal facilities serving
heavily industrialized areas. But, nevertheless, it is a worthwhile simplifying
generalization.
III
MEDIA-QUALITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND BALANCING
Nearly all of the regulatory provisions in the more recent occupational health
and environmental statutes can be classified as media-quality-based, technology-
based, or balancing approaches to pollution control. A media-quality-based
approach focuses primarily upon the quality of the receiving media. Society first
articulates some overall goal for the receiving media. This goal could be specified
with great particularity (for example, no more than 150 dead fish or cases of
human cancer per year), but more often it is expressed in more hortatory terms
Limitations Guidelines, New Source Performance Standards, and Pretreatment Standards for the Inor-
ganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category 66-68 (1980) (characterizing waste streams of cate-
gories of the inorganic chemicals manufacturing industry).
12. See inf/a notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
13. See Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control. Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25
PUBLIC POLICY 383, 401 (1977); Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Summary of Hearings on
the Regulation and Monitoring of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Before
the Subcomm. on Investigatzons and Review of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transporatmon, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 599 (Comm. Print 1977) (testimony of Dr. Charles Schultze). This is, of course, always true of the
workplace where waste streams from different plants never interact.
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such as "fishable/swimmable water.' 4 The regulatory entity then determines the
level of pollutant in the receiving medium that will just meet the external goal by
estimating the environmental and health effects of the pollutant at various concen-
trations in the receiving medium. 15 A pollution allocation load (for locations
meeting the standard) or pollution reduction load (for locations not meeting the
standard) can then be calculated with a model that relates discharges from indi-
vidual facilities to overall media quality.1 6 Finally, the regulatory entity must
apportion the load among the existing sources, perhaps saving some portion of the
available load for future sources.k'
The allocation formula that the regulatory entity uses is of very little conse-
quence to media quality, but it is of great importance to pollution sources. A
reasonably comprehensive list of load allocation techniques includes first-come-
first-served, a lottery, uniform percentage reduction for all sources, an auction and
a subsequent market in pollution "rights," effluent charges set at a level that would
induce the degree of control just adequate to use up the load, technology-based
effluent limitations for all sources just adequate to use up the load, and allocation
in accordance with other unspecified "political" factors. If the entire load in a
relevant media-quality region is attributable to a single source, as is the case with
many sources of toxic substance discharges into air and water and all discharges
into workplaces, then no allocation is necessary. The regulatory entity can simply
use its reduction model to work backwards from the desired level of media quality
to an effluent or emission limitation for the source. After allocating the available
load, the regulatory entity then monitors the sources and the receiving media to
detect violations and to determine whether the model functioned properly.
Under the technology-based approach, the legislature specifies in vague terms,
such as "best available technology," or "lowest achievable emissions rate," the
degree of pollution control technology' that it expects regulated industries to
implement.19 The legislature typically distinguishes between new and old sources
14. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. V 1981).
15. See, e.g., 1 EPA Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter and Sulfur Oxides (External Review
Draft No. 2, Feb. 1981); Air Quality Criteria for Lead (Dec. 1977) (EPA-600/8-77-017).
16. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1974); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313 (Supp. V 1981); cf G. GRIMSRUD, E. FINNEMORE & H. OWEN, EVALUATION OF WATER QUALITY
MODELS: A MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR PLANNERS (1976) (EPA Socioeconomic Environmental Studies
Series, EPA-600/5-76-004).
17. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. V 1981); TEXAS AIR CONTROL
BOARD, TEXAS STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: CONTROL STRATEGIES (1979).
18. In using the term "pollution control technology," I do not intend to limit the discussion to "end-
of-pipe" technologies aimed exclusively at pollution controls. Changes in the design and operation of the
basic units of production and in the way that employees perform their tasks can reduce pollution as well as
(and often more cheaply than) end-of-pipe technologies. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION,
PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1975).
19. Very often the statute will specify criteria that the agency must apply in identifying the specified
level of pollution control technology. For example, the Clean Water Act specifies that:
Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take into account the age of equip-
ment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of var-
ious types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-
water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate . ...
33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V 1981); see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (pointing out the
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in articulating these broad requirements. The regulatory entity then divides the
various regulated industries into categories and subcategories in accordance with
the production processes they employ, the nature of the waste streams, the age of
the facilities, the cost of pollution control, and other factors that appear to be
relevant to the standard setter and its engineers. 20 The regulatory entity next
surveys the pollution control technologies in use in the regulated industry and in
industries with similar waste streams and searches for technologies that may be in
use in pilot plants or that may be at even less mature developmental stages. It
then picks the technology that best meets the statutory criteria. Since cost is inva-
riably one of those criteria, the standard setter must consider economic feasibility
as well as technological feasibility. Finally, the standard setter must specify the
degree of effluent or emissions reduction achievable by the specified technology
within each category and subcategory and write an effluent or emissions limitation
expressed in units of pollution per unit of production, input, or discharge, that
mandates that degree of reduction. 2 1
Statutes nearly always allow an individual source the freedom to meet the
promulgated limitation with any technology it desires; the standard setter is only
very rarely given the authority to mandate the use of particular technologies. 22 A
technology-based regime could, however, assume an even less direct approach by
requiring the standard setter to establish a "charge" or "tax," rather than a limita-
tion, that would induce the relevant sources to adopt the desired technology. 23 In
either case, the regulatory entity would establish the limitation or charge without
regard to the quality of the receiving media.
Congress has frequently adopted a mixture of both media-quality-based and
technology-based approaches for regulating health and safety. The Clean Air Act,
for example, takes a predominantly media-quality-based approach. The core of
the Act is the primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards for
ubiquitous pollutants, which must be set at a level which protects the public
health and welfare with an adequate margin of safety.2 4 Standards for less ubiqui-
tous toxic air pollutants must protect public health with an "ample margin of
conflict between maximum technological feasibility and limiting criteria such as energy and other environ-
mental requirements).
20. A technology-based standard need not be promulgated on an industry-wide or even a subcat-
egory-wide basis. In principle a technology-based standard could be promulgated for each individual
source of pollutant. The standard setter would then act very much like a court, adjudicating the economic
and technological feasibility of various suggested pollution control alternatives for each source. This
approach would, however, entail enormous administrative costs. Congress has required the EPA and the
states to make case-by-case "best available technology" determinations in granting permits to major emit-
ting facilities under Part C of Title I of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (Supp. V 1981).
21. E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 400-460 (1980).
22. See Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981). OSHA gives the agency the flexibility
to require the implementation of specific "practices, means, methods, operations or processes ..
Occupational Safety and Health Act § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (Supp. V 1981).
23. Despite strong support among academicians, this approach has not been adopted in the United
States. F. ANDERSON, supra note 9; W. IRWIN & R. LIROFF, ECONOMIC DISINCENTIVES FOR POLLUTION
CONTROL: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSIONS (1974) (EPA Socioeconomic Environ-
mental Studies Series, EPA 6005-74-026).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. V 1981).
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safety."'2 5 In addition to these media-quality-based standards, however, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) must also promulgate technology-based new
source performance standards that require the implementation of the "best avail-
able demonstrated" technology.
2 6
The Clean Water Act also takes a mixed approach. The EPA has focused its
efforts on promulgating technology-based standards for new and existing sources
of ubiquitous "conventional" pollutants. 27 The Act does, however, provide for
water-quality-based standards28 and effluent limitations. 29 The Act, as amended
in 1977, also provides for both technology-based effluent limitations30 and media-
quality-based effluent standards3' for discharges of toxic substances.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act
prescribe a feasibility-limited media-quality-based approach. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) must promulgate occupational safety
and health standards, 32 and the EPA must promulgate National Primary Drinking
Water Standards33 capable of protecting worker and public health (a media-qual-
ity-based approach) insofar as that is feasible (a technology-based concept).
As an alternative to focusing primarily upon media quality or upon tech-
nology, Congress occasionally requires the regulatory agency to combine both con-
siderations in a balancing process. Typically, Congress mandates balancing in
product licensing statutes that require a product's proponent to demonstrate that a
product's benefit outweighs the risks that it poses to the public. 34 A balancing
approach could with somewhat greater administrative difficulty be implemented
for controlling process and by-product risks as well, although Congress has seldom
done so. For example, Congress could mandate that the EPA set media-quality
standards at precisely the level at which the costs of meeting the standards equal-
led the benefits of the standard. This would, of course, necessitate an inquiry into
the availability and costs of pollution control technologies in addition to the risks
of various levels of pollutant to humans and the environment and the value of the
threatened consequences. Alternatively, Congress could require that the regula-
tory entity set technology-based standards at precisely the point at which the pol-
lution reduction benefits derived from the standard equalled the cost of
implementing the standard. Again this would require an examination of both
media-quality and technology considerations. The balancing approach is there-
fore in the middle of a spectrum of pollution control approaches ranging from
pure media-quality-based standards to strict technology-based standards.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316 (Supp. V 1981).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(e) (Supp. V 1981).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. V 1981).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b) (2) (A), 1317(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 300(J)(1)(B)-(C) (Supp. V 1981).
34. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (burden of
proving pesticide's benefits outweighs its risks at all times on the proponent of the pesticide); Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. IV 1982).
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IV
BALANCING AND THE FAILURE OF THE MARKET PARADIGM
The weltanschauung of the policy-oriented economist has come to dominate
the intellectual analysis of the pollution control and worker health policy
problems. 35 At the heart of the policy-oriented economist's conceptual framework
is a commitment to utilitarianism-society should strive to achieve the greatest
good for the greatest number of its citizens. 36 From a pure utilitarian perspective,
governments and markets should strive for Pareto efficiency-a policy or exchange
should be undertaken if it makes a least one person better off and leaves no persons
worse off. When this ideal cannot be achieved, a policy is still appropriate under
the utilitarian analysis if the "good" (or utils) that it produces for its beneficiaries
is greater than the "bad" (or loss of utils) that its victims suffer. Many utilitarians
would stop the analysis here without attempting to reduce utils to a more common
unit of exchange such as money. Others might attempt to measure gains and
losses in monetary terms, but weigh those preferences in accordance with some
function that recognizes that when wealth is unevenly distributed people do not
convert utils to dollars at the same rate.37
To the policy-oriented economist and his fellow travellers in the legal profes-
sion, however, pure utilitarian analysis is viewed as impractical. The starting point
for the analysis should not be a poll where persons are asked to hypothesize about
the pain they would suffer or the satisfaction they would derive from the imple-
mentation of a public policy. Rather, the policy analyst should look to the real
world for surrogate measures of the value that people attribute to goods and bads.
The real world is, of course, the marketplace. Government policies, in this view,
should strive to achieve that allocative result which the marketplace would itself
reach were it not hindered by some unfortunate market defect. An ideological
corollary to this "practical" application of utilitarianism is the proposition that the
unregulated marketplace is the norm, and it should not be disturbed absent some
demonstrable and correctable failure. 38
35. In using the term "policy-oriented economist" I mean to identify a subcategory of neoclassical
economists that are concerned with the practical applications of microeconomic theory in the public policy
arena. The intellectual product of this group of economists is not highly mathematical or theoretical.
Rather, the policy-oriented economist concerns himself with the application of various well-developed par-
adigms to concrete problems of private firm strategy or public policy. Examples are too numerous to
mention but include R. DORFMAN & N. DORFMAN, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED
READINGS (1977); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18; D. NORTH & R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC ISSUES (1976). While this approach to problem solving is predominant in the nation's business
schools, it is by no means confined to those institutions. It also dominates many graduate schools of public
policy and undergraduate economics courses. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS (1978). Indeed, it has even achieved a strong foothold in the law schools. See R. MILLER,
ECONOMICS TODAY: THE MICRO VIEW 355-75 (1982); R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1982); R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1978);
36. See, e.g., THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT (A. Bullock & 0. Staslybrass eds.
1977).
37. It has been suggested, but by no means proven, that wealthy persons attach a lower value to an
additional dollar of income than poor persons. See, e.g., Markovits, Legal Analysis and 1he Economic 4nalyss of
Allocative Effciency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 815 (1980).
38. Professor Breyer's classic analysis of "regulatory failure," for example, "assumes that an unregu-
lated marketplace is the norm and that those who advocate government intervention must justify it by
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Market failure means that someone would be willing to pay more for a thing
than the possessor of the thing would be willing to sell it for, but the transaction
does not take place. There should be a market for the thing; for some reason or
reasons (usually afforded the common label-"transaction costs"), however, the
market does not exist. Adopting the Kalder-Hicks formulation of the problem, the
policy-oriented economist argues that when markets fail, government should inter-
vene when the beneficiaries would be willing to pay more for the resulting policy
than the victims would be willing to sell it for. In simpler terms, a policy should be
adopted if its beneficiaries could bribe its victims to accept it.39 The transaction,
however, need not occur; the policy is efficient in any event and should be
adopted.4°
showing that it is needed to achieve an important public objective that an unregulated market cannot
provide." Breyer, Ana'yzing Regulatory Failure. Mzmatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 549, 552 (1979); see also Posner, Some Uses andAbuses ofEconomics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 288-
89 (1979).
39. See Markovits, supra note 37, at 815.
40. Professor Markovits has articulated an alternative (and in my opinion preferable) test for whether
a policy is allocatively efficient. Under the Markovits test:
[a] policy increases allocative efficiency if and to the extent that the number of dollars its beneficiaries
would have to receive to leave them as well off as they would be if the policy were adopted exceeds the
number of dollars its victims would have to lose to leave them as badly off as they would be if the
policy were adopted, assuming no one's real income is affected either directly by the sequence of
events which led to his receiving the money in question or indirectly by the payment (by any tendency
of the finance payment to charge the prices he must pay for goods, the price or quantity of goods he
sells, or the real income of other individuals whose welfare he values).
Markovits, supra note 37, at 817-18. This extremely careful definition more closely comports with the
reality that money does not in fact flow from the beneficiaries of a government policy to its victims. In
reality, the beneficiaries will be better off with the adoption of a non-Pareto efficient policy and the victims
will be worse off. The Markovits test realistically acknowledges this.
The Markovits test as applied will more often support governmental intervention on behalf of the poor
than the Kalder-Hicks test:
Since the number of dollars that poor individuals would have to be paid to induce them to reject such
a policy will tend to exceed the number of dollars they would be willing and able to pay to obtain the
policy, the [Kalder-Hicks] approach will tend to make such policies seem less efficient than they are by
measuring the gains they generate for their beneficiaries in an incorrect way-by measuring them
according to the lower number of dollars they would be willing to pay for the policy rather than the
higher number of dollars they would be willing to accept instead of the policy.
Markovits, supra note 37, at 821-22.
The Markovits test remedies some of the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis that Professor Kennedy
identifies. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems. A Critique, 33 STAN. L. RE%,. 387 (1981); R.
Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming in STAN. L. REV.). See text accom-
panying notes 57-64 infra. The test, however, is still incoherent or schizophrenic in cases involving large
shifts of wealth (defined in utils rather than dollars), such as in the contexts of risks to health and destruc-
tion of highly valued natural entities.
The Markovits test is also difficult to apply as a practical matter, because in many cases it poses a
difficult psychological question to the potential beneficiaries and victims of a policy. The beneficiary, for
example, must tell the policymaker (or the policymaker must somehow otherwise ascertain) the amount of
money that would satisfy him as much as a governmental policy without informing him of the direct link
between the policy and the dollar gift. When the policy entails a direct transfer of dollars (for example,
licensing taxicabs in New York City), this may be an easy operation. When the policy implements other
values, it may be more difficult. Implementation of a policy that greatly reduces the risk of death that a
person otherwise faces will generate a great feeling of relief. It is difficult, I suspect, to compare this feeling
of relief with the feeling of satisfaction or joy that the same person would experience upon receiving a
windfall gift of dollars.
It is not clear why the Kalder-Hicks test has historically carried the day. It is clear that the Markovits
test has until now attracted few proponents.
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A. The Market Paradigm and the Problem of Externalities
In the context of health and environmental risks, the policy-oriented economist
would argue that governmental regulation should be strictly limited to the narrow
goal of "internalizing externalities" or, phrased differently, "correcting for spill-
overs." The spillover problem results from the fact that a firm is allowed to engage
in conduct that causes harm to others or otherwise consumes a valuable common
resource, and from the fact that these costs do not affect the firm's conduct because
it does not have to pay them. 41 The market for health and environmental controls
has failed.
If the legal system specified a rule that no effluent or emission from any plant
could harm any interest of any person and gave any aggrieved party the right to
enjoin such conduct, a firm would then be required to purchase the "right" to
pollute from its neighbors. 42 The firm would expend resources on pollution con-
trols up to the point at which it would be cheaper to purchase rights from the
neighbors. Similarly, if the rule were the opposite-that any firm could pollute
with impunity-then those damaged by a firm's conduct would band together and
purchase the desired amount of pollution control devices up to the point at which
the reduced pollution was no longer worth their resource outlays. Professor Coase
has suggested that in a smoothly functioning system the amount expended upon
pollution control and the level of pollution would be the same under either rule.
43
A "market" for pollution control would develop under both rules, and government
intervention, except insofar as was necessary to enforce the contracts and the
"property rights," would be unnecessary. 44 The market would allocate the
resources in the optimum manner for society.
A smoothly functioning market would likewise efficiently allocate worker
safety. Informed workers could bid up wages to the point at which income from
increased wages matched their individual assessments of the disutility of exposure
to additional risks. A rational employer would make health and safety related
expenditures up to the point at which the cost of such measures equaled the sum of
the reduced output due to work-related injury or illness and the increased wages it
would have to pay to induce employees to accept more hazardous employment.
4 5
41. See F. ANDERSON, Su/pra note 9, at 3-6; A. KNEESE, & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 4-6; Breyer,
supra note 38, at 555.
42. The legal system would also have to acknowledge the right of a person to alienate his "right" to
enjoin a polluter, and it would have to be capable of enforcing the contract of alienation. This, of course, is
"government intervention" into private conduct, but the economist would probably not consider it inter-
vention into the marketplace because enforceable property "rights" and contracts define the marketplace.
Without at least this much government intervention there can be no effective market, and the rule of the
jungle would prevail.
43. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). This point is well-illustrated in
the pollution control context in R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 35, at 133-36.
44. This intervention is not insignificant. The legal system must be prepared to enjoin all emissions
that were not bargained for under the first rule, and it must be prepared to protect the firms' facilities from
attack by angry neighbors under the second rule.
45. R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, ITS GOALS AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS
27-28 (1976); Zeckhauser & Nichols, The Occupational Safety and Health Adminisration---An Overview in COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
169, 172 (1978).
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Again, society would produce the "optimal" amounts of health and other com-
modities, and government intervention would be necessary only to enforce con-
tracts and "property rights."
Although the policy-oriented economist's goal is to reach that result which the
parties themselves would have "freely" reached in a smoothly functioning market-
place, 46 he accepts the fact that the real world does not function ideally. First, the
market paradigm requires that both parties to the transaction have perfect knowl-
edge of the risks posed by the release of chemical substances and the incremental
costs of reducing those releases. 47 In the case of toxic substances in the workplace
or the environment, information on the chronic hazards posed by these substances
is very expensive, and "perfect" knowledge is entirely unobtainable. 48 When large
uncertainties dominate attempts to assess the risks posed by toxic substances, 49
both sides of the bargaining process are likely to underestimate the true long term
costs of industrial illness and death. 50 Furthermore, in the case of two or more
sources of pollution, the absence of perfect knowledge about which source contrib-
utes how much additional risk to the neighbors further complicates an already
impossibly complex bargaining problem.5'
Second, collective action in the environmental pollution context involves high
"transaction" costs. 52 If, for example, the courts were to adopt a rule that polluters
may pollute with impunity, then affected neighbors could pay them to reduce pol-
lution. Yet, since each neighbor is damaged only a small amount, no individual
46. Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis by Regulatory Agencies. Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-70 (1980) (statement of R.W. Crandall, Senior Fellow, Brookings Insti-
tute)[hereinafter cited as Cost-Benefit Hearings]; W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS, THE CASE FOR
OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974); B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 291-92 (1980).
47. F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 22; B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 291.
48. See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 335-38 (1976); J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING
SAFETY 7-8 (1979); Zeckhauser & Nichols, supra note 45, at 178-79.
49. See generally American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); N. ASHFORD,supra note 48, at 332-33;
Cornell, Noll & Weingast, Safety Regulation, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE NEXT TEN YEARS
458-70 (1976); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Dscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques-
tions.. Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979).
50. Employers facing circumscribed planning horizons feel great pressures to emphasize short term
production over long term risk reduction. See generally McGarity & Schroeder, R'Ik-Orented Emp/oyment
Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1981). Employers will therefore tend to place unrealistically low
estimates on risks. Moreover, psychological studies in other low probability-high consequence contexts
where risks can be more objectively assessed indicate that individuals who expose themselves to risks of
death or serious bodily injury tend to underestimate the risks to themselves, perhaps in the belief that
"those horrible things only happen to the other guy." See, e.g., Arnold & Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation:
An Analysis of Market Failure, 12 BELL J. OF ECON. 27, 34-35 (1981); Zeckhauser & Nichols, supra note 45, at
178. Hence the short run tendency of both sides of the bargain is toward long run inefficiency and human
loss. See McGarity, Contending Approaches to Regulating Laboratory Safety, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 183, 200 (1980).
Moreover, since greater information about workplace risks can only lead to a higher probability that
workers will demand higher wages before encountering those risks, employers will have little incentive to
produce information on those risks.
51. The problem of multiple sources of chemical pollutants is not as relevant to worker protection
where the source of chemical contaminants is nearly always the employer's operations.
52. See generally R. STEWVART & J. KRIER, supra note 35, at 140-42; Coase, supra note 43, at 15-19;
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liabihty Rules, and Ina&nability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).
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would be willing to pay enough to reduce the pollution to a significant extent. All
would benefit from a collection from all of the neighbors that would then be paid
to the source of the pollution. Unfortunately, the cost of the collection system
might be very high, especially if, as the market paradigm would require, the "fee"
collected would vary with the amount of harm that each individual felt. Moreover,
a "free rider" could reap the benefits of the others' efforts without contributing to
the collection in the absence of an expensive legal mechanism to force contribu-
tions.53 The problem is the same if the opposite liability rule applies. If any dam-
aged party may acquire an injunction against the source, then the firm must seek
out and pay off all possible plaintiffs. The seeking-out process alone could be very
expensive. Moreover, since any plaintiff could "hold out" for more compensation
than the harm actually felt, it would be impossible to tell whether the holdout was
expressing his true disutility or merely being too greedy.
Third, the courts have not yet developed an adequate scheme of "rights" in
environmental entities.54 While the pollution source in a jurisdiction in which pol-
luters must pay will have to strike an acceptable deal with all humans that con-
sider themselves affected by its activities, it may damage nonhuman receptors with
impunity to the extent that no human is willing to make the nonhuman's disutility
his own.55 The utilitarian ideal is thus anthropocentric-it considers only human
utility.56
These practical limitations on the bargaining model have, with the possible
exception of the third objection, been well accepted by proponents of the market
paradigm. Few of the policy-oriented economists would suggest that the pollution
problem should be left to the unregulated marketplace, and only a few more
would leave the worker health problem to private negotiations between workers
and employers. There is, however, in addition to these practical limitations to the
bargaining model, a more serious and ultimately more damaging theoretical flaw in
the model. This theoretical flaw stems from the fact that the Coase theorem, as
applied to worker safety and pollution control problems where risks are relatively
high, is demonstrably wrong.
It is not true that the same amount of resources will be invested in pollution
control and worker safety under either liability rule. A neighbor might demand
much more in payment per unit of pollution reduction under the first rule (the
polluter must pay off neighbors) than he would pay to reduce pollution by the
same amount under the second rule (the neighbor must buy off the polluter). The
neighbor may not be able to afford the amount of pollution control that he would
really like because he is not wealthy. His own financial status, however, will not
53. See J. GREGOR, INTRA-URBAN MORTALITY AND AIR QUALITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
COSTS OF POLLUTION INDUCED MORTALITY 7 (1977) (EPA Socioeconomic Environmental Studies Series,
EPA 600/5-77-009); J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 29 (1977).
54. Cf Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
55. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objectj, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
450 (1972).
56. See Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J.
1315 (1974); see also Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974); Tribe, From
Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures. Learning ftom Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975).
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limit to the same extent the amount that he will request from the polluter if he has
a right to stop the pollution. In the second case the neighbor suffers a lost opportu-
nity to add resources to his existing steady-state stream of income and outgo. In
the first case he suffers a disruption of that steady state, and as the "right" involved
becomes increasingly more important, the neighbor suffers greater disruption. If
the neighbor is very wealthy, this disruption may be relatively inconsequential.
But if the neighbor is poor, then the price at which he is willing to buy a very
valuable right will very quickly reach a limit dictated by his impecunious circum-
stances. There is no reason to believe that a poor person values money any less
than a rich person when he has a valuable object to sell. 57 There is obviously good
reason to believe that a poor person will pay less than a rich person for safety if
they are both required to purchase that commodity. The practical end result is
that more commodities are produced from more polluting plants located near low
income neighborhoods under the first rule whereas fewer commodities are pro-
duced from less polluting plants more evenly distributed among the population
under the second. The current distribution of industrial activity with respect to
rich and poor should suggest which rule has often predominated in this country.
The same dichotomy applies to the workplace. The worker may demand more
for the risk of an industrial disease if he had a "right" to a workplace free of dis-
ease-causing chemicals than he would be willing to pay to be rid of the risk. The
fact that the employment relationship is regarded as consensual by the policy-
oriented economists motivates them to argue that wage premiums for hazardous
jobs would be the same under either rule. A worker has a "right" to as much
safety as he wants because he can shop around for a safer job if he does not care to
accept the wage premium that the employer is willing to offer. The fully informed
worker is willing to sell his health at precisely the price (or wage premium) which
the emloyer is willing to buy it. Laborers are laborers and not members of the
Board of Directors because they prefer risking their health to risking their
capital. 58
To state this proposition is to declare its implausibility. The wage premium
that an employer offers for hazardous work, if such a premium ever exists,59 is not
always determined by free parties in an open marketplace. For many low skill jobs
it is set by the unemployment rate and the level of desperation of currently
employed workers. The alternatives to a low skill, low income worker are too few
to support the argument that he freely accepts the employer's tradeoff between
safety and wages. The low skill worker "chooses" high risk employment in much
the same sense that a robbery victim "chooses" to part with his money-in both
57. Indeed, the more plausible assumption is precisely the opposite-a wealthy person probably
values an additional increment of wealth less highly than a poor person. Markovits makes much the same
point when he suggests that the demand for a particular policy may be "wealth elastic." Markovits, supra
note 37, at 819.
58. See F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 301 (1921) (alluding to "the disposition of
laboring people to gamble recklessly with life and limb as well as income").
59. Compare Chelius, The Control of Industrial Accidents." Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 700 (1974) with W. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF
MARKET PERFORMANCE ch. 12 (1979) and R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT
app. B (1976) (American Enterprises Inst., Wash., D.C.).
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cases, given the alternatives, it is the intelligent thing to do. There would probably
be higher wages, more safety, fewer manufactured commodities, and perhaps
greater unemployment in a system under which workers have a realistic "right" to
trade safety for wages.
In both the environmental and workplace contexts there are likely to be "ideo-
logical holdouts" who, under the "willingness to sell" rule, would be unwilling to
be bribed by the polluting entity at any price. Even a large copper company, for
example, might not have sufficient resources to meet the price that one of the
leaders of Earth First, 60 a radical environmental organization, would demand for
yielding up his right to stop the construction of a new copper smelter in an Idaho
wilderness area. Indeed, for some kinds of transactions we are all probably ideolog-
ical holdouts; there are some things that most of us are unwilling to sell at any
price. Characteristic examples are our general reluctance to become prostitutes or
to sell our votes. 6 1 Risks to health probably belong to this category of "not-for-
sale" aspects of personhood. I am unwilling to sell you my arm because I will not
be the same person after the transaction is completed. Not only would I be a one-
armed person, I would also be a person who has sold my arm. The same analysis
applies to the sale of a high risk to my arm or to the sale of a treasured environ-
mental entity. In both cases the price I would demand for the sale would be
higher than the amount that would compensate me if the arm or the entity were
lost due to an act of God because there is an added cost attributable to the very act
of selling something so intimately attached to self-identity.6 2
There is no reason to choose the "willingness to buy" or the "willingness to
sell" liability rule on "efficiency" grounds. 63 Professor Kennedy explains that the
efficiency criterion as applied to the externality problem is "incoherent. '64 If not
incoherent, the market paradigm is at best schizophrenic. It has two very different
personalities, and there is no "neutral" way to choose between the two. Yet, the
60. Cf Kaufmann, Earth Saving. Here Is a Gang of Real Environmental Extremists, AUDOBON, July 1982, at
116.
61. See S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? 54-77 (1981).
62. See Markovits, supra note 37, at 824 n.13.
63. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 388.
64. According to Professor Kennedy, "[T]he concept of efficiency is indeterminate-it cannot yield an
answer-if we try to apply it to the whole system of private law rules." Id.
Professor Markovits disputes Professor Kennedy's assertion that cost-benefit analysis is incoherent.
First, Markovits rejects the Kalder-Hicks "willingness to buy"-"willingness to sell" formulation of cost-
benefit analysis. Instead, Markovits asserts that the proper question to ask is whether the amount of money
required to make the "winners" as well off as the proposed policy exceeds the amount of money that would
have to be taken away from the "losers" to make them suffer as much as the implementation of the pro-
posed policy. See Markovits, supra note 37, at 815-18; R. Markovits, supra note 40. Interestingly none of
the policy-oriented economists of which I am aware have used this formulation of cost-benefit analysis,
even though it is, as Markovits demonstrates, a more realistic assessment of the real world.
Professor Markovits convincingly demonstrates that when his approach to cost-benefit analysis is
employed, it is normally neither incoherent nor biased in favor of the status quo. Nevertheless, Professor
Markovits concedes that cost-benefit analysis cannot yield a correct result (and is therefore, in my terms,
schizophrenic) when it is applied to cases where dollar costs and benefits are significantly affected by the
wealth of the winners and losers. This is precisely the case when the benefits of a regulation (or the costs of
a failure to regulate) are life saving in nature. In these cases a proper "Markovitsian" cost-benefit analysis
is likely to demonstrate that both the policy and its reversal are cost beneficial. The test is therefore inde-
terminate. When the policy merely reduces small risks to life, the test may be less indeterminate.
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analyst cannot prescribe even a hypothetical "best answer" to the externality
problem without first deciding which valuation rule should hold. This determina-
tion is quintessentially a political judgment. The "best answer" is therefore not
scientific or objective but necessarily ideological and highly dependent on the ana-
lyst's view of the status quo allocation of resources.
Health and environmental amenities are valuable societal resources, as are the
commodities that industrial processes produce. The market paradigm, if it func-
tions properly, maximizes overall societal wealth or allocative efficiency, but the
paradigm will yield different mixes of these two forms of wealth, depending upon
how the political system allocates "rights."
This final defect in the "bargaining" model is more than merely a practical
problem for which a "second best" solution can be hypothesized. Policy analysts
have tools for factoring uncertainty, transaction costs, and incommensurables into
a utilitarian equation with varying degrees of analytical validity. Each of these
tools, however, ultimately depends upon the analyst's political choice between the
"willingness to pay" and "willingness to sell" criteria for valuing health and envi-
ronmental resources. Its dependency on this political choice is a fundamental
theoretical flaw in the market paradigm with profound implications for any
attempts to guide health and environmental regulation toward that ideal.
B. The Tort System and the Market Paradigm
Tort law is a form of indirect government intervention into the marketplace
that has the potential to reinforce the bargaining model by ensuring that firms and
their consumers compensate employees and neighbors for damage that their activi-
ties cause. In addition to compensating those actually harmed, the threat of future
payouts can provide an immediate inducement to firms to invest in risk reduction
technologies. Yet, despite this indirect incentive, the tort system in practice does
not produce the results dictated by the market paradigm.
A variety of compensation systems are available to those who have been
injured by industrial activities. Neighboring landowners and government entities
may sue to abate private or public nuisances. 6 5 Similarly, those who suffer phys-
ical harm from exposure to toxic substances may sue, alleging negligence or strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 66 Employees, in addition, may press
claims against employers in workers compensation proceedings. 67 All of these
compensation systems, however, share one crucial element-they all require the
claimant to establish a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the
65. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS ch. 15 (1971); W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch.
2 (1977).
66. See generall W. PROSSER, supra note 65, chs. 5, 13. Employees faced severe obstacles at common
law in establishing a cause of action based upon these two theories. At common law employers could raise
the "unholy trinity" of defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant
rule. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundary & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); 11 A. LARSON,
LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 4.30-50 (1978). Workers compensation statutes were
enacted to reduce those barriers to employee recovery. However, it has been argued that the "unholy
trinity" defenses reappear in different forms in workers compensation proceedings. See, e.g., D. BERMAN,
DEATH ON THE JOB 66-67 (1978).
67. See I A. LARSON, supra note 66, ch. 5.
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claimant's harm.68 This causation requirement poses the same practical problems
as the "full knowledge" assumption of the bargaining model.
When the causal link between an individual's exposure to an acutely toxic sub-
stance and resulting harm can be established with an adequate degree of certainty
to convince a judge or jury to compensate the injured party,69 the threat of poten-
tial liability has been a strong inducement to polluters and employers to reduce or
eliminate acute health risks.70 Claimants have much greater difficulty, however,
establishing a sufficient causal link between past exposure to a chemical substance
and a present chronic ideopathic disease."1 Even if adequate epidemiological or
laboratory studies demonstrated a causal relationship between a substance and
harm to human beings or environmental species, it would not follow that any indi-
vidual plaintiff could establish that exposure to the chemical caused identifiable
harm to his person or property. 72 Courts generally require the plaintiff to present
expert testimony that the defendant's conduct "probably" caused the plaintiffs
harm.7 3 Only where the cause-effect relationship is especially well established-as
in the case of acute damage, very rare chemically induced diseases,7 4 and
68. See W. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 41; Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60
(1956).
69. See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (nuisance action for damage
caused by lead and sulfur oxides); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 487, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (strict liability
for personal injuries due to hydrocyanic acid); Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1979) (strict
liability for fish kill); Roessler & Hasslacher Chem. Co. v. Doyle, 73 N.J.L. 521, 64 A. 156 (1906) (nuisance
for personal injuries due to sodium cyanide).
70. Systematic worker exposure to acutely toxic chemicals that threaten immediate death or serious
bodily injury is virtually nonexistent in the United States today. One important exception is the exposure
of farmworkers to acutely toxic pesticides. See S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 291-92 (1979).
Although EPA ensures that the labels for acutely toxic pesticides specify appropriate field reentry times,
these are not always observed in practice. OSHA has yet to promulgate effective farmworker protection
standards. See Comment, Farmworkers inJeopardy: OSHA, EPA and Pesticides, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 69 (1975).
Many kinds of workers are, however, systematically exposed to substances that pose high risks of low
consequence harms, such as contact dermatitis. NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF FARMWORKERS ORGANIZA-
TIONS, PESTICIDE DESK REFERENCE (second draft 1980). The tort system apparently fails here not
because of problems of establishing causation but because the high costs of entry into the compensation
system preclude suits for the relatively small damage recoveries that can be had for such injuries.
Acute environmental risks have likewise been reduced, though not as much as human health risks.
While incidences of large fish kills and air pollution-induced deforestation seem to be declining, air and
water pollution still generate a large number of common law nuisance suits based upon easily established
causal relationships.
71. See Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientiic Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 371, 371-88 (1974); Comment,Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal and Scientift Proof of Cancer Causation, 3
COLUM. J. ENV. L. 344 (1977).
72. See generally Small, Gafing at a Thing Called Cause, 31 TEx. L. REV. 630 (1953).
73. See, e.g., Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939); Comment,supra note 71,
at 367, 371.
Although the causation requirement in a workers compensation proceeding is somewhat less stringent,
see generally I A. LARSON, supra note 66, § 1, workers must still show more than a mere possibility that their
physical harm resulted from exposure to a particular industrial chemical unless the legislature has already
recognized the statistical causal relationship and erected a statutory presumption of causation. See Miller
v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1960); Miller v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966). See generally Comment, supra note 71, at 355-68.
74. The courts are beginning to allow plaintiffs to attempt to convince the factfinder that exposure to
asbestos causes mesothelioma. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); see
also Comment, Asbestos Litigation.- The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978-79).
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extremely well studied chemicals that emanate from very few sources, 7 5-will the
courts be willing to allow the plaintiff's case to go to the factfinder.7 6
Even when causation can be established, the multiplaintiff lawsuit presents the
same transaction costs problem that plagues the bargaining model. In many cases
of acute and chronic exposure, no single person has suffered sufficient harm to
make it worth his while to sue the defendant. Theoretically, all of the plaintiffs can
join together in a single lawsuit, but the costs of bringing and keeping them
together are sufficiently high that the lawsuit often never happens.7 7 The class
action lawsuit is a potential solution to this dilemma,7 8 but the courts have not
been receptive to innovative uses of the class action tool and have erected sufficient
procedural barriers to render the device ineffectual.
79
Another disadvantage of relying on the tort system to correct for spillovers is its
passive character. A plaintiff can only with great difficulty persuade a court to
enjoin risky conduct before the plaintiff has suffered actual injury. While the
threat of future damage payouts should theoretically induce firms to reduce risks
75. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (smoking and
lung cancer). Even when cause-effect relationships can be established for chronic diseases, statutes of limi-
tations in some states may preclude recovery for diseases that manifest themselves many years after the
disease-producing event. See Harwood, Accrual Dilemma. Statute of Limitations in Hazardous Waste Cases, 45
ALBANY L. REV. 717 (1981); Comment, Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitations. Resolving Relevanl
Pohcy Coals, 10 ENVTL. L. 113 (1979).
76. The causation problem is exacerbated in environmental pollution cases involving multiple defend-
ants. Even when a cause-effect relationship between a particular chemical and a health or environmental
effect is well established, the tort system may be unable adequately to sort out which of several firms
emitting that substance into an airshed or watershed should be liable for how much damage. While
modern courts will generally not allow one of the many polluters to escape liability on the ground that the
plaintiff has failed to trace his or her harm directly back to that firm's discharge, see, e.g., Michie v. Great
Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974); Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Dis-
posal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952), they still have difficulty apportioning the damage among
the various defendants. The most commonly applied rule is a simple equal division of the damages among
the joint tortfeasors, even if one contributed a great deal more to the pollution than another. See W.
PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 385 (1976); UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1(b), 2, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). More recent cases in the
product liability area divide up liability according to market share. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). It is not clear that either of these
approaches sends the correct signals to the polluters, although any signal is better than no signal at all.
77. H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1010.1b, .2h (1977); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
24-25, 349-350 (1972); Dewees, Prichard & Trebilcock, An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class
Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUDIES 155 (1981); Note, Notice Cost Problems Under Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) after
Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 1979 DUKE L.J. 882.
78. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1782 (1969); Lamm &
Davison, Environmental Class Actions Seeking Damages, 16 ROCKY MT. L. INST. 59 (1971); Parsons & Starr,
Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions.- The Unrealzed Viabtiity of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881
(1975); Comment, The Federal Class Action in Environmental Litigation. Problems and Possbihities, 51 N.C.L.
REV. 1385 (1973).
79. Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (plaintiff should normally bear the costs
of identifying absentee class members); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (diversity suit
may not proceed as a class action when the named plaintiffs meet the jurisdictional amount requirement
but the unnamed members of the class do not); Note, Class Actions-Failure of Unnamed Plaintit to Meet
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement Bars Class Action, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 497 (1974).
Even if the courts were willing to entertain huge class action lawsuits against multiple defendants, the
kind of lawsuit necessary to internalize large externalities effectively could reach such gigantic proportions
that it would exceed the capacity of a single judge. See, e.g., Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971) (class action suit on behalf of all residents of Los Angeles County
against 293 industrial corporations and municipalities accused of polluting the air).
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up to the point at which current expenditures equal the present value of future
payouts, the hit-or-miss nature of tort damage awards and the circumscribed plan-
ning horizons of today's corporate management combine to produce management
decisions that underinvest in health and environmental controls. It is, in other
words, very difficult to induce the tort system to administer that necessary ounce of
prevention. 80
The tort system thus faces numerous practical obstacles to bringing about the
result that the bargaining model would reach in the ideal world.8 In addition,
tort theory does not necessarily impel the tort system toward that result. Except for
the relatively rare case in which a court will enjoin a nuisance,8 2 the tort system
begins with the premise that the polluter or employer has a "right" to expose
others to risks. Among its other goals, tort law seeks to encourage polluters and
employers to optimize those risks.
In some cases of very hazardous conduct the tort rule is that the entrepreneur
must pay for all damages caused by the enterprise.8 3 The source will therefore
expend money on pollution control or worker safety up to the point that the last
dollar spent on controls brings about a dollar's worth of reduced future damage
payouts, discounted to present value. The source will elect to pay future damages
at this point rather than waste resources cleaning up pollution and the workplace
more than it is worth.
The same result will be reached, in theory, under a negligence rationale. 84
Under the famous negligence formula first articulated by Judge Learned Hand, a
defendant should be required to pay for a nonnegligent plaintiff's loss only when
the risks posed by its conduct (the probability of harm multiplied by the conse-
quences) exceed the cost of avoiding those risks.8 5 This formula, of course, is
simply the balancing test of the bargaining model written in tort law. 86 The pol-
80. The tort system also requires the judiciary as an institution to make difficult balancing decisions
concerning the extent to which the costs of development should be borne by the sources and receptors of
the unwanted by-products of industrial activities. To leave the entire matter to the tort system is to place a
huge responsibility in the hands of persons who are ultimately unaccountable to the democratic process.
Society might legitimately determine that these sensitive questions should not be decided on an ad hoc
basis by unelected and unresponsible judges. Moreover, since many issues that would be expected to arise
in most "toxic torts" suits will involve complicated questions of toxicology and ecology, judges and lay
juries may not be in the best position to evaluate the competing scientific claims.
81. R. POsNER,supra note 77, ch. 23; A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 102-03 (1982).
82. An injunction flatly prohibiting conduct causing a nuisance is an available remedy in a common
law nuisance action, but in most cases the court will either award damages or "balance the equities" and
order the defendant to implement technologically feasible abatement efforts. See W. RODGERS, supra note
65, at 143-50.
83. See W. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 78.
84. In practice the private nuisance action, which is generally more appropriate to environmental
disruption, is similar. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del
E. Webb, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); W. RODGERS, supra note 65, at 107-12. The defendant is subject to abate-
ment or damages only if its use of its property is unreasonable in the context of the surrounding activities.
W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 596-602; W. RODGERS supra note 65, at 117-21; see supra note 82.
85. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
86. Using the same utilitarian analysis, Professor Calabresi maintains that the goal of the tort system
is to minimize the sum of accident costs and accident avoidance costs. This offers a mechanism for choos-
ing among several alternative rules (or technologies), all of which meet the cost-benefit criterion. Calabresi
would place all of the costs of a particular accident on that party who could best minimize the sum of
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luter or employer will, under this rule, invest in cleanup equipment up to the point
at which a court holds him to be nonnegligent. But this is precisely what he would
have invested under a strict liability rule because the negligence formula cuts off
liability at the precise point at which costs exceed risks. The only difference
between the two rules is that the defendant must still compensate plaintiffs for the
damages that occur despite its control efforts under the strict liability rule, whereas
it may force plaintiffs to bear those losses under the negligence rule. The
defendant only has to pay damages under the negligence rule when a court or jury
later finds that it has made an error in its calculations.
As in the case of the pure bargaining model, the ideal tort model results in the
optimum amount of resources spent on pollution control and worker health. Nev-
ertheless, the crucial ambiguity that haunts the bargaining model likewise afflicts
the tort model. The polluter's optimization decision (and the court's determina-
tion under the negligence formula) depends upon an accurate measurement of the
damage caused by pollution discounted by the probability that the damage will
occur at various levels of exposure. But what is the measure of the damage? Is it
the amount the victims are willing to pay to be rid of the damage or is it the
amount they would charge one who would inflict it upon them? The "willingness
to buy"/"willingness to sell" ambiguity remains. Like the bargaining model, the
ideal tort model is schizophrenic. Neither measure is logically more appropriate.
At first glance, the real world tort system appears to adopt the "willingness to
pay" measure of damage. A wrongful death award is usually calculated by refer-
ence to the lost wages and services of the decedent. This amount is, of course, all
that the decedent could possibly have paid for the right to remain alive had he
been able to strike a deal with the defendant that would have prevented his death.
The decedent, however, probably would have demanded a great deal more in
return for his life had he the power to prevent the defendant from taking it.
Similarly, if the plaintiff is maimed, she may recover for medical expenses, out
of pocket expenses such as lost wages, and permanent disability and disfigurement.
Most plaintiffs who could afford it would pay at least this much to avoid the
damage altogether, assuming (as we must) that the defendant had a "right" to
inflict it upon him. Some plaintiffs, however, could not afford to pay the
defendant this amount. Thus, to the extent that the tort system requires that it be
paid anyway (and to the extent that it is included on the risk side of the negligence
formula), then the tort model in practice is departing from the "willingness to
pay" version of the bargaining model.
The real world tort system also allows a damaged plaintiff to recover for pain
and suffering. This type of recovery goes far beyond the "value" of the plaintiff in
any market-determined sense, except to the extent that a suffering person is not as
productive as one who is not in pain. While we all are willing to pay dearly to
avoid pain and suffering, some of us are able to afford less pain-avoidance than
others. Once again, to the extent that this element enters into the risk side of the
accident costs and accident avoidance costs. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTs: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 133-40 (1970).
Page 159: Summer 1983]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
calculation, the result reached by the tort system more closely resembles that
reached by the "willingness to sell" version of the bargaining model.
In other subtle ways, the tort system in practice orients its outcome toward the
"willingness to sell" criteria. The trial court delegates the balancing function in
most negligence cases to a lay jury.8 7 The court does not tell the jury to apply the
knowledgeable buyer or the knowledgeable seller criterion to the hypothetical bar-
gain between the plaintiff and the defendant; nor, in most cases, does it tell the
jury to balance the utility of the defendant's conduct against the risks to the plain-
tiff or the class of potential plaintiffs. 8 The courts reject the market paradigm
altogether. The jury is told only to measure the defendant's conduct against that
of a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances.8 9 This instruction
gives the jury a great deal of discretion to apply factors, such as the relative wealth
of the parties, that the policy-oriented economist would condemn as irrelevant.
Moreover, the tort system allows the jury, within bounds set by the supervising
judiciary, to evaluate the defendant's conduct under a moral, as well as a utilita-
rian, standard. Thus, we observe a jury assessing damages for a single plaintiff in
the Pinto litigation against Ford Motor Company equal to the amount saved by
the company in making its "cold blooded" decision to subject its customers to an
increased probability of future deaths rather than expend fifty dollars per auto for
additional protection. It will be a rare jury indeed that will accept an automobile
manufacturer's a priori calculation of the costs and benefits of the preservation of
human life when presented with a dead or severely maimed plaintiff. Further-
more, in cases of intentional or grossly negligent misconduct, the tort system in
most states gives the jury the express option to "punish" the defendant for its
moral fault by assessing punitive or exemplary damages against the defendant. 9°
This is an explicit recognition of the decisionmaker's role as a moral faultfinder as
well as a risk and benefit assessor.
While the policy-oriented economist might condemn all of this as irrational, it
may very well represent a rough approximation of a "rational" assessment of the
net utility and costs of the defendant's conduct under the market paradigm but
applying the "willingness to sell" rather than "willingness to pay" criterion. 9'
87. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837); F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS
159 (1933); L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 160-70 (1930); C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS
49 (1980); Reynolds, The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the "Odtous Creature" 23 OKLA.
L. REV. 410 (1970).
88. In some formulations of the standard for strict product liability, juries are told explicitly to eval-
uate risks and benefits of the product at issue. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fruehauff Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1145
(5th Cir. 1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Tex. 1979); Green, Strict Liabil'ty
Under Sections 4024 and 402B: A Decade of Litgaton, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1976).
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 206; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965).
90. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 9.
91. A more common alternative explanation for the tort system's failure in practice to reach results
dictated by the bargaining model is that most of us are willing to sacrifice allocative efficiency when it
conflicts with justice. See R. DWARKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Dwarkin, Why-Efficzency?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). The tort system should be aimed at achieving just results rather than
efficient results. In suggesting that the tort system might be achieving an "efficient" result under the
"willingness to sell" test, which recognizes the plaintiff's "right" not to be harmed, I do not mean to suggest
that justice should play no role. Indeed, justice may in many cases not involving large physical loss dictate
results different from those arrived at through application of the "willingness to sell" test. My intent here is
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Since the economist is no better qualified than the rest of us to make this choice,
disapproval of the current tort system may reflect political views about the relative
statuses of industrial activity and other human activity. Thus, the current appeals
from industry and some economists to reform the tort system 92 may not be moti-
vated by a desire to implement a more rational system; rather, they may be viewed
as calls for a different system in which manufacturers and other defendants do not
pay as much to avoid damage to others.
C. Health and Environmental Regulation and the Market Paradigm
Government regulation can to some extent remedy the defects in the tort
system and the pure bargaining model. A regulatory regime would not require the
causal link between a chemical and a particular disease to be established with
nearly the particularity of the tort system because the regulatory system addresses
overall societal risks rather than individual damage. The regulatory entity can use
broad epidemiological studies and animal experiments to draw conclusions about
the nature and extent of the health and environmental harm attributable to the
release of a substance into the workplace or the environment. The regulator can
often anticipate potential problems in advance and attempt to remedy them
before human beings and environmental entities are harmed, perhaps irreversibly.
A regulatory regime can offer direct incentives that should considerably broaden
societal and individual firm planning horizons. The regulator can also solve the
multiplaintiff, multidefendant transaction costs problem by acting as a surrogate
for all injured parties and by framing generic controls or incentives that affect all
firms discharging harmful substances. A regulatory agency can acquire in-house
expertise to aid it in resolving questions of scientific fact and separating resolvable
questions of fact from policy or value questions. Finally, the regulatory entity can
be placed closer to the political process than the courts, thus ensuring greater polit-
ical accountability.
Many policy-oriented economists, agreeing that a regulatory system helps
resolve many of the practical problems of the bargaining model and the tort
system, still argue that the market paradigm should dictate the regulatory
results. 93 Society is best off, according to these economists, when the marginal
dollar expended on health and environmental control achieves exactly one dollar's
worth of health and environmental benefit. 94 When more than one of many tech-
only to suggest that even those unwilling to ignore considerations of justice and/or fairness in prescribing a
tort system are still making a political statement when they measure the existing system according to the
"willingness to pay" test.
92. See H.R. 7921, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); see also O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State ofthe
Art: Terminologv, Practce and Reform, II AKRON L. REV. 627 (1978).
93. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 71; Comar, S0 2 Regulation Ignores Costs, Poor
Science Base, 57 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Apr. 23, 1979, at 42, 46; Lave & Seskin, Neither Cynical nor Idealitic
View is Sound Basis for Pocy, 57 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Apr. 23, 1979, at 49.
94. See M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE 15 (1980); Breyer, supra note 38, at 570; Chelius, supra
note 59, at 701-02; Freeman, Air and Water Pollution Poliy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 12, 19-20 (P. Portney ed. 1978); Solow, The Economist's Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173
SCIENCE 498 (1971).
Some economists would also add that the costs of imposing a control should include administrative or
enforcement costs borne by the government as well as the costs that the regulated entities must pay to
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nological solutions can meet this criterion, society should choose that solution
which minimizes the sum total of the cost of the damages remaining after imple-
mentation of the technology and the cost of implementing the technology. 95 By
carefully balancing control costs against health and environmental benefits,
society maximizes the total output of goods and services and puts each resource to
its best use.96 Thus, in the context of health and environmental regulation, the
policy-oriented economist suggests that immediate regulatory goals be determined
by cost-benefit analysis.
This simple utilitarian notion has a firm foundation in plain common sense. 97
It is not sensible to spend more on pollution control than it is worth. Health and
environmental quality, in this view, are collective economic commodities that
society pays for just as it pays for streets, police protection, and fire prevention.98
As with these other commodities, there is an optimum amount of industrial and
pollution-induced disease, harm to environmental organisms, and damage to
material that health and environmental regulators should attempt to achieve.99
This optimum can be derived through a careful cost-benefit balancing process. To
spend more than the optimal amount of resources on pollution control is, in the
policy-oriented economist's engaging metaphor, to reduce the size of the total eco-
nomic pie.
1. Practical Limitatzwns. In the context of health and environmental regulation,
one will discover once again that numerous practical difficulties hobble attempts
to accommodate the bargaining paradigm to real world problems. Since these
practical limitations are treated in great detail in the policy analysis literature, 1° °
comply with the regulation. Cost-Benefit Hearings, supra note 46, at 326 (statement of M.L. Weidenbaum).
Whether this is a legitimate component of the cost of regulatory intervention is as much a question of
ideology as of analytical correctness. In the common law, the costs of maintaining the judiciary are gener-
ally borne by the state. In some cases, however, they are imposed on the polluting source. This would
argue for putting the costs of the regulatory system on the benefits side of the ledger as one of the costs of
controlling the harms which the source would otherwise freely impose on the rest of society.
95. See N. ASHFORD, supra note 48, at 328-29; Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 669, 670 (1974).
96. Seskin & Lave, Health Benefits Exceed by 70% Costs to Control Stationary Source 4ir Pollution, 57 CHEM.
& ENG'G NEws, Apr. 23, 1979, at 38 ("In particular, when society's scarce resources are allocated among
competing government programs or private production and consumption additional resources should go to
those activities that will produce the greatest social benefits. There is no alternative to evaluating the
additional benefits flowing from devoting additional resources to competing activities."); W. BAXTER, supra
note 46, at 27 ("If individuals in a society are free to engage in whatever exchanges of resources are mutu-
ally satisfactory for themselves then, at least in theory, every resource in the society will be deployed in the
way that yields the greatest possible human satisfaction."); see also J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 53, at
31.
97. See Freeman, supra note 94, at 19; Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev.
1393, 1394 (1981) (citing Ruff, supra note 9).
98. See Cost-Benefit Hearings, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Rep. Lent: "The cost of this regulation
hits the citizen in his capacity both as a taxpayer and a consumer. Its costs add to inflation and signifi-
cantly cut back on the amount of disposable income every American earns."); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE,
supra note 18, at 69; Chelius, supra note 59, at 701; Leone & Jackson, The Political Economy of Federal Regula-
tory Activity: The Case of Water Pollution Controls, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATING 239 (G. Fromm ed.
1981).
99. See M. BAILEY, supra note 94, at 23.
100. See, e.g., M. GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENE-
FITS OF FEDERAL HEALTH/SAFETY ENFORCEMENT (1979); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis
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they can be briefly summarized here. The following discussion will pay particular
attention to the practical problems of health and environmental regulation of the
chemical industry. As it happens, the chemical industry poses some of the more
intractable real world obstacles to the successful implementation of a balancing
approach.
a. Quantiytng Costs. Quantifying the costs of regulatory intervention is the
simplest of the tasks facing the regulatory entity. It need only sum the forecasted
costs of implementing various levels of pollution control. Numerous practical
problems, however, plague even this conceptually simple operation. The informa-
tion necessary to perform these forecasts is very costly, and large predictive uncer-
tainties accompany the calculations. Engineers must estimate the costs of various
pollution reduction technologies for all of the firms discharging a particular chem-
ical substance into a relevant body of air or water. The engineers must further
predict the effects of the installation of the alternative technologies on receiving
media quality so that the regulatory entity can know the total cost of each level of
media quality. °'0 This operation requires both a prediction of the end-of-pipe pol-
lution concentrations resulting from each technology and the development and
application of a pollutant dispersion model capable of converting end-of-pipe con-
centrations to steady-state ambient concentrations. For some pollutants in some
media, such models already exist,' 0 2 but they are plagued by large uncertainties.'0 3
For other media, such as ground water, dispersion and fate models are still in
relatively primitive stages of development, 0 4 and the huge uncertainties sur-
rounding them make them virtually useless for relating the costs of pollution con-
for Health, Safey and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Rodgers, Benefits,
Costs, and Risks. Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
101. If more than one firm discharges a pollutant into the relevant media so that the discharges of all
firms overlap, the informational costs of assessing the costs of various levels of media quality are further
exacerbated. Fortunately, one characteristic of the chemical industry is that this condition is not often met.
Hence, the assessment of pollution control costs for a given body of air or water reduces simply to an
assessment of a single firm's costs. In cases of multiple polluters, however, the assessment of costs is vastly
more difficult. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. INTEREST 69, 76 (1970).
102. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R.
§ 51 (1980). Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), illustrates some of the disputes that can occur
over the accuracy of such models.
103. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Cost and Economic Impact Assessment for Alterna-
tive Levels of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone 1-7 (Draft Report June 1978):
"Depending on the [modeling] technique used, wide variations can result in allowable emission levels and
the concomitant reduction in projected emissions that is required [to meet alternative ambient air quality
standards for ozone]." Table I-I in the Economic Impact Assessment Document for Ozone dramatically
demonstrates the sensitivity of cost estimates to the choice of the reduction model. For example, the linear
rollback dispersion model yields estimated costs of $6 billion to $8 billion for meeting a 0.08 ppm ozone
standard while the empirical kinetic modeling approach yields estimated costs of $9 to 12.5 billion for the
same standard. While both of these models are reasonably sophisticated, the choice between them depends
upon one's assumptions about air dispersion modeling. Clearly, large uncertainties cloud the application
of even those reasonably well accepted models. Even larger uncertainties can be expected with water
quality modeling, which is at a more primitive stage of development. However, the fact that only one
source need be considered for the discharge of toxic pollutants from chemical industry may simplify mod-
eling assumptions.
104. Rose-Ackerman, Efikwnt Charges: A Critique, 6 CAN. J. OF ECON. 512, 518 (1973); A. KNEESE &
C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 17.
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trol to levels of media quality.1 0 5
Another factor on the costs side of the equation that severely confounds any
attempt at marginal analysis is the limited supply of pollution control technologies
that are available to firms over relevant time periods. A particular source or cate-
gory of sources may have only two or three realistic pollution control options, each
of which yields a particular level of receiving media quality. "Turning down" the
pollution control machine may be impossible or may not significantly reduce
overall operating and maintenance costs. In other words, control technologies may
often come in discrete and nontunable units. 0 6 Once a firm has installed a partic-
ular technology, any greater reduction in pollution may be achievable only by
installing the next most effective equipment, and any lesser reduction may be
impossible short of turning off the technology.° 7
If it is difficult to fine-tune pollution reduction systems to meet specific limita-
tions, it may be impossible to set a limitation at precisely the point at which costs
equal benefits. Figure 1 provides a hypothetical example of a costs-versus-pollu-
tion reduction curve and a benefits-versus-pollution-reduction curve. The benefits
curve is a simplified linear curve. The costs curve illustrates the technological
105. "While reasonably adequate engineering models exist relating discharges to ambient water qual-
ity, cost data are generally weak and fragmentary." F ose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 389.
In addition, the ability of a single technology to reduce concentrations of more than one chemical can
be a benefit that is not accounted for in a proceeding involving the costs and benefits of reducing exposure
to an individual pollutant. The regulatory entity may simultaneously or within a short period of time
regulate several pollutants within a single firm's discharge. It is certainly possible (and for some pollutants
likely) that a single technology is capable of reducing discharges or emissions of many pollutants at the
same time. See Development Documents for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Inor-
ganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category (Proposed), Environmental Protection Agency 137
(1980). For example, in the nickel sulfate subcategory, alkaline precipitation with dual media filtration
will remove some nickel, copper, chromium, antimony, zinc, and lead. Id at 771. Similarly, secondary
treatment can apparently remove numerous organic toxics from effluent wastes. Implementation of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.- Hearings on Regulation and Monitoring of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Review of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. XV (1980) (summary of hearings) [hereinafter cited as Implementation
Hearings]; SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT 49 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereafter cited as PROHLMAN REPORT]. If a single technology can
remove more than one pollutant, that additional benefit may not be factored into the cost-benefit balance
for a single pollutant. It would therefore be inappropriate to list the entire cost of installing the single
technology (or perhaps minor modifications of a single technology) in the cost estimation for each of the
individual pollutants.
106. "On the basis of what we already know, it is difficult to agree that the shapes of air pollution cost
and abatement functions are linear, as implied by Kneese." Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution. Central
Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 229 (1968). Some technologies, such as scrubbers, can be tuned
to some extent to reach a spectrum of emission concentrations. See 1 U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Proceedings: Symposium on Gas Desulfurization 43-58 (1978).
107. For example, it is becoming apparent that the "secondary treatment"-activated sludge,
trickling filters, and other minor variations on this theme-which has been required for publicly owned
treatment works and for many firms as part of EPA's "best practicable technology" effluent limitations, is
capable of removing more than 90% of some toxic organics. Implementation Hearings, supra note 105, at 43
(statement of Walter E. Garrison, Chief Engineer and General Manager, County Sanitation District, Los
Angeles County). Lesser technologies remove much lower percentages of these pollutants. Hence,
assuming only a single source in a relevant body of water, the cost side of the cost-benefit equation will not
vary from some high level of ambient water concentration to that much lower level reached by 90%
removal. The choice for the regulatory entity is therefore "all or nothing," even if the benefits side of the
equation warranted expenditures less than secondary treatment but greater than less effective treatments.
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options available to a source on the assumption that technologies are discrete and
nontunable. The broken curve is the curve that would presumably exist if technol-
ogies were nondiscrete and tunable. In the real world of discrete technologies, it
would appear worthwhile to install technologies A and B but not technology C.
The benefits of installing technology B are 6.5 million dollars while the cost is only
five million dollars. Technology C is too expensive because thirteen million dollars
in expenditures yields only ten million dollars in benefits. It would be ideal to
install a technology that cost $8.75 million and produced $8.75 million in benefits,
but unfortunately, that technology does not exist. The regulatory entity is there-
fore likely to settle for technology B. Since the costs of installing technologies
capable of reducing pollution by a given amount rise dramatically with the overall
amount of pollution reduction, the cost-benefit based approach may result in a
systematic bias toward underprotection. 0
Finally, an accurate assessment of the costs of a spectrum of possible regulatory
controls would require some measurement of secondary economic effects such as
anticompetitive and employment effects.' 0 9 While it would be irresponsible for the
regulatory entity to ignore these effects, their very amorphous nature will provide
substantial leeway to hinge its cost estimates on untestable assumptions.' 10 More-
over, any assessment of costs must depend heavily upon input from the regulated
firms. It would be unrealistic to expect that a firm's cost projections will not be
affected by the purpose for which the regulatory entity plans to use the projec-
tions.l 1 1 Hence, both primary and secondary costs may be biased against regula-
tory intervention.
In sum, the estimates of the costs side of the cost-benefit equation will in most
cases be highly dependent upon the scientific assumptions that underlie the disper-
sion model that the agency chooses and the economic assumptions behind cost
predictions. The uncertainties inherent in these calculations provide great leeway
for the regulatory entity. Since regulated firms can be expected to participate fully
in the cost-assessment process, the regulatory entity must either vigilantly police
industry-submitted cost estimates or independently produce its own. If it chooses
the former alternative, it must acknowledge that its estimates are likely to gravi-
tate toward the high side.
b. Quantinyz Risks. The uncertainties that plague the regulatory entity's
attempts to quantify costs pale into insignificance when measured against the
uncertainties inherent in assessing the benefits side of the equation. The quantita-
tive study of risks posed by human exposure to environmental contaminants is still
108. If a particular industry contained enough firms, many individual cost curves might aggregate
into a single smooth upwardly sloping curve common to the economics literature. Nevertheless, the sources
of a particular chemical within the chemical industry are likely to be sufficiently few that a smooth aggre-
gate curve will not result. Indeed, since a given technology for removing particular pollutants has about
the same capital costs for any firm, the only variability among firms is likely to be in installation and
operation and maintenance costs. The aggregate curve for a small number of sources may therefore look
much like the curve for an individual source.
109. See Leone & Jackson, supra note 98, at 232.
110. Id. at 233.
111. See Baram, supra note 100, at 483, 490.
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in a state of awkward infancy.' 1 2 Even the comparatively straightforward assess-
ment of the toxicological properties of a particular environmental contaminant is
fraught with uncertainty. Epidemiological studies are notoriously inconclusive, as
the continuing disputes over the health effects of beryllium and benzene amply
demonstrate. 113 Animal studies can provide advance information on the toxico-
logical effects of a chemical, but cost considerations usually preclude testing an
adequate number of animals at environmentally relevant dose levels.' 1 4 Hence
attempts to extrapolate human risks from animal studies must make untestable
assumptions about interspecies extrapolations' 1 5 and about the shape of the dose-
response curve for the chemical at low exposure levels.' 16 Finally, uncertainties
arise in attempts to ascertain actual human exposure to environmental contami-
nants. 117 The net result is that risk assessments can vary over nine orders of magni-
tude, depending upon the assumptions that fuel the models." 8
The science of assessing the risks that pollutants pose to nonhuman species and
materials is also imprecise and fraught with uncertainty." 19 Yet these effects, too,
must be factored into any reasonable cost-benefit analysis of mandated pollution
controls, 120 thus enlarging the overall margin of uncertainty. The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act has spurred a large number of commendable efforts to
include small effects on ecosystems in the analysis of governmental activities, and
this knowledge is now available to regulatory decisionmakers. Still, environmental
112. For the author's analysis of the scientific and policy debates surrounding "science/policy" issues
arising out of carcinogen regulation see McGarity, supra note 49.
113. See McGarity, supra note 49, at 740-41; see also Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential
Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 5,009 (1980).
114. See McGarity, supra note 49, at 733-34; Schneiderman, Mantel & Brown, From Mouse to Man-Or
How to Get From the Laboratory to Park Avenue and 59th Street, 246 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 237, 241
(1975).
115. See McGarity, supra note 49, at 743-45; Wood, Interrelations of Humans, Dogs and Rodents, 176 ScI-
ENCE 437 (1972).
116. See Leape, Qualitiate Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. EN\rL. L.
REV. 86, 100-01 (1980); McGarity, supra note 49, at 734-35. I have placed the issue of high dose-low dose
extrapolation models in a category of science/policy questions that Dr. Alvin Weinberg calls "trans-scien-
tific." These are questions which "hang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet
whiCh cannot be answered by science. " Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
117. McGarity, supra note 49, at 738; see also supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. The problem
of determining human exposure in the workplace is not an especially difficult one. In most cases, the
chemical concentrations in the actual workplace can be monitored relatively easily. However, determining
human exposure to environmental contaminants is much more difficult. For air pollutants the calculation
requires at least an adequate dispersion model and, for chemicals like lead, an assessment of alternative
pathways, such as ingestion or dermal exposure, in addition to the more usual inhalation exposure. For
persistent water pollutants the calculation is extraordinarily complex, requiring an adequate dispersion
model, an assessment that the contaminant will become part of a drinking water supply, an assessment of
the exposure to various organisms as the chemical makes its way up the food chain, and a prediction of the
amount that will ultimately find its way into the human food supply.
118. Comment, The Sgn fiant Rirk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens. Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. REV. 551 (1981).
119. Baram,supra note 100, at 483; Gelpe & Tarlock,supra note 71, at 371.
120. For one extensive, though in many ways dissatisfying, effort to quantify the benefits of attaining
alternative levels of sulfur dioxide and particulate controls see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Benefits Analysis of Alternative Secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxide
and Total Suspended Particulates (Draft Final Analysis July 1981) [hereinafter cited as EPA Sulfur
Dioxide Standards]. See generally A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
(1979).
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impact analysis is hardly a precise science, and agency policy analysts tend to
belittle these "soft variables." 12'
The foregoing difficulties with quantitative risk assessment constitute a formi-
dable threat to the rationality of cost-benefit analysis. How much useful knowl-
edge has the regulatory decisionmaker gained when he is told, as the
Administrator of the EPA was once told, that the risks posed by a polluting
activity range from zero to 660,000 cancers over a seventy-year period? 122
Arguably, the decisionmaker can use this information in setting priorities; 1 23 he
might decide to regulate this contaminant after he has regulated one that poses a
risk of zero to 990,000 cancers over the same period. This information, however,
cannot be of much utility in a marginal balancing analysis.
This branch of reductionist quantitative risk analysis can, however, work a pos-
itive harm when the decisionmaker (or, more likely, his or her technical under-
lings) masks the huge uncertainties inherent in the enterprise and presents to the
public a "best estimate" that implies an accuracy that simply does not exist. The
public is in a very real sense being deceived when it is told that the lifetime risks
posed by a chemical are twenty-six cancers, rather than somewhere in the range
between zero and 660,000 cancers. The public is also being deceived when it is
told, without further elaboration, that the risks posed by a pesticide are about the
same as smoking one cigarette per lifetime.' 2 4 The regulator can choose from
among a wide variety of proposed risk assessment models, some of which resolve
uncertainties in favor of protecting the public and the environment and others of
which resolve uncertainties in favor of maximizing industrial activity. Only rarely
will the proponent of a model acknowledge the covert political considerations that
motivate the choice among models.125 Yet, until models are developed which can
attract a reasonable scientific consensus, the choice between models is entirely
policy dominated. Regulators who use such highly refined, but ultimately hollow,
121. Tribe, Trial By Mathemats. Preczsion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 1361-
65 (1971).
122. This example comes from the author's personal experience in the Office of General Counsel of
the EPA.
123. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed.
Reg. 5,002, 5,256 (1980); see infra text accompanying note 340.
124. In August 1981, Dr. John Todhunter, EPA Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic
Substances, determined that the cancer risk from one year's use of ethylene dibromide (EDB) to fumigate
citrus crops was 100 times less than the risk of smoking one cigarette in a lifetime. PESTICIDE & Toxic
CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1981, at 19-20. One week later, Dr. Todhunter corrected this estimate of cancer
risk to equal the risk of smoking between one and two cigarettes over a lifetime. PESTICIDE & Toxic
CHEM. NEWS, Sept. 2, 1981, at 14.
Dr. Adrian Gross, at that time chief scientist of EPA's hazards evaluation division, said that
"Todhunter is trying to say that the risk is one in a million that someone will contract cancer whereas I find
the data to show that the risk is one in a thousand and possibly 50 to 70 per thousand." Wash. Post, Oct. 8,
1981, at A29, col. 5. He continued that the chemical "is much more dangerous than Todhunter believes
because it can find its way into food products as easily as it can be consumed" in fruit. Id One staff
member who worked on the Agency position document said he would not eat fruit treated in accordance
with Dr. Todhunter's "minimum expectations for residue." Id
125. See Mantel & Schneiderman, Estimating "Safe" Levels, A Hazardous Undertaking, 35 CANCER
RESEARCH 1379, 1382 (1975) (choice of log-probit dose-response model over more conservative linear
model justified on grounds that use of former ultimately would result in fewer products taken off the
market).
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techniques to "fine tune" benefits analyses are deceiving the public and perhaps
themselves.
2. Theoretical Limitations. In addition to the foregoing practical limitations of
cost-benefit analysis, it also has several important theoretical limitations. Some of
these have already been suggested in the previous analysis of the "bargaining" and
"tort" models.
a. Valuzng the Benefits. While the adoption of a regulatory agency approach
to the pollution problem remedies many of the practical defects of the "bar-
gaining" and "tort" models, it fails to resolve the debilitating schizophrenia that
afflicts the bargaining model. Even if scientists could precisely quantify all of the
lives, organisms, and materials lost at all relevant levels of media quality, only
some of these could be evaluated in any meaningful way126 because the "willing-
ness to pay" measure of health and environmental harm will in many cases diverge
widely from the "willingness to sell" measure.
Past attempts by regulatory agencies and policy analysts to measure the bene-
fits of health and environmental controls have invariably invoked the "willingness
to pay" criterion. 127 The implicit, and often explicit, assumption of the economists
who attempt to place a monetary value on the benefits of health and environ-
mental controls is that the freely polluting market is the norm and any govern-
mental intervention must be justified. 128 This is the equivalent of a rule of law
that all polluters may freely pollute unless they have contracted not to. As we
have seen, one can have an equally rational society in which the opposite rule
holds. Translated to the regulatory sphere, the polluter in the latter society must
justify its pollution by showing that the surrounding neighbors would be willing to
accept it for the decrease in product price attributable to the amount that the firm
saves from failing to control it. Yet, strangely, no economist of which I am aware
has taken the "willingness to sell" criteria as the appropriate test for the benefits of
pollution reduction. In the case of pollutants that cause only minor discomfort or
property damage, the two measures are, as Coase suggests,129 probably about the
126. There is a real, working market in most materials. The damage to materials can be evaluated by
reference to the market costs of replacement or repair. For some materials, however, such as the Statute of
Liberty, this valuation method may not be entirely adequate. Aesthetics as well as economics play a role in
the valuation process, and the market paradigm once again becomes schizophrenic. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 127-130.
127. See, e.g., EPA Sulfur Dioxide Standards, supra note 120, at 1-4; 5 U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Methods of Development for Assessing Air Pollution Control Benefits 6 (1979) (EPA-60015-79-
001); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Critical Review of Estimating Benefits of Air and Water
Pollution Control 1-5 (1978) (EPA-60015-78-014); Zeckhauser & Shepard, Pinciplesfor Saving and Valuing
Lives, in THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 91, 96-97 (1981).
Even the "willingness to pay" criteria is criticized by some economists as being unrealistic when the
beneficiaries of health and environmental controls are not actually forced to pay for them. See Crandall,
Environmental Control t Out of Control, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Apr. 23, 1979, at 29, 31.
One instance in which the "willingness to sell" test has been invoked is in current proposals to compen-
sate localities for siting hazardous waste facilities within their borders. See Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming
Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities. The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 265, 275-
79 (1982). The authors point out that this is efficient because it allows "projects to proceed only if their
social benefits outweigh their social costs." Id at 275.
128. See Breyer, supra note 38, at 552.
129. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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same. But if willingness to sell were the measure of the benefits of controlling life-
threatening industrial activities, the numbers that the various economic models
produce, which are indeed quite large under the "willingness to pay" criterion,
130
would probably become significantly larger.
A second theoretical conundrum with benefits analysis is the value of reduced
risks to persons not yet in existence. 13' Those persons, of course, are not consulted
as to either their willingness to pay for or their willingness to sell additional risks to
their health and well-being. The decisionmaker can make a very crude attempt to
consider the interests of future generations by adjusting the "discount rate" of the
benefits analysis in such a way that a dollar's worth of future benefit is worth more
than the value given to it by a current investor.' 3 2 Yet, the fact that future bene-
fits are discounted at all connotes a bias of sorts against future inhabitants of the
planet. One report on benefits analysis suggests that "in the future, one may very
well value good health and a clean environment even more than one does today so
that an individual might choose to use a negative, rather than a positive discount
rate for certain future benefits."' 3 3 Indeed, for harms like physical pain and suf-
fering the entire discounting theory may be inappropriate. While a present dollar
is clearly worth more than a future dollar, it is not clear that present pain is worth
more or less than the promise of future pain.
Another infirmity that afflicts standard economic valuation of pollution con-
trol benefits is the disturbing tendency of the policy-oriented economist to "dwarf
soft variables."'' 3 4 Policy analysts are often inclined to ignore unquantifiable vari-
ables, such as the psychic costs of knowing that a species has become extinct,
35
and to undervalue those "soft variables" that they can identify but cannot easily
appraise. 136 Moreover, the analyst's assessment of the environmental benefits of
130. Crude estimates were made of the "willingness to pay" for improved air quality in the south
coast air basin of southern California. Assuming approximately 30% improvement in ambient air quality,
where a household is willing to pay $42 per month, the annual benefit to this area was predicted to be
$950,000,000. 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methods of Development for Assessing Air Pollu-
tion Control Benefits 16-17 (1979) (executive summary).
In determining health benefits derived from a 60% reduction of particulates and sulfur dioxide, the
national urban benefits were estimated at $4.1 to $13.7 billion and $2.2 to $7 billion respectively. Id. at 7;
see also I EPA Sulfur Dioxide Standards, supra note 120; M. Freeman, The Benefits of Air and Water
Pollution Control: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Estimates (1979) (report prepared for the Council on
Environmental Quality).
131. See Baram, supra note 100, at 486; Rodgers, supra note 100, at 196; Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Center for Policy Alternatives, Benefits of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation,
(1980) (prepared for the Senate Comm. on Govtl. Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.) [hereinafter cited as MIT
Report].
132. The discount rate is a standard economic tool for taking into account the fact that a dollar in
hand is worth more than the promise of a dollar in the future. See Baram, supra note 100, at 486-87.
Benefits due to a present environmental improvement that accrue in the future must therefore be dis-
counted to their present value.
133. MIT Report, supra note 131, at 18; see also Baram, supra note 100, at 486 n.47 (suggesting that
analysts have chosen rates that tend to confirm the outcomes they desire); Rodgers, supra note 100, at 196
("the decisionmaker who uses today's preferences to discount tomorrow's life is one whose impartiality
might reasonably be questioned").
134. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics." Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,
1361-65 (1971).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
136. The decisionmaking process fixates on the comparison of the monetary terms and fails to suffi-
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environmental regulation is invariably anthropocentric. The value placed upon a
segment of stream, for example, does not take into account the stream's value to
the fish, deer, insects, and plant life that also use the stream, except insofar as these
entities are valuable to humans. 13 7 Many policy-oriented economists therefore
have little patience with statutes like the Endangered Species Act' 38 that seem to
give nonhuman entities greater intrinsic value than they have in any conceivable
marketplace.139
b. Distrzbutional Considerations. The policy-oriented economist does not
directly concern himself with the distributional effects of the policies that he advo-
catest 4° He is more interested in maximizing the size of the economic pie than in
suggesting how it should be sliced. 4 1 Yet, virtually any governmental action,
including the definition of the property and contract rules that define the "free
market," affects the distribution of wealth among its citizens. A property rule
giving a polluter the right to pollute unless he has contracted otherwise makes
polluters richer; a rule giving neighbors the right to enjoin polluters makes sur-
rounding property owners wealthier. 14 2 Even if Professor Coase is correct in main-
taining that the unimpeded market will ultimately maximize total wealth under
either rule, it is clear that under the first rule polluters will receive a greater pro-
portion of that total wealth than they will under the second.1 43
Regulatory intervention in the workplace and the environment will likewise
shift wealth. If the regulatory entity follows the policy-oriented economist's
approach, it must still elect the "willingness to sell" or the "willingness to pay"
criterion for valuing the benefits of the intervention. A choice of the "willingness
to pay" criteria will shift wealth from the poor to the rich because the poor have
fewer resources to draw upon. A choice of the "willingness to sell" criteria will
shift wealth from the rich to the poor because the poor can ask for as much in
return for risks to their health as the rich.144 Even if as an empirical matter poor
ciently incorporate non-monetary terms in the decision. There is a strong tendency for a deci-
sionmaker and for other parties critiquing the process to compare only the monetary terms apart from
the non-monetary terms, and to introduce the non-monetary terms as a marginal adjusting factor, if at
all.
MIT Report, supra note 131, at 19; see also Baram, supra note 100, at 484; Leape, supra note 116, at 96-97;
Rodgers, supra note 100, at 197.
137. See Tribe, supra note 56.
138. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. VI 1982).
139. "I argue that environmental legislation, at least during the past twenty years, fails to make eco-
nomic 'common sense', that is, it fails to maximize the satisfaction of consumer demand over the long run.
Laws like the Endangered Species Act flaunt this concept of economic efficiency." Sagoff, supra note 97, at
1396.
140. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 28.
141. See A. FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 81
(1973); Rodgers, supra note 100, at 194.
142. Set Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 52, at 1095.
143. See id. at 1095-96. This point is different from the argument that "willingness to pay" will not
always equal "willingness to sell." That argument relied upon the distribution of wealth (and perhaps of
risk propensity) immediately prior to the time the property rule is determined. This argument, that regula-
tory intervention has distributional consequences, speaks to the distribution of wealth after the government
decides to intervene or to fail to intervene. The earlier argument says that because of unequal wealth
distribution it makes a difference which property rule is adopted. The argument here is that governmental
intervention will redistribute wealth regardless of the property rule adopted.
144. This point assumes that the right to enjoin really exists. In the workplace, of course, it does not.
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people do not generally demand as many dollars for health risks as wealthy people,
they will almost certainly demand more than they can pay under the opposite test.
Irrespective of the valuation criteria, governmental intervention will shift
wealth from polluters and consumers of their products to the beneficiaries of the
regulatory intervention, and any intervention that does not completely eliminate
risks will allow the polluters and their consumers to profit from the loss of others.
Consumers of the polluter's products would be willing to pay the victims (under
the "willingness to sell" rule) or the victims would be willing to pay the polluter
(under the "willingness to buy" rule), but the failure of the "bargaining" and
"tort" models means that these transactions never occur. The utilitarian regulator
would allow the polluting activity to continue if the overall benefits of the activity
outweigh its costs, but the regulator will not actually require the beneficiaries to
compensate the losers. Any rule short of a complete prohibition of polluting
activity or a perfectly enforced strict liability compensation system therefore cre-
ates an uncompensated minority of victims who must endure health risks and envi-
ronmental harm so that the economy as a whole may expand. 145 On the other
hand, a rule of complete prohibition forces consumers to pay more for risks than
the victims would demand under the "willingness to sell" rule or pay under the
"willingness to pay" rule (assuming transaction costs did not impede the transac-
tion), and this would certainly seem inequitable to the beneficiaries of the pol-
luting activity. These distributional concerns can be addressed, perhaps more
efficiently, through direct transfers from the public treasury to the "victims" of the
governmental policy through mechanisms like a large "superfund." Such transfer
devices, however, face the same causation problems as the tort system, and they
are often difficult to implement politically.
1 46
The distributional concerns raised by regulatory application of the market par-
adigm are not limited to shifts of wealth between distinctive groups within society.
To the extent that the regulatory entity neglects to measure the value of or under-
values future human beings or nonhuman inhabitants of the planet, the result will
be a shift of the world's resources away from those neglected groups and toward
present human consumers' manufactured products.
Finally, economists have recently postulated that regulatory controls can have
A worker cannot really insist that the employer eliminate toxic substances from the workplace; the worker
can always be fired and replaced by a "less picky" worker. Under this sort of economic duress, the worker
may be willing to sell his health for an unrealistically low price. Low income persons operating under
economic duress may well sell their health for less than the rich. To a limited extent the same is true for
environmental controls. Since a dollar means more to someone with very few of them, the poor may sell
their right to a clean environment at a lower price than the rich.
145. Occasionally this minority of victims can be identified. For example, many forms of air pollution
are more irritable at lower levels of exposure to persons afflicted with emphysema. See, e.g., American
Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Many pollutants affect children more dramatically
and at lower exposure levels than adults. Lead Indus. Ass'n. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1141 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denzed, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). For other pollutants a "susceptible" group is less easily identified, although
some preliminary attempts have been made. See generally E. CALABRESE, POLLUTANTS AND HIGH RISK
GROUPS (1978).
146. See Roberts & Stewart, Energy and the Envi'onment, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE NEXT
TEN YEARS 411 (1976).
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distributional impacts within the regulated industry itself.14 7  Government-
required capital investments in pollution controls can put some firms at a disad-
vantage with respect to their competitors. 148
The fact that the economist qua economist is uninterested in the distributional
impacts of the policies that he advocates does not mean that the rational poli-
cymaker is likewise free to ignore the distributional implications of her decisions.
The response of some economists that inequities can be resolved through direct
transfer payments to the victims of utilitarian policies presumes that a mechanism
for this transfer exists and that it will be used. Moreover, this response also ignores
the negative symbolic impact of a governmental action which allows some to profit
from health risks imposed upon others. Finally, the advocate of transfer payments
implicitly espouses the same presumptuous premise that afflicts policy-oriented
economists' pursuit of the valuation problem-that all values can be reduced to
coin. The policymaker must therefore directly address the distributional concerns
that alternative policies raise. A sufficient reason for rejecting a wealth-maxi-
mizing policy is that too much wealth would change hands in the process.
D. Politics and the Rejection of the Market Paradigm
The policy-oriented economists often appear frustrated by politicians' persis-
tent failure to heed their teaching with respect to the proper goals of health and
environmental regulation, 149 and to select efficient tools for the pursuit of desig-
nated environmental goals. There is some justification for the frustration arising
from the failure to select efficient tools. 150 The economist, however, should not feel
slighted by the politician's failure to pursue the market paradigm in setting the
goals for health and environmental regulation because that endeavor requires
more than economic expertise. There are important reasons why the politician
must reject that paradigm, not the least of which is its basic schizophrenia. The
politician does not reject the discipline of economics; she merely seeks to accommo-
date a broader range of values than most policy-oriented economists are willing to
address. The pollution problem is not merely an economic problem, as some
policy-oriented economists maintain; 15 1 rather, it is primarily apohltical problem to
be resolved by the political process.
147. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 22-23; Leone & Jackson, supra note 98,
ch. 5.
148. Relaxation of governmental controls can have similar intrafirm distributional effects, as illus-
trated by the recent dramatic changes in the airline industry. "Some firms, finding that they simply
cannot afford the cleanup may have to go out of business." Leone & Jackson, supra note 98, at 27.
149. Over the past decade, the U.S. has made a major commitment to improving the quality of our
air and water. During this entire period, economists who think about environmental policy have,
virtually without dissent, accused the government of going about the task of environmental cleanup in
the wrong way.
Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle, 64 PUB. INTEREST 106 (1981); see also Freeman &
Haveman, Clean Rhetoric and Dirty Wate, 28 PUB. INTEREST 51, 52 (1972).
150. See generally F. ANDERSON, supra note 9; A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18; B. MITNICK,
supra note 46; Lave, Health and Environmental Regulations, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: AGENDA FOR
THE 1980's 131 (J. Pechman ed. 1980); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13.
151. Chelius, supra note 59 ("For all the moral anguish associated with accidents, it must be
remembered that safety is an economic commodity."); Freeman & Haveman, supra note 149, at 52 (refer-
ring to the basic economic nature of the problem); Ruff, supra note 101, at 69 ("We are going to make very
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The fact that the market paradigm is only rarely invoked in the actual political
debate that impels legislators to enact pollution control statutes is unsurprising to
the student of the political process. 152 A politician stands to gain little political
capital by announcing to her constituents: "I have identified an instance in which
the tort system has failed adequately to internalize externalities, and I am today
introducing legislation to minimize the sum of pollution and pollution avoidance
costs." The politician is likely to attract much more attention if she announces: "I
have discovered that a large chemical company is poisoning its neighbors and the
environment, and I am today introducing legislation to protect the environment."
The arguments opposed to pollution control legislation can likewise be translated
into the language of politics. Rather than arguing that "the statute will require the
regulatory agency to induce an inefficient allocation of resources by setting the
marginal cleanup costs for most firms higher than the marginal benefits," the anti-
interventionist politician assures her constituents that "the statute will create a
self-serving bureaucracy that will drive small firms out of business, stifle innova-
tion, contribute to galloping inflation, and send capital overseas."
When the focus of the debate is a subject as sensitive as toxic substances in the
air and water and the threat of bankrupting small businesses, symbols play a large
role.153 Proponents of controls are likely to strive for absolutist symbolic legislative
statements such as the proposition that "the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited' 15 4 or that no new sources of pollution should be allowed
to degrade media quality in pristine areas of the country.155 Complex controver-
sies about the extent to which media quality goals may be met through dispersion
enhancement, intermittent controls, and flow augmentation reduce to slogans such
as "dilution is not a solution to pollution,"1 56 and "treatment for treatment's
sake."1 57
As any smart advertising executive knows, much of our energies are directed
toward symbolic and unachievable goals. We do not begin a mountain climb with
the goal of scaling to the optimal height; we strive for the summit. The coach does
little real progress in solving the problem of pollution until we recognize it for what, primarily, it is: an
economic problem, which must be understood in economic terms.").
152. See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977);
Freeman & Haveman, supra note 149, at 59.
153. See Ingram, The Polical Rationality of Innovation, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in
APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 12, 20-23 (1978); Kelman, supra note 149. Even in those
very rare cases in which Congress has considered a tool aimed solely at curing a defect in the market or the
tort system, the language of the debate has been largely symbolic. For example, proponents of Senator
Proxmire's sulfur dioxide tax stressed that it "makes polluters pay" while detractors contended that it
would "force companies to pay twice" or argued that it would give companies s "license to pollute." See
Busby, Environment Report/ Wh te House Plans Push for Sulfur Tax Despite Strong Industry Opposition, 4 NAT'L J.
1663 (1972); Environment Report/White House Activists Debate Form of Sulfur Tax-ndustry Shuns Both, 4 NAT'L
J. 1643 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 833-35 (1972) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
154. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1976).
155. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976); Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
156. See Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts.- The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air
and Clean Water, 62 IowA L. REV. 643 (1977).
157. See, e.g., Implementation Hearings, supra note 105, at 40 (statement of Walter E. Garrison, Chief
Engineer and General Manager, County Sanitation District, Los Angeles County).
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not direct his charges to fight for the alma mater up to the point at which mar-
ginal costs exceed marginal benefits; he exhorts them to give their all. We recog-
nize that we will not always reach the summit and that we will not always win.
But if we set our sights on the bland optimum, we will always set them too low.
The advertising industry invokes this human characteristic in a cynical fashion
when it urges us to expend more than the optimal amount of resources on products
that are just beyond the material lifestyles that we can safely afford. Congress
manifests the same motivation in a more idealistic way when it sets "inefficient"
goals for the quality of life.
The political debate is the appropriate locus of that quintessentially political
choice between the "willingness to buy" and "willingness to sell" measures of the
value of health and environmental improvement in setting national goals. The
policy-oriented economist cannot give an apolitical, scientific answer to the ques-
tion of the appropriate level of pollution control. The economist can inform the
political debate by calculating the probable costs of various pollution control
measures, yet he can say very little about the benefits absent an a priori political
value judgment. The politician must explicitly or implicitly choose between the
two approaches-she must decide whether as a starting point companies have a
"right" to pollute or citizens have a "right" not to be placed at risk by polluters.
The basic political choice that renders the market paradigm impotent as a scien-
tific tool is thus expressed succinctly in the politician's vernacular. The statutory
standard that the legislature articulates to guide the implementing agency reflects
that body's resolution of this question as well as its assessment of other issues, such
as the respect due to future generations and the extent to which environmental
controls should redistribute wealth, that are relevant to the political debate. The
entire dialogue is, unfortunately, played out against a backdrop of huge uncertain-
ties concerning the relationship between chemical pollutants and human and envi-
rorimental well-being.
Historically, Congress has behaved as if it were following a "willingness to sell"
approach.' 58 There has been much talk in the political debate of a "right" to a
healthy workplace and a clean environment.1 59 Proponents of early occupational
158. The major exception to this proposition is the large construction grants program under the Clean
Water Act where the federal government pays up to 80% of the cost of building publicly owned sewage
treatment works. Here, it would appear that the federal government is, in a sense, determining its "willing-
ness to pay" for pollution control. The same may be true of pollution control in public utilities, where
virtually all citizens pay for the increased costs of controlling pollution that they themselves produce.
159. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., IST SESs., LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 432 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF OSHA]. "The worker is entitled to know that standards in the workplace are
geared to overcoming safety and health hazards that are shortening his life." Id at 865 (statement of Sen.
Williams); "The well being of every American working man and woman is an essential human right which
we can no longer deny." Id. (statement of Rep. Perkins); "This bill represents a long overdue significant
additional recognition that working men and women need Federal assistance to secure their inalienable
right to earn their living free from the ravages of job-caused death, disease or injury." Id. at 891 (statement
of Rep. Burton); "Mr. Speaker, our Nation has had a sad and frustrating history of weak-kneed inaction by
those who have been charged with protecting the divine right of every citizen to breath clean air." COMM.
ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1970 116 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hechler) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF CAA AMENDMENTS OF
1970]; "Surely in a nation that has scaled the peaks of technological achievement where most people enjoy
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and environmental legislation were anxious to enact measures that would success-
fully "clean up the environment and the workplace" and keep it clean. Since the
states were not accomplishing those goals rapidly enough, the federal government
had to intervene. 60 Congress therefore required that media-quality-based stan-
dards for exposure to pollutants be set at levels which would "protect public
health" with an "adequate margin of safety"1 61 or even an "ample margin of
safety."' 162 If feasible, workers were entitled to a "safe and healthful" place of
employment.1 63 The toxics control sections of the statutes are emphatic in their
rejection of a narrow cost-benefit approach. 64 These absolutist legislative state-
ments have great symbolic value. The lofty goals of the environmental statutes
give us all a common sense of mission in the same nonutilitarian way that the goal
of putting a man on the moon galvanized the American public for a decade in
support of the space program. As consumers we may dislike paying more for
automobiles, fuel, electricity, and products of the chemical industry, but as citizens
we can rationally vote for extremely costly and, by the "willingness to pay"
measure, inefficient goals.165 The goals that we set as voters constantly remind us
unprecedented standards of personal property it is not asking too much to insist on the right to breathe
decent air." Atr Pollution, 1967: Heartngs on S 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Publc Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 759 (1967) (statement of Sec. Gardner of Health, Education
and Welfare).
160. Prior to 1967, the states had the primary responsibility for air pollution control. The inadequacy
of most state programs, however, soon attracted national attention. In the 1967 amendments to the Clean
Air Act, Congress removed this sizable and complex burden from the states and substituted a strong
national media-quality-based approach. The congressional debate was characterized by strong "cleanup"
rhetoric:
This bill . . . recognizes that control efforts considered acceptable just a few years ago are now clearly
inadequate . . . .Developed in full awareness of the public's greatly increased support and demand
for prompt and effective control action, the Air Quality Act of 1967 broadens control programs at all
levels of government in an effort to protect and enhance the quality of the environment.
S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967).
By 1970 this sense of urgency increased as the compliance deadlines neared. Congress once again
amended the statute and once again stressed cleanup and nondegradation goals: "Here we have learned
that tests of economical and technological feasibility applied to those standards compromise the health of
our people and lead to inadequate standards. . . . It is clear that enforcement must be toughtened [sic] if
we are to meet the national deadlines." HISTORY OF CAA AMENDMENTS OF 1970, supra note 159, at 226
(statement of Sen. Muskie); see also Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), afd sub
nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); "The problem of assuring safe and healthful workplaces for
our working men and women ranks in importance with any that engages the national attention today." S.
REP. No. 1281, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF OSHA, supra n6te 159, at
141 (statement of Sen. Williams); "We surely owe it to the millions of working men and women whose
health and lives are unnecessarily jeopardized by hazards of the workplace to pass the most effective
measure we can devise." Id. at 141 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
161. Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. V 1981).
162. Clean Water Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. V 1981); Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(Supp. V 1981).
163. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
164. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 56(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976); Clean Water Act § 307,
33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. V 1980); Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981). Indeed even the
older health and environmental statutes, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. § 135 (1982), and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), that articulated a risk-
benefit approach did so in the context of a product licensing scheme that placed the burden of demon-
strating that the benefits of theproduct outweighed its costs. This surely represented a tacit conclusion that
the public had a "right" to reasonably safe pesticides and food and drug products, and that it would
exchange for the benefits of the products only upon a showing of reasonable safety.
165. See Sagoff, supra note 97, at 1399.
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as we assume our role as consumers that there are things in life more important
than the pursuit of material wealth.
In addition, environmental goals reflect society's nonutilitarian moral judg-
ments. We may wish to reaffirm to ourselves that pollution is not merely ineffi-
cient-it is wrong. 166 We may desire to invoke the ritual of a civil or criminal trial
to remind ourselves and the defendant of our determination that pollution is anti-
social conduct. The tort system provides an avenue for a plaintiff to seek revenge
as well as shift loss, and the tort alternative in theory operates as an inducement to
forego self-help.' 67 The failure of the tort system to shift loss is likewise a failure to
assuage this strong human emotion. We may therefore legislatively set goals and
prescribe implementation techniques that satisfy our collective desire for
retribution.
The Supreme Court has recognized and reaffirmed this political judgment in
the worker safety context in the Cotton Dust case.' 68 This case dealt with the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, which requires OSHA to establish standards that
"require conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment or places of employment."' 169 For toxic materials
and harmful physical agents, the statute further requires the agency to set the
standard "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for
the period of his working life."' 170 OSHA read these provisions to require it to
establish ambient standards for toxic substances at a "safe" level where feasible
and at the lowest feasible level if safe levels were infeasible. 171 Since OSHA knew
of no mechanism for establishing a "safe" level for carcinogens, it set standards for
carcinogenic substances at the lowest feasible level without regard to the health
effects at that level. In other words, for carcinogens and other nonthreshold pollu-
tants, OSHA read the Act as requiring it to adopt a technology-based approach
rather than a media-quality-based approach.
The petrochemical industy in the earlier Benzene case 172 and the textile
industry in the Cotton Dust case' 7 3 challenged OSHA's view. According to these
industries, the statute commanded OSHA to adhere to a balancing approach for
all chemicals; since section 3(8)'s definition of "standard" modified section
6(b)(5)'s feasibility requirement, OSHA could only promulgate media-quality-
based standards that were reasonably necessary or appropriate. The industries
further argued that since "reasonableness" connotes cost/benefit balancing,
166. See S. KELMAN, supra note 61, at 32-39; Kelman, supra note 149, at 114-15.
167. See W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 23.
168. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
171. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Carcino-
genic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977).
172. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
173. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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OSHA could only promulgate standards at ambient levels at which benefits out-
weighed costs. 174 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the industry's contentions in the
Benzene case, 7 5 but the D.C. Circuit disagreed in the Cotton Dust case.' 76
The Supreme Court refused to decide the cost/benefit question in the Benzene
case, but a plurality of the Court did find fault with OSHA's approach to carcino-
gens. 177 The Court held that OSHA could not promulgate a standard for a toxic
substance, whether or not it was a carcinogen, unless it could sustain the affirma-
tive burden of showing that the standard was "reasonably necessary and appro-
priate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment."' 178 In the Cotton
Dust case, however, the Court squarely addressed industry's cost/benefit claims
and rejected them. At the heart of the majority opinion was its conclusion that
"cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility
analysis is."'1 79 The Court was persuaded that Congress had the power to man-
date that the agency adopt a nonutilitarian technology-based approach and that it
had done so.180
While the policy analyst should not be surprised or judgmental when the poli-
tician seems to ignore his appeals for more "rational" goals, he should be prepared
to elaborate upon many of the disadvantages of adopting nonutilitarian goals. For
example, the policy analyst might explain to the participants in the political
debate who invoke symbolic and highly moral goals that they should not be sur-
prised if those goals seem long in coming. They may in fact be gaining symbolic
benefits at the expense of practical effectiveness.
Congressional articulation of health and environmental goals does not neces-
sarily put the political forces to rest. Very often the locus of the political debate
174. Id. at 501; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 634-40
(1980). Although it was not necessary to do so in either of the two cases, industry would presumably have
argued further that OSHA could not promulgate infeasible standards even if the benefits of such standards
would outweigh the costs because section 6(b)(5) places feasibility limits on section 3(8) standards. Section
6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act empowers OSHA to promulgate occupational safety and
health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). Section 3(8) defines "occupational safety and health standard"
to be a standard that is "reasonable, necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment." Id § 652(8). Section 6(b)(5) specifies that in setting occupational safety and health
standards for toxic materials and harmful physical agents, the agency must set the standard "which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such stan-
dard for the period of his working life." Id. § 655(b)(5).
175. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), af'dsub nom. Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
176. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), f'dsub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
177. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
178. Id at 607 (emphasis added). This holding has been criticized. See Rod gers,Judicial Review of Risk
Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambhng the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301 (198 1); The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 75, 242-51 (1980).
179. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981). The Court thus recognized
the distinction between media-quality-based standards and technology-based standards and applied it in
the context of the language of the OSHA Act.
180. Hence, it would appear that OSHA requires a technology-based approach. Yet, the Court reaf-
firmed the Benzene plurality's holding that OSHA may only promulgate standards that are necessary to
remedy a significant risk. This approach would appear to be a media-quality-based one. The resulting
mixed requirement can probably best be described as a technology-limited, media-quality-based strategy
with a zero discharge goal.
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merely shifts to the implementing agency. The implementation process often fol-
lows a familiar pattern. As the agency pursues the statute's inspiring goals through
its typically hazy implementation instructions, the agency inevitably encounters
strong opposition from those who argue that the agency is, in its unrestrained
enthusiasm for those goals, ignoring the economic consequences of its activities.
The losers of the Congressional debate, in other words, have a second chance to
influence policy when the agency attempts to bring the statutory goals to earth. 181
After the agency has resolved the tensions in a more concrete fashion, the political
battle is waged one further time before the reviewing courts.18 2 Statutory dead-
lines are missed; administrative initiatives are constantly blunted by political and
judicial review and the agency begins to lose its enthusiasm for its "mission."
Indeed, it often begins to appear that the political system may have promised more
than it could deliver.' 83
Economic factors must inevitably play an important role in the actual imple-
mentation of the goals that society sets for itself.18 4 It is a simple economic reality
181. See Stewart, The Reformation of Ameran Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
182. See Currie,JudvialReview Under the Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221 (1977); Stewart,
The Development of Administrative and Quasi- Constitutional Law injudtcial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking.
Lessonsfrom the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977).
183. Another disadvantage of relying upon the political system to set health and environmental goals
is the potential that such reliance offers for the insertion of other goals, or hidden agendas, that are only
tangentially related to society's efforts to protect human health and the environment. A well-reported
example of the insertion of a hidden agenda into an environmental statute is the provision in the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act that the EPA establish both an allowable emission limitation and a
required "percentage reduction" of emissions for new fossil -fuel- fired stationary sources of pollutants.
Clean Air Act § 11 l(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981). This provision was enacted at the behest of a
bizarre coalition of environmentalists, who wanted to preserve pristine areas in the West where new sources
would burn low sulfur coal, and eastern coal interests, who wanted to ensure that coal-fired power plants in
the East were required to install scrubbers so that "dirty" eastern coal would not lose its competitive
advantage over "clean" western coal. Whereas the environmentalists' concerns were clearly related to
pollution problems, the provision owes its existence to the hidden agenda of the representatives in Congress
of the eastern coal interests. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE L.J. 1466, 1491-95 (1980). This ostensibly protective measure arguably left the eastern United States
worse off than it was before enactment of the amendments. See id. at 1496. The lesson here is that when
the political process is allowed to define nonutilitarian health and environmental goals, it may be expected
to include an occasional red herring. Advocates of the political process are open to legitimate criticism on
this score.
Similarly, the debate over the appropriate regulatory control technique can absorb other hidden
agendas that are wholly unrelated to the primary goal of clean air or water. For example, the question
whether decisions about individual sources of pollution should be made at a local or national level can be
analyzed independently of the implications that the answer to the question has for the power relationships
among the affected bureaucracies, but these latter otherwise irrelevant considerations are likely to motivate
the bureaucratic participants in the debate more than the merits of the national versus local issue. Simi-
larly, arguments concerning the likelihood that various regulatory techniques may result in "forum shop-
ping" for "pollution havens" may be motivated more out of concern for a loss of a tax base than a concern
that the media quality in pristine areas not be allowed to degrade. See id. at 1504-05. Finally, competitive
concerns may motivate a company to favor a particular implementation technique that appears anomo-
lous from the perspective of the environment versus economic growth. See, e.g., Leone & Jackson, supra
note 98, at 241.
184. Another independent reason for taking economic considerations into account in setting health
and environmental goals is the possibility that large expenditures on pollution and workplace controls will
put the United States at a competitive disadvantage with countries that have lower health and environ-
mental goals. See SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., lST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1133 (1973) (testimony of Paul V.
McCracken) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF THE WPCA AMENDMENTS]. There is a great debate over
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that the unlimited pursuit of the clean-up and nondegradation goals that emerge
from the political system would cost an enormous sum. Indeed, it is probably
impossible literally to meet the absolutist goals implicit in the "ample margin of
safety" language of the toxics provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act
short of catastrophic economic disruption.' l 5  Cost is therefore an extremely
important political consideration, and those with a strong economic interest in
continued discharge can be depended upon to raise the question of economic and
technological feasibility at every possible opportunity in the political debate before
Congress, the agencies, and the courts. 18 6
Congress has reacted to feasibility arguments in two ways. First, it has often
simply ignored feasibility concerns and left absolutist media-quality-based goals in
place. By adopting a stringent media-quality-based approach, Congress in effect
has announced its decision to clean up dirty areas and maintain pristine areas
"whatever the cost." The goals are established in the hope that the technology
capable of reaching those goals either exists or will soon be developed 8 and that
the implementing agency will have the political courage to resist the pressures
generated by regulatees who must pay large sums to meet the goals.
In the alternative, Congress has explicitly acknowledged economic concerns by
adopting a technology-based approach. Congress has incorporated feasibility con-
siderations directly into health and environmental statutes through such language
as "to the extent feasible,"' 188 and "tak[ing] into account the age of equipment and
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application
of various types of control techniques, process changes, [and] the cost of achieving
the reality of the threat that this poses for U.S. export markets. Indeed, it may well be that the retooling
required by health and environmental controls will have the effect of enhancing the efficiency of produc-
tion processes, thereby increasing the U.S. share of foreign markets. This may have been the effect of
OSHA's cotton dust standard. Interview with Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, during promulgation of
the standard (Apr. 25, 1982).
185. A. FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, supra note 141, ch. 2; Kneese, Pollution and a Better
Environment, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 10, 11-16 (1968).
186. Cost considerations have always been a part of the congressional debates. In arguing that cost
considerations should be included in Clean Water Act standards, Senator Bentsen stressed that:
If these programs cause too severe economic dislocations, if the economic and social benefits of pollu-
tion control programs bear no reasonable relationship to the costs involved in implementing them,
then all of our best efforts to clean up the waterways could be defeated in a backlash against those of
us who are working to clean up the environment.
HISTORY OF THE WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 1281. Senator Dominick succinctly argued that
feasibility should be a consideration in promulgating standards under OSHA by suggesting that "[w]hat
we are trying to do is put people to work, not put them out of work." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF OSHA,
supra note 159, at 526.
187. See J. BONINE, THE EVOLUTION OF 'TECHNOLOGY-FORCING' IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT (BNA
Env't Rep. Monograph No. 27, July 25, 1975); La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and FederalEnvironmental Statutes,
62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 776 (1977). Senator Muskie, the author of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, was
a strong proponent of this view:
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of technological or economical judgments-or
even to bet limited by what appears to be economically or technologically feasible. Our responsibility
is to establish what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may mean that
people and industries will be asked to do what seems impossible at the present time, but if health is to
be protected, these challenges must be met.
HISTORY OF THE WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 227.
188. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
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such [controls]."''8 9 The statutory language, however, rarely prescribes a finely
tuned balancing of environmental considerations against feasibility considerations
for setting technology-based standards. The language, rather, is aspirational. The
agency is told to require the implementation of the "best available technology
economically achievable,"190 or the "best technological system of continuous emis-
sion reduction which . . . has been adequately demonstrated," 19 or the tech-
nology capable of producing the "lowest achievable emission rate."' 92 Economic
considerations are relevant to the standard-setting process, but they are not meant
to dominate it. The economic impact of achieving technology-based standards is
to be considered along with a host of other factors that may legitimately affect the
regulatory entity's decision. 193 By contrast, media-quality considerations play only
a very small role in technology-based standard-setting. Congress has, in other
words, announced to the world: "If we cannot have a perfectly clean workplace
and environment, then we shall do the best that we can."'
194
While neither of these goals meets the policy-oriented economist's efficiency
criterion, they are both rational po/iical end points.' 95 Society may rationally
decide to make costs a relevant consideration to a media-quality approach only at
the extremes and err on the side of overprotection. Similarly, a rational society
might pledge itself to do the best that it can in pursuit of safe workplaces and a
healthy environment even though it recognizes that even those efforts will not
make those places safe or healthy in any absolute sense and even though they may,
in the policy-oriented economist's opinion, cost too much.
If we acknowledge that it was rational for Congress to reject a narrow cost-
benefit approach to pollution control and adopt either a media-quality-based
approach or a technology-based approach to that problem, it is still necessary to
ask which of the two alternative approaches (or, perhaps more appropriately,
which combination of the two approaches) is best suited for health and environ-
mental regulation of the chemical industry. This article now turns to a considera-
tion of the factors that can enlighten that choice.
189. Clean Water Act § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
190. Clean Water Act § 301(b) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
191. Clean Air Act § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981).
192. Clean Air Act § 173(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. V 1981).
193. EPA v. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d
328, 346 (D.C. Cir.),cert. dirmissed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976); Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1012 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
194. Addressing the rationale for the technology-based effluent limitations of the 1972 amendments to
the Clean Water Act, Senator Bayh explained: "The whole thrust of the bill is to force industry to do the
best job it can do to clean up the nation's water and to keep making progress without incurring such
massive costs that economic chaos would result." HISTORY OF WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at
216.
195. Recently, Congress has expressed a keen interest in mandating that regulatory agencies balance
costs and benefits in promulgating regulations. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (discussing
the Regulatory Reform Act (S. 1080)). None of the serious efforts, however, have sought to overturn the
nonutilitarian approaches of the worker safety and environmental statutes.
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V
THE CHOICE BETWEEN MEDIA-QUALITY-BASED AND TECHNOLOGY-
BASED APPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL
Congress has taken a variety of attitudes toward the choice between media-
quality-based and technology-based approaches to pollution control. Only very
rarely has Congress mandated one to the exclusion of the other.196 More often,
Congress has required agencies to implement both approaches simultaneously.
For example, under the Clean Water Act the EPA must prescribe technology-
based effluent limitations for new and existing sources 9 7 while the states with EPA
approval must establish and enforce media-quality-based water quality stan-
dards.1 98 The two approaches come together in the statute's prescription that
every point source of water pollution have a discharge permit. 99 At the permit
stage, the implementing agency must require implementation of the more strin-
gent of the two requirements. 2° ° This strategy of mandating the more stringent of
the two requirements typifies the statutes that adopt both approaches. 20 In prac-
tice, however, the implementing agency has a great deal of discretion in choosing
which of the two approaches to emphasize. 20 2 Moreover, the statutes that exclu-
sively require a media-quality-based approach often give the implementing agency
the practical flexibility to transform the media-quality-based approach into a tech-
nology-based approach at the implementation stage. 20 3
196. Standards under section 302 of the Clean Water Act are apparently intended to prescribe
effluent limitations for point sources of water pollution strictly on the basis of media quality. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1312 (Supp. V 1981). However, the language, "can reasonably be expected to contribute to the attain-
ment or maintenance of such water quality," Id § 1312(a), leaves the door open for a technology-based
approach, especially in light of the fact that the hearings on such standards are to "determine the relation-
ship of the economic and social costs of achieving any such limitations .... " Id § 1312(b)(1). This
section has never been implemented by EPA.
Section 112 of the pre-1977 Clean Air Act prescribed a strictly media-quality-based approach to emis-
sions limitations for hazardous pollutants. However, when faced with the practical impossibility of pre-
scribing a media-quality-based standard for asbestos emissions from buildings being demolished, the EPA
promulgated a technology-based standard. After this standard was overturned by the Supreme Court on
the ground that it was not an "emission standard," Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275
,(1978), Congress amended the statute to allow the EPA to promulgate technology-based standards when
"it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce" a media-quality-based emission standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1)
(Supp. V 1981).
197. Clean Water Act §§ 301, 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316 (1976).
198. Id § 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(1976).
199. Id § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1976).
200. Id.
201. See Id § 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 13 17 (a)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (administrator may substitute media-
quality-based toxic effluent standard for technology-based toxic effluent limitation if the standard "imposes
more stringent requirements"); Clean Air Act § 165(a)(3), (4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), (4) (Supp. V 1981)
(new major emitting facilities in prevention of significant deterioration areas must install "best available
control technology" but may not be constructed at all if they will cause or contribute to a violation of a
media-quality-based increment required by section 163, 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. V 1981), or a violation of
a national ambient air quality standard).
202. The EPA has, for example, concentrated the bulk of its attention on promulgating technology-
based effluent limitations under the Clean Water Act, even though it also has authority to implement a
media-quality-based water quality standards approach under seciion 303. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
203. See itn/a text accompanying notes 204-23.
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A. The Transformation of the Media-Quality Approach into a Technology
Approach
In the case of the primary ambient air quality standards, which are required to
protect the public health with an "adequate margin of safety," the EPA has
arguably adhered to the statute's absolutist goal without regard to the economic
consequences. 20 4 The Clean Air Act leaves it up to the states to decide how the
ambient air quality standards shall be reached and maintained within their bor-
ders. In theory, one would expect the states to determine a pollution load (for
areas that currently meet the standard) or a pollution reduction load (for areas
that do not currently meet the standard) and then parcel out this load among
current and future emitters. The states could distribute the load according to his-
toric use, emissions charges, marketable permits, or political clout as demonstrated
in individual permitting proceedings. 20 5 In practice, however, the states rarely
follow this logical progression. They do calculate pollution reduction loads for
nonattainment areas because this is already required by the EPA.2 0 6 They do not,
however, always determine how much additional pollution it will take in attain-
ment areas before the standards will be violated.20 7 Instead, they often force indi-
vidual sources in individual permitting proceedings to demonstrate no threat to
the media-quality-based standards. 208 In neither case do the states allocate the
pollution "pie" among sources according to any fixed formula. Rather, the states
typically prescribe technology-based regulations for various categories of new and
existing sources of pollutants, not unlike the EPA's technology-based standards for
new sources, 20 9 and they hope that they can convince the EPA that the tech-
nology-based standards will not result in violations of the ambient air quality stan-
dards. 210 Occasionally, the states allow economic considerations to intrude still
farther into the implementation process by providing for variances for individual
sources upon a showing that the costs of the technology-based controls outweigh
the benefits. 2 1'
204. There are at least two instances in which the EPA has apparently considered the costs of
achieving the standard in establishing the "margin of safety." The agency did not require absolute safety
for its lead standard; rather, it set the standard at the level that would, according to its statistical analysis,
protect 99.5% of the most sensitive exposed human population. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1144 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). Arguably, the fact that the EPA did not set the
standard at the level that would protect 100% of the population constituted a bow to economic considera-
tions.
In the EPA's decision to raise the national primary ambient air quality standard for photochemical
oxidants, economic considerations allegedly played a role through the intervention of White House eco-
nomic advisors. The Council on Wage and Price Stability "urged EPA to ignore the law-to consider costs,
as well as medical information." Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1979) (statement of Richard Ayres, Natural Resources Defense Council).
205. 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1980) (the EPA state implementation estimate pollution reduction load).
206. Clean Air Act § 172(a)(1), (b)(3), (8), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1), (b)(3), (8) (Supp. V 1981).
207. Interview with Terrel Kott, Permitting Officer, Texas Air Control Board (July 16, 1982).
208. Id
209. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981).
210. This has been the pattern in Texas. Interview with Terrell Kott, Permitting Officer, Texas Air
Control Board (July 8, 1982); see also Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 27, 65-69 (1981).
211. See generally Currie, supra note 210, at 53-62. The heavy reliance on this individual permitting
process has two important practical consequences. First, in areas that currently meet the media-quality-
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The conversion from a media-quality-based approach to a technology-based
approach is even more dramatic in the case of toxic substances regulation under
the Clean Air Act 2t 2 and the pre-1977 Clean Water Act. 2 13 Both of these statutes
mandate a stringently absolutist test regarding standards for the release of toxic
substances. Yet, when pressed to set an air-quality-based standard for a carcino-
genic substance, for which no "safe" level of exposure or "ample margin of safety"
could realistically be established, the EPA ultimately considered economic feasi-
bility and promulgated a technology-based standard.2 14 Similarly, in light of the
immense administrative difficulties that the EPA faced in promulgating water-
quality-based effluent standards under the pre-19 7 7 Clean Water Act, the EPA
and several environmental groups compromised upon a process whereby the EPA
would attempt to promulgate media-quality-based standards for a small number
of very toxic pollutants and promulgate technology-based standards for categories
of sources of sixty-five other pollutants. 2 15 Congress later amended the statute to
incorporate this compromise retroactively.2
1 6
Finally, when many areas of the country failed to meet the media-quality-
based national ambient air quality standards by the 1977 statutory deadline, Con-
gress amended the Clean Air Act to address these "nonattainment" areas. 2 17 In
addition to requiring the states to meet the standards "as expeditiously as practi-
cable, '218 the amendments require states to require major new stationary sources
to install technology capable of achieving the "lowest achievable emission rate"
21 9
and existing sources to use "reasonably available control measures" 220 and "rea-
sonably available control technology."' 22' While not entirely superseding the
former media-quality-based approach, the 1977 Amendments do significantly shift
the focus from media-quality-based standards to technology-based standards. The
based standards the available load is in effect used up on a first-come-first-served basis. There is little
opportunity for overall planning and few opportunities for a new source to "purchase" some emissions once
the available increment has been allotted. Second, in areas that do not meet the media-quality-based
standards, the failure to distribute the pollution reduction load in any explicit fashion means that deadlines
will inevitably be missed as optimistic assumptions about the ability of technology-based standards to meet
the media-quality-based standards are proven wrong. Federal law currently prevents the construction of
major new sources of pollutants in areas that do not meet the national ambient air quality standards for
those pollutants unless the new source achieves the "lowest achievable emission rate" (a technology-based
standard) and procures an "offset" for its emissions so that total emissions are reduced. Clean Air Act
§ 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981).
212. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981).
213. Clean Water Act § 307(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976).
214. Occupational Safety and Health, Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,896
(1974) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1982)). See generally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chlorde: A
Short Course in the Law and Pohcy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 563-64, 572 (1978).
215. Natural Resouces Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'din
part on other grounds sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L.
REV. 609, 611-17 (1978).
216. Clean Water Act § 307(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (Supp. V 1981).
217. Clean Air Act §§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. V 1981).
218. Id § 7502(a). The statute sets a new attainment deadline of December 31, 1982, which may be
extended for photochemical oxidants and carbon monoxide until December 31, 1987. Id
219. Id § 7503(2).
220. Id § 7502(b)(2).
221. Id. § 7502(b)(3).
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Texas Air Control Board, for example, has proposed to achieve the emissions
reduction necessary to meet the new attainment deadline by simply incorporating
the EPA guidelines for technology-based standards into the state's already existing
technology-based regulations.222
The past decade has witnessed a fairly consistent trend toward transforming
the pure media-quality-based approach into a technology-based approach. Some-
times this has been mandated explicitly by the legislature in amendments to the
relevant statutes; at other times it has been accomplished sub silentlo through
administrative action. The following section of this article will examine many of
the theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages of both approaches in
an attempt to explain this trend and to assess whether it is, by and large, a whole-
some development for health and environmental regulation of the chemical
industry.
B. A Critical Comparison
An adequate comparison of the media-quality-based and technology-based
approaches to health and environmental regulation must begin with a set of cri-
teria against which the two may be measured. This article adopts the following
considerations as its list of evaluative criteria, recognizing that every policy ana-
lyst's list of evaluative criteria would probably differ in significant respects from
that of any other analyst: (1) efficiency; (2) administrative feasibility; (3)
survivability (under existing conditions of judicial and political review); (4)
enforceability; (5) fairness and equity; and (6) ability to encourage technological
advance.
1. Effci'ncy. While this article has argued that the "efficiency" criterion should
not dictate health and environmental goals, efficiency is certainly an extremely
important consideration in determining which tech'niques should be used to imple-
ment those goals. It does not profit even the most ardent environmentalist to
waste valuable resources to achieve his goals. All other things being equal, if two
approaches can reach the desired goal and the implementation of one costs more
than the other, it is sensible to adopt the cheaper of the two approaches. The
process of choosing the most efficient mechanism for achieving a given political
goal is often referred to as "cost-effectiveness" analysis. 223
Measured against only the efficiency criterion, the media-quality-based
approach can theoretically be much more efficient than the technology-based
approach. Media quality standards specify an ascertainable end point in the pur-
suit of which the implementing agency may choose from among many regulatory
tools. Once the pollution reduction load is specified, the regulatory entity can
implement positive incentives, such as emissions or effluent charges or marketable
permits, that give the regulatees the maximum flexibility to achieve the media-
222. See TEXAS AIR CONTROL BOARD, TEXAS STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: CONTROL STRATE-
GIES VI-33 & 34 (1979).
223. F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 9-12; M. GREEN & N. WAITZMAN,supra note 100, at 75; J. KRIER
& E. URSIN, supra note 53, at 30-32; Baram, supra note 100, at 478.
Page 159: Summer 19831
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
quality goal at the least cost. 224 A regulatory scheme that simply divides up the
pollution load on a pro rata basis or allocates the load according to historical use is
justifiably condemned by economists as wasting societal resources that could be
put to better use. 225
The efficiency advantage of the media-quality-based approach may, however,
be overstated in the context of the chemical industry. Unless two firms discharge
the same substance into the same receiving medium, a relatively rare occurrence
for the chemical industry, the marketable permits incentive approach is unavail-
able. When there is no market in which to bargain, the initial sale of the permit is
the last, and the technique becomes indistinguishable from a one-time-only
"charge." The "charge" approach still has efficiency advantages, but these too can
be overstated. The regulatory entity under the "charge" approach must estimate
what charge will induce the necessary cleanup to meet the predetermined media
quality goal. Yet the regulatory entity cannot know how various charges will affect
the conduct of the regulatees absent knowledge about the technologies available to
the regulatee and the costs of implementing those technologies. 2 26 The agency
may in effect set the charge at the level that will induce the adoption of a partic-
ular technology. If technologies come in discrete untunable units, the charge may
in practice give the source as little choice as a technology-based command. 227
224. Economists have for two decades urged policymakers to implement incentive-based schemes for
achieving pollution control goals. See Economic Analysis and the Efticency of Government, Part 6-Economc Incen
tives to Control Pollution. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Economic Analyszo Hearings]; F. ANDERSON, supra note
9; A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE., supra note 18; Solow, The Economist's Approach to Pollution and its Control 123
SCIENCE 498 (1971). Economists have also been uniformly critical of the technology-based approach for its
failure to achieve adequate media quality efficiently. See Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Envi-
ronmental Pohctes: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978); Ruff. supra note 9, at
314-20; Comment, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713, 1719 (1979). In
theory both the media-quality-based approach and the technology-based approach could be implemented
to accord with the market paradigm either through "command-and-control" style standards or through
"charges." Although the "charges" technique is more commonly associated with a media-quality-based
performance standard, the technique can be used to implement, presumably at less cost, a technology-
based approach. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 33. The marketable permits technique, however, is not
adaptable to the technology-based approach to pollution control.
225. HISTORY OF CAA AMENDMENTS of 1970, supra note 159, at 752 (letter from Manufacturing
Chemists' Ass'n); A. KNEESE &C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 26; Freeman & Haveman, supra note 149, at
62 n. 16. Another possible advantage of a media-quality-based approach is that for some health and envi-
ronmental effects it accepts a level of media quality at which there is no harm so that no pollution reduc-
tion is necessary. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 35, at 570. Discharge into pristine waters,
however, would violate the nondegradation policy and thus may be inconsistent with a stringent media-
quality-based approach.
A similar response can be made to the argument that media-quality-based standards are superior
because they can be met through more efficient techniques such as dispersion enhancement and flow aug-
mentation. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 86; Solow, supra note 224, at 501. The
courts and Congress have frowned upon dispersion enhancement as a media-quality technique under the
Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. V 1981); see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). The situation is more ambiguous under the Clean Water
Act. See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977) (flow augmentation not unlawful in absence
of EPA regulations to the contrary).
226. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 175.
227. There is still a practical difference between the use of a charge in implementing a media-quality-
based approach and a technology-based effluent limitation. The charge under the media-quality-based
approach will require the implementation of that technology necessary to meet the media-quality-based
standard. The effluent limitation under the technology-based approach will be set irrespective of media
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The efficiency concept is generally less relevant to the technology-based
approach than the media-quality-based approach. The regulatory entity under
the technology-based approach searches about for technologies that are capable of
reducing emissions or effluent from a given category of sources and then prescribes
numerical limitations or reductions based on the capabilities of the "best" of these
technologies. Cost is certainly a relevant consideration in determining which of a
variety of available technologies is "best. '228 The "best efforts" goal itself, how-
ever, is ambiguous with respect to economic efficiency because media quality con-
siderations are largely irrelevant. 229 Under the pure technology-based approach,
the receiving media is never too dirty nor is it ever clean enough short of zero
discharge. The marginal balancing analysis that the efficiency criterion demands
is foreign to the technology-based approach.
In practice the regulatory entity examines the costs of the various available
technologies, compares their efficacy, and looks for a point at which costs begin to
escalate much more rapidly than efficacy. 230  Indeed, the agencies may simply
establish a "rule of thumb" of X dollars per pound of removal and look for tech-
nologies that meet this rule of thumb in promulgating technology-based standards
for several industries. 23t While these approaches may be equitable and in some
sense cost-effective, they are not necessarily efficient ways of pursuing an overall
societal goal of cleaning up the receiving media. 232 Moreover, the technology-
based approach in practice can bias pollution control in favor of capital-intensive
"white elephant" technologies which may be ineffective in the long run. 233
There is a sense, however, in which the technology-based approach is efficient.
The promulgation of an ambient media-quality-based standard does not tell an
quality. Even this distinction, however, narrows in the case of the discharge of toxics into pristine waters
when the media-quality-oriented nondegradation policy would require the charge to be so high as to
induce the implementation of the very best technology available. This would be largely indistinguishable
from a technology-based effluent limitation based on the best available technology.
228. All of the federal statutes mandating a technology-based approach specify cost as a relevant
consideration. See supra note 19.
229. See Implementatzon Hearings, supra note 105, at 58 (testimony of Jan Olson); HISTORY OF CAA
AMENDMENTS of 1970, supra note 159, at 226 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie: "Emissions standards
alone will not-and probably cannot-guarantee ambient air quality which will protect the public
health."); B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 405.
The efficiency of the technology-based approach can be enhanced by subdividing categories of indus-
trial sources into smaller and smaller subcategories. As the categories became smaller, individual cost
considerations play a larger role. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 10-11.
230. This was essential to the approach the EPA took in setting technology-based standards for vinyl
chloride under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981). See Doniger, supra note
214, at 575-76.
231. This is sub silentio the position that the Texas Air Control Board takes toward setting "best avail-
able technology" limitations for new sources of volatile organic compounds in its individual permitting
proceedings. Interview with Terrell Kott, Permitting Officer, Texas Air Control Board (July 17, 1982).
232. See HISTORY OF THE WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 1117, 1144-45 (testimony of Rus-
sell E. Train: "the imposition of enormous incremental costs unsupported by water quality benefits
attained will divert an inordinate amount of our resources from other environmental priorities, where they
could be much more effectively utilized"); Id at 1123 (testimony of Paul V. McCracken); see also Roberts &
Farrell, The Politcal Economy of mplementation, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 152 (A.
Friedlander ed. 1978); Letter from W.J. Driver, Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n., to Hon. Jennings Ran-
dolph (Sept. 1, 1970), reprinted in HISTORY OF CAA AMENDMENTS OF 1970, supra note 159, at 750.
233. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 80.
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individual source much about what is expected of it. Unless the media-quality-
based standard is implemented through technology-based standards binding on
individual sources or through a historically based allocation scheme, the source has
little basis for planning for the future. The value of its marketable permit may rise
or fall, and its charge may have to be raised or lowered to reflect the addition of
new sources to the receiving media. The source may face constant uncertainty
about the regulatory entity's future expectations. This uncertainty can hinder cap-
ital investment and precipitate economically wasteful investment decisions. 234 A
technology-based new source performance standard tells the regulatee exactly
what is expected and can therefore facilitate private planning. 23 5 This may be
particularly valuable in the chemical industry where the regulatory entity cannot
be expected to promulgate media-quality-based standards for all of the hundreds
of toxic pollutants simultaneously. Technology-based standards can address all of
a given plant's toxic discharges, thereby avoiding the "pollutant of the month syn-
drome" that often afflicts the media-quality-based approach.
236
2. Admim'strative Feasibhity. Whatever its theoretical advantages, a regulatory
tool that cannot be implemented in the real world is useless. Practical considera-
tions of administrative feasibility must therefore play a large role in the choice
between the media-quality-based and technology-based approaches. Indeed, the
history of the implementation of the federal pollution control statutes indicates
that administrative feasibility has been the dominant consideration. The media-
quality-based approach has been abandoned repeatedly because it proved to be, in
the minds of the regulatory decisionmakers, administratively infeasible.
The media-quality-based approach demands huge quantities of detailed infor-
mation about the effects of a discharger's wastes on the quality of the receiving
medium, and uncertainties fill the inevitable informational voids. We have
already seen that quantifying the effects of a particular plant's discharges on
humans and environmental entities is a formidable informational challenge that is
ultimately policy dominated. 237 The uncertainties that plague this process, when
combined with the large unknowns inherent in modeling the fate of toxic sub-
stances in receiving media, should dampen the enthusiasm of even the most ardent
instrumental rationalist. 238
234. See Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Fonnulating and Implementing Energy
Pohy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 21-27 (1979).
235. See H. R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 397 (1972) (additional views of Reps. Abzug &
Rangel); S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 354.
236. If a mixed strategy is adopted by the regulatory entity, however, this planning advantage of the
technology-based approach may disappear. If, for example, the agency requires sources to meet the more
stringent of media-quality and technology standards, compliance with a technology-based new source per-
formance standard will not necessarily protect the source from a later arriving more stringent media-qual-
ity-based standard. The Clean Water Act, which takes this mixed approach, however, cushions the
harshness of this possibility by protecting the owner of a new source for up to 10 years from more stringent
future standards. Clean Water Act § 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) (Supp. V 1981).
237. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
238. The absence of adequate models for tracing the effects of pollutants back to their sources was one
of the primary factors that Congress relied upon in mandating the technology-based approach of section
301 of the Clean Water Act. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971) ("Water quality stan-
dards . . . often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-defendable in court tests, because of the
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If the regulatory entity operates under a statute that requires a "margin of
safety," the regulator's task under the media-quality-based approach may become
downright impossible. For some pollutants the agency may be able to rely upon
existing epidemiological studies to determine a "no-effect" level and add a margin
of safety to that level to arrive at a media-quality standard. It could be argued,
however, that even this level would result in harm to some very sensitive persons or
environmental entities.239 Moreover, the nature of the chronic effects of other pol-
lutants is such that there may be no scientifically acceptable way to determine a
"no-effect" level, and afortiori no basis for specifying a margin of safety. For such
chemicals the margin of safety requirement simply cannot be implemented in a
straightforward media-quality-based fashion. When faced with this dilemma, the
EPA has implemented the media-quality requirement through a technology-based
approach. In explaining its toxics effluent standards under the Clean Water Act,
for example, the agency made this conversion explicit. Referring to the "elastic"
nature of the margin of safety concept, the agency suggested that:
In any case where a discharge is allowed, on a spectrum ranging from certain safety (a
prohibition) to that uncertain point where harmful effects are caused and safety ends, a
logical break point is struck where the very best that control technology can do is
required.
24 0
The media-quality-based approach also requires economic and technical infor-
mation about the regulated sources. If the implementing agency chooses any allo-
cation technique other than a marketable permit approach,2 4 1 it must have some
idea of the costs faced by the various regulatees for various degrees of polution
control. 242 This in turn requires at least a superficial knowledge of the technolo-
gies available to the sources of a given pollutant and the cost of implementing
those technologies.
The technology-based approach, by contrast, requires the regulatory entity to
struggle with only the latter sort of information, albeit perhaps in greater detail
than under the media-quality-based approach. 24 3 Rather than resolve extremely
imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters."); H. R. REP. No. 92-
911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 394 (1972) (additional views of Reps. Abzug and Rangel).
The problem of modeling the fate of toxic pollutants continues to dominate congressional consideration
of the Clean Water Act, see PROHLMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 48, despite optimistic projections in the
early 1970's that adequate models would be forthcoming within five years. See HISTORY OF THE WPCA
AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 1116-17 (testimony of Russell E. Train).
239. See Thompson, Margin of Safety as a Risk-Management Concept in Environmental Legislaton, 6 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1979).
240. Proposed Toxic Pollutant Effluent Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,576 (1976). Even though the
statute required an "ample margin of safety," the D.C. Circuit upheld this approach in Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and in Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
241. The marketable permit approach in theory requires no information about the economic and
engineering problems of implementing various controls. The regulatory entity under this approach merely
sells the pollution load to the highest bidder. Presumably those sources that face the greatest cleanup costs
will bid higher for the right to pollute. See B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 389-95.
The marketable permit allocation technique, however, is not likely to be very useful in health and
environmental regulation of the chemical industry. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
242. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 5, 35-36; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 104, at 575; Roberts &
Stewart, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1644, 1653 (1975).
243. The media-quality-based approach in theory requires only marginal cost data from the relevant
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complex and value-laden questions about the toxic effects of chemicals, the regula-
tory entity need only group the relevant industries into categories and subcatego-
ries, identify potentially applicable technologies, assess the implementation costs,
and choose the technology that best fits the statutory standard. Although this is a
formidable task in its own right, it is much simpler than assessing environmental
risks in addition to the costs of cleanup technologies. Moreover, implementation of
the technology-based approach is at least possible, whereas a strict application of
the margin of safety version of the media-quality-based approach cannot be
accomplished without a certain degree of administrative dissembling.
The technology-based approach also offers the path of least political resistance.
Since this approach does not directly implicate important moral questions about
the value of human lives and endangered environmental entities, the standard-
setting process is less likely to precipitate the highly emotional controversy that can
accompany the promulgation of media-quality-based standards. The important
issues under the technology-based approach are unexciting questions of engi-
neering and economics that generally appear better suited for expert resolution
than for public debate. Moreover, since the technology-based approach focuses
upon industrial categories rather than individual bodies of water or air, a proposed
technology-based standard will almost certainly attract greater attention among
the regulated industry than it will among the potentially affected public. Public
participation will therefore be minimized, and matters can be quietly resolved
between the regulator and the regulatees.
Finally, the technology-based approach gives the administrative decisionmaker
greater discretion than the media-quality-based approach. Statutes mandating a
media-quality-based approach are typically straight forward-"protect the public
health with an ample margin of safety." While it may be impossible to implement
this directive, it is not difficult to comprehend. Statutes mandating a technology-
based approach, however, typically use more vague terms such as "best technology
adequately demonstrated" and specify a host of factors that further cloud the
meaning of the guiding phrase. This hint at the need for clarification through
expertise greatly enhances the administrator's discretion. In practice, the agency
has more leeway to bargain with the interested parties and to bend to such polit-
ical pressures as the process generates.2 44
The technology-based approach is therefore likely to be more attractive to
bureaucrats than the media-quality-based approach. Likewise, the regulated firms
may feel more comfortable with a process that gives them room to bargain with
the agency in low visibility proceedings that depend heavily on industry-supplied
information, especially when the agency may be sympathetic toward their plight.
Administrative convenience may go a long way toward explaining the historical
sources to estimate the effects of various levels of charges on the dischargers. F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at
36. The pure technology-based approach requires the agency to survey all appropriate pollution control
technologies for efficacy and expense and then choose among them. See id. at 12; A. KNEESE & C.
SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 1; R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 35, at 557. In the not atypical case
where there is only one source of a pollutant and only two or three alternative technologies, however, the
amount of information needed for both approaches would seem to be roughly equivalent.
244. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 158, 164.
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conversion of the media-quality-based approach to a technology-based approach.
This historical development, while understandable, is not necessarily sound.
Before embarking upon the technology-based approach toward setting effluent
limitations for conventional pollutants under the Clean Water Act, Administrator
Ruckelshaus warned that:
[I]n completely obliterating the admittedly complex relationship between municipal and
industrial effluent and water quality, the Senate may have sacrificed wisdom for simplicity.
It is simpler to address the problem in terms of available technology than in terms of com-
plex treatment and ambient water quality relationships. But it is my conviction that in the
environment as elsewhere, the renunciation of known complexity on the altar of simplicity
is the essence of bad government policy.
2 4 5
3. Enforceabiity. No regulatory scheme can function properly if its requirements
may be violated with impunity. The regulatory mechanisms that society estab-
lishes to influence the conduct of employers and polluters must ultimately be
backed by a realistic threat of sanctions for cheaters. 246 Yet, before society can
punish someone for cheating, it must specify with sufficient clarity the conduct
that will bring forth government sanctions. While this can be done generically, it
is often more effective to put each individual regulatee on notice of what is
expected of it through a permit system.
At first glance it may appear that the media-quality-based approach is easier to
enforce. When the regulatory entity allocates the pollution reduction load, it can
simply assign a numerical effluent or emissions limitation to each permitholder 47
or, in the case of the workplace where no allocation is necessary, specify an
ambient concentration for all workplaces. The enforcer then requires only an
accurate mechanism for monitoring sources. Indeed, enforcement could be further
simplified by requiring sources to monitor their own discharges with some accept-
able monitoring device that is not subject to undetected tampering.2 48
245. HISTORY OF THE WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 1183.
246. It has been suggested that some regulatory techniques compatible with the media-quality-based
approach, such as marketable permits and charges, do not require as much vigilance by the policy
authority because compliance is in the self-interest of the polluter. See B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 351-
52. The regulatory entity, however, must still have an enforcement capacity to ensure thatsources are not
"cheating on their tax returns" or do not emit more than their marketable permits allow. See Economt
Analysis Hearings, supra note 224, at 1284 (testimony of David R. Zwick); F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 93;
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 396-97; Roberts & Stewart, supra note 242, 1652 n.34. This problem can
be alleviated somewhat by requiring self-monitoring so that cheating can be easily detected. See F.
ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 93. But even with self-monitoring, enforcement would be necessary to ensure
that sources did not cheat by diverting emissions to unmonitored vents and outfalls or (in the case of air
pollution) by expanding "fugitive" emissions at the expense of monitored emissions. See Wolozin, supra
note 106, at 236.
247. The individual source emission or effluent limitation in the case of a political or historical alloca-
tion would be set by the regulatory entity according to its allocation formula. In the case of a marketable
permit system, it would be the sum total of the source's permits. In the case of a charge system, a specific
limitation would not be necessary. The enforcing authority would simply take note of the discharge for
purposes of calculating the tax at some later time. Under all of the approaches, however, there must be a
numerical measure of pollution and a mechanism for monitoring sources in accordance with that measure.
248. The major pollution control statutes have provisions allowing the regulatory agency to require
self-monitoring. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1976); Clean Water Act
§ 308(a)(4)(A)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A)(iii) (1976); Clean Air Act §§ 114(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7414
(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1980).
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The enforcement agency, however, faces numerous practical limitations that
greatly reduce the ease with which it can police the media-quality-based
approach.2 4 9 Accurate monitoring devices do not exist for all toxic chemicals.
250
Such monitoring equipment as does exist is often very expensive to purchase and
use.2 5' Sampling a single stack for sulfur dioxide and particulates can consume
two or three man-days and entail over two thousand dollars in equipment costs.
252
The monitoring costs for a source of many different chemical pollutants can be
even higher.2 53 Even when the EPA exercises its authority to require self-moni-
toring, the cost of installing the equipment can be so high as to be arbitrary and
capricious. 254
Enforcement costs for a technology-based aproach can run considerably less
than media-quality monitoring costs. While technology-based standards normally
specify numerical limitations for individual facilities, the limiations are based
upon the pollution removal capacity of a particular technology or its equivalent.
The enforcement officer can normally infer that the numerical limitations are
being met from the fact that the technological components are running properly,
without monitoring actual discharges. This greatly simplifies the enforcement pro-
cess because the enforcement officer need only check to see if the pollution control
equipment is being properly used and maintained and observe recorded evidence
that the equipment was in fact turned on during the relevant enforcement
period.255
249. For a thorough treatment of the problems of monitoring under a media-quality-based approach,
see F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, ch. 4.
250. There is, for example, some question whether an accurate monitoring device exists for moni-
toring stack emissions of sulfur dioxide. See 40 Fed. Reg. 46,240 (1975); B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 382;
Roberts & Farrell, supra note 232, at 163.
251. See PROHLMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 48; F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 91-101; B. MIT-
NICK, supra note 46, at 382; Wolozin, supra note 104, at 235. Relatively inexpensive monitoring devices do
exist. For example, environmental protection officials in the decades before the recent federal environ-
mental legislation routinely used bioassays to monitor stream quality near an industrial outfall. Implernenta-
tion Hearngs, supra note 105, at XXV (testimony of Douglas Costle: "EPA soon will form rules to
incorporate standardized bioassay tests in its testing regulations, anticipating that bio-testing will play a
larger future in toxics control."); id. at 490 (testimony of John Convery); id. at 33 (testimony of W.E.
Garrison). The bioassay directly measures the impact of water on living aquatic species by observing
whether a member of a test species dies during the duration of the test. This monitoring device is inexpen-
sive, but it is very crude. It does not reveal the amount of various pollutants in the waters which might
cause chronic effects in aquatic organisms and humans who consume aquatic organisms. It is therefore
especially inappropriate for monitoring discharges of toxic substances. Nevertheless, it has been suggested
that the EPA be allowed to grant media-quality-based waivers from its technology-based standards for
toxic water pollutants on the strength of bioassays demonstrating that the receiving water is not immedi-
ately toxic to test organisms. Id. at 22 (statement of Dr. John Hernandez).
252. See Roberts & Farrell, supra note 232, at 165.
253. A monitoring protocol now exists for measuring all 65 of the toxic pollutants listed in the NRDC
consent decree. A complete scan for all of these chemicals costs approximately $2,000 per sample. Inter-
view with Dr. Elinor Zimmerman, Office of Water Planning, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Mar.
18, 1982).
254. See Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1340 (9th Cir. 1980) (EPA arbitrary and
capricious in requiring smelter to install self-monitoring device at estimated cost of over $300,000); F.
ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 97 (cost of installing continuous monitor for water discharges of total organic
carbon and chemical oxygen demand estimated at $5,000-410,000 plus maintenance).
255. See B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 403. Recording devices for documenting that a machine is
operating are very inexpensive. Since they can, of course, be tampered with, the enforcement officer may
need to make surprise visits or take other action to discourage tampering. The difficulties with forging
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While technology-based standards are probably easier to police, it may be
more difficult to convince a judge or a jury to levy an effective penalty for a viola-
tion of a technology-based standard than for a media-quality-based standard. It
may be more impressive to the fine setter that the defendant has violated a stan-
dard that is designed to protect human health than a standard designed only to
compel the implementation of the best available technology. On the other hand,
the fine setter may be swayed by the fact that a technology-based standard is usu-
ally set at a level that someone, perhaps a competitor, has been able to meet. Yet,
even this may be unconvincing to a judge or juror when presented with the
defendant's assertion that compliance with the technology-based standard will
cause its financial demise, especially if the prosecutor can point to no definite envi-
ronmental harm that will flow from the violation. 256
Moreover, the overall ease of enforcement of technology-based standards may
be offset somewhat by the diminished likelihood that any given enforcement
action will result in penalties high enough to deter future violations.2 5 7 Still, ease
of detecting violations is a significant advantage, especially in a regime in which
citizens are allowed to prosecute violations of the standards on their own
initiative.2 58
4. Survivabiiy. Any standard or requirement that an agency imposes upon
regulatees must ultimately survive review by designated reviewing institutions.
Health and environmental standards are no exception to the general presumption
in American administrative law that agency actions are subject to judicial review.
Under the current environment statutes, the agency must demonstrate that a stan-
dard is not "arbitrary and capricious"; 259 OSHA must establish that its standards
are supported by "substantial evidence on the record as a whole. ' 260 In addition,
agency actions must survive less formal, but still very real, review by the political
entities that have the power to influence and control the implementing agency's
chart recordings are sufficiently great, however, that this should not pose a great threat to the technology-
based enforcement strategy.
256. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 12; A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 402.
257. The agency can avoid the problem of low penalties if it has the authority to administer civil
penalties and if it uses that power to assess penalties that roughly approximate the economic savings to the
source that resulted from its failure to comply plus some additional "deterrent" penalty. The EPA at one
time had promulgated a civil penalty policy to guide prosecutors in determining what to ask for in judicial
enforcement actions. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Civil Penalty Policy For Major Source
Violations of Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, 8 ENV'T REP. BNA 2011 (Apr. 11, 1978); see also Ohio ex
rel. Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 13 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery County
1979). This policy has since been repealed. Section 120 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. V
1980), allows the EPA to assess noncompliance penalties in an amount sufficient to deter future violations.
See Assessment and Collection of Noncompliance Penalties by EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 66.1 (1982); Orloff, But-
tressing the Traditional Approach to Enforcement of Environmental Requirements.- Noncomphance Penalties Under the
Clean Air Act, 9 ENVTL. L. Rsr. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 50,029 (1979); Zener & Olstein, Pollution Regs. Problems for
Lawyers, Accountants, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 22, 1980, at 11.
258. All of the major environmental statutes have citizen enforcement provisions. See Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Clean Air Act
§ 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1980). OSHA does not, however, provide for citizen enforcement.
259. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1982).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
Page 159: Summer 1983]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
conduct. 26 1 If the agency's actions do not satisfy the relevant Congressional com-
mittees, the agency head faces difficult oversight hearings and possible loss of funds
or statutory authority. If those actions do not satisfy the President, the heads of
OSHA and the EPA, which are not independent agencies, can lose their jobs. The
political supervision described here is not usually the detailed case-by-case review
of the judiciary, although it can be detailed and particularized at times; rather, it
is the understanding that an agency official rapidly acquires that its actions must
be explainable to the satisfaction of politicians whose constituents perceive them-
selves harmed by those actions.
The inevitability of judicial and political review may have an impact upon the
choice of regulatory approaches. If one approach is likely to survive judicial and
political review more readily than the other, then proponents of stringent health
and environmental goals may prefer the first approach and regulated industries
the second.
a. Judicial Reivew. The EPA's technology-based standards have taken a ter-
rible beating in the courts of appeals. The agency's initial effort in the mid-1970's
to promulgate national technology-based effluent limitations for new and existing
sources under the Clean Water Act precipitated more than 250 court challenges. 262
After many of these cases were consolidated, the courts of appeals across the
country decided sixteen appeals, 263 all but three of which resulted in remands to
the agency on one or more substantive issues. 264 While many of the remands
involved only minor components of much larger standards, the EPA has had diffi-
culty in establishing virtually all of the engineering techniques that it has adopted
for setting technology-based standards. The agency has been most successful when
it can point to an existing source which currently meets its proposed effluent limi-
tation.265 Similarly, when the EPA can point to an existing pilot plant that can
261. See Pierce & Shapiro, Political andJudicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1981).
262. See Note, Efficttbe Regulation of Point Sources Under the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 10 GA.
L. REV. 983, 1019 (1976).
263. There are sixteen written opinions involving appeals from EPA's BPT effluent limitation regula-
tions under Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(1)(A), 304(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1976): Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979),rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); National Crushed Stone Ass'n v.
Costle, 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d
637 (1st Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir 1978); American Iron & Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3rd Cir. 1977); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976); National Renderers Ass'n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.
1976); E. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aft'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977);
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976); Tanners' Council of Am. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188
(4th Cir. 1976); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train,
539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker
Chemicals & Plastics v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir.
1975).
264. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); California & Hawaiian Sugar
Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1977); American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dismissed 429 U.S. 967 (1976).
265. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American Frozen Food Inst. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). But see
Tanners' Council of Am. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v.
Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976).
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meet its proposed limitation, the agency can usually survive judicial review.2 66
However, when the EPA cannot point to an exemplary or pilot plant in the same
industrial category or subcategory and therefore relies upon its prediction that an
existing treatment technology will transfer from one industry to another, the
courts are more skeptical, and the agency usually loses. 267 In the rare cases in
which the EPA has gone beyond existing technology to project that the industry
will be able to develop a technology capable of meeting the prescribed effluent
limitations at some future date, the EPA has lost two out of three appeals. 268
A large proportion of the many remands have resulted from the reviewing
courts' dissatisfaction with the EPA's numerical calculation of the level of pollu-
tion removal that a given technology is capable of producing.269 Even though the
reviewing courts might agree with the EPA's identification of the "best available"
or "best practicable" technology, it may be skeptical that the technology, when
installed in most plants, can reduce pollution to the extent required by the effluent
limitation.270 This unfortunate impasse results from Congress's general failure to
empower the EPA to prescribe the technologies itself; the agency may only pro-
mulgate limitations based upon the technologies that it has identified. While this
limitation on the EPA's power has the salutary purpose of maximizing an indi-
vidual source's freedom to develop different technologies capable of meeting the
same limitation, the practical effect has been to hamstring the EPA's efforts to set
any limitations at all.
The flood of remands ultimately deprived the EPA of the benefit of the
Supreme Court's holding in E. du Pont de Nemours, Inc. v. Traln2 7 1 that the EPA
266. American Paper Inst. v. Train; 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dzsmitsed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976); CPC
Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
267. See Tanners' Council of Am. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976); American Petroleum Inst.
v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973
(4th Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); American Iron &
Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir.
1975). But see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); California & Hawaiian Sugar
Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1977); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
268. Compare FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train,
526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) with American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. dsmlssed,
429 U.S. 967 (1976).
269. See National Renderers Ass'n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539
F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); Amer-
ican Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442
(7th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
270. Perhaps the most egregious example ofjudicial second-guessing in all of the appeals is CPC Int'l
Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976). The EPA established an effluent limitation for new sources in
the Corn Wet Milling Industry of 10 pounds of total suspended solids per thousand standard bushels of
corn. The Eighth Circuit held this action to be arbitrary and capricious in CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515
F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). The EPA responded to the remand by attempting to provide greater record
support for its limitation. The court, however, was unpersuaded. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329
(8th Cir. 1976). The court allowed that a standard of 25 pounds per thousand standard bushels could be
supported by the record, but not the original standard of 10 pounds per thousand standard bushels. The
court therefore remanded to the EPA "with directions to it to revise the TSS standard to 25 pounds per
MSBu or to compile additional evidence to support a lower standard." Id. at 1345. Not surprisingly, the
EPA took the none-too-subtle hint. 40 C.F.R. § 406.15 (1982).
271. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
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had the power to promulgate national effluent limitations. The EPA responded to
only a very few of the remands, 27 2 and even when it did, it could not always per-
suade the remanding court of the validity of its standards. 273
The EPA's batting average in the courts of appeals is not much better for its
technology-based new source performance standards (NSPS) under the Clean Air
Act. 274 Even with the wisdom gained from its humiliating Clean Water Act experi-
ence, the EPA could not in 1977275 draft a new source performance standard for
lime manufacturing plants that could survive in the generally sympathetic D.C.
Circuit. 27 6
The EPA's technology-based standard setting under both the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts has been plagued by the intractable problem of excursions and
upsets. 277 The agency readily acknowledges that even the best technologies do not
perform flawlessly under strenuous real world conditions. Startups and upsets
(such as those caused by unexpected rainfall or equipment breakdowns) can
swamp the pollution control technology and cause a facility's discharge to exceed
an effluent limitation that is predicated upon normal operating conditions. 27 8 The
dilemma is initially attributable to the requirement that the EPA write effluent
limitations rather than prescribe actual technologies. Yet even if the agency could
prescribe technologies, it would face the enforcement problem of limiting the
number of upsets to those actually required by bona fide production disruptions.
The EPA initially proposed to address this conundrum by wisely exercising its
enforcement discretion. 279 The regulated sources are, not surprisingly, invariably
dubious about this "solution" in light of the fact that any citizen may sue to
272. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976); ef Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,
620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
273. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussed supra note 270).
274. Although many of the new source performance standards have gone into effect without chal-
lenge, industry has usually been successful in securing a remand when those standards have been chal-
lenged. Compare National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Essex Chem. Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (remand on two relatively
minor issues); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
921 (1974), on hearing subsequent to remandsub nom. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) with Sierra Club v. Costle, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2137
(D.C. Cir. 1981); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
275. The New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) for lime manufacturing plants was promulgated
on May 3, 1977. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Lime Manufacturing Plants, 42
Fed. Reg. 22,506 (1977).
276. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
277. See Corn Refiners Ass'n v. Costle, 594 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590
F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp.
v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 432-33 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 398-99 n.91
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
278. See Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539
F.2d 973, 986 (4th Cir. 1976).
279. In Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1272 (9th Cir. 1977), the EPA refused to include a
provision for upsets in the permit, preferring instead to "set a standard by using a 97.5 or 99 percent
'confidence interval,' and then to address the expected one percent or more of 'excursions' when they
actually occur. If. . . a violation . . . was not the fault of the permit holder, EPA will informally exercise
its discretion not to prosecute."
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enforce an effluent limitation that is reflected in a discharge permit. 280 Yet, if the
effluent limitation itself must provide for predictable upsets, a source might abuse
its privilege to upset entitlements. 28' And if the EPA must set the limitation so
high that it can be reached under upset conditions, as one court has apparently
suggested, 282 then the limitation will be far too lenient. While the courts of appeals
have split on the issue of whether to require the inclusion of upset conditions as a
factor in setting the limitations, most have required the EPA to do more than
allude to its enforcement discretion. 28 3 Most recently, the EPA has decided to
,write excursion and upset provisions into its general permitting regulations under
§ 402 of the Clean Water Act. 28 4 This merely delegates the problem to the permit
writers and enforcers.
OSHA's experience with judicial review of technology-based standards has
been less bleak. All of OSHA's standards for carcinogens and its standards for lead
and cotton dust have been technology-based because the point of economic and
technological infeasibility was reached before the level of toxic substance in the
workplace was deemed safe.285 In only one case did a court of appeals reject
OSHA's conclusions concerning the feasibility of a standard.28 6 In the only case in
which the Supreme Court has considered the record's support for a technology-
based standard, the Court upheld OSHA's cotton dust standard over vigorous
industry objections that OSHA had made wholly unsupported assumptions and
had manipulated the existing studies in an unreasonable way to support its
conclusions. 28 7
In sharp contrast to its mixed experience with technology-based standards, the
EPA has been reasonably successful in securing judicial approval of its media-
quality-based standards. Industrial firms challenged only one of the EPA's initial
national ambient air quality standards. While that challenge was successful, it
280. Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1273 (9th Cir. 1977); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train,
544 F.2d 657, 660 (3d Cir. 1976) ("There is no authorization to block a citizen's suit under section 505 even
though the agency believes that the suit should not go forward.").
281. Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1320
(8th Cir. 1976); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977) (court emphasizes the temptation to store pollutants for excess discharges).
282. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
283. Compare Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckel-
shaus, 486 F.2d 427, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 398-99 n.91 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Getty Oil v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1972), ceri. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) with Corn Refiners Ass'n v.
Costle, 594 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
284. American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981).
285. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); American Iron & Steel
Inst. v. OSHA, 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1451 (3d Cir. 1978); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1975); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
286. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), afd sub noma. Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
OSHA's emergency temporary standards for 14 carcinogens, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,074 (1973), were rejected
for lack of support on the toxicity issue in Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d
Cir. 1973), and Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 973 (1975). The permanent standards, however, were upheld in Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
287. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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resulted in a relatively limited remand requiring the EPA to provide greater
record support for one of its assertions. 288 The EPA apparently learned from this
experience, and its revised standard for photochemical oxidants survived chal-
lenges from both environmentalists and industry.28 9 The reduction models with
which the EPA calculates pollution reduction loads have also easily survived judi-
cial review, even when petitioners have pointed to other models that appear to
depend upon fewer brash assumptions. 290 There have been no challenges to the
EPA's hazardous emission standards under section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
2 9 1
and the EPA's media-quality-based toxics effluent standards, promulgated under
section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act, easily survived judicial review in the D.C.
Circuit.292
From a reading of the EPA's history, it would appear that the courts are
inclined to review technology-based standards more carefully than media-quality-
based standards. Judges may be less hesitant to substitute their judgment for that
of the agency on questions of engineering and economics, or it may be that lawyers
can characterize an agency action as erroneous and arbitrary more easily when
those kinds of issues are involved. When the question before the court concerns the
intricacies of toxicology and meteorology, the judges apparently feel uneasy with
the conclusion that the agency's decision lacks support. Yet, this reasoning does
not explain why most of OSHA's technology-based standards have survived so
well, even though the standard of review for OSHA's technology-based standards
has traditionally been viewed as more exacting. 29 3 One explanation for this
apparent inconsistency is that OSHA's standards, like the EPA's media-quality-
based standards (but unlike the EPA's technology-based standards), are directly
tied to human health. 294 OSHA may only impose a technology-based standard
when the workplace is already unsafe, and even after the standard is in place the
workplace may still pose risks to workers. The direct link between a standard and
worker health may make the courts more reluctant to overrule OSHA's standards.
It is also possible that OSHA has simply done a better job than the EPA in justi-
fying its standards.2 95
288. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Interestingly, the EPA did not
respond to the remand. The agency may have read more into the court's opinion than was required. See
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Diection in Administrative Resolution of Science Pohcy Questions.- Regulating
Carcinogens if EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. REV. 729 (1979).
289. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
290. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
13 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1993, 2032 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d
1150 (6th Cir. 1978); Mission Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289
(5th Cir. 1974). But see Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1114 (1979).
291. There was a challenge to the section 112 standard for vinyl chloride, but it was not pursued. See
Doniger, supra note 214, at 581-85.
292. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hercules, Inc. v.
EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
293. See McGarity, supra note 288, at 791-92.
294. This explanation is even more true after Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), because OSHA must first determine that current exposure levels pose a
"significant risk" to workers before the agency may promulgate a feasibility-based standard.
295. OSHA may be aided in this by the fact that OSHA always allows opposing counsel to cross-
examine witnesses and otherwise conducts its hearings in a relaxed trial-like fashion while the EPA's
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One can perhaps draw the tentative conclusion that pure technology-based
standards may have greater difficulty in surviving judicial review. 296 The evidence
on this score, however, which is derived largely from a single agency's experience
with two statutes mandating across-the-board technology-based standards, is not
especially compelling. Nevertheless, the ability to survive judicial review would
appear to be a factor that weighs in favor of media-quality-based standards.
b. Poh'tical Review. The evidence concerning political review of the two
approaches is extremely sparse, and it supports few conclusions. Since OSHA's
health standards usually have both media-quality and technology components, it
is impossible to tell whether the considerable political attention that has sur-
rounded many of those standards is directed toward the agency's scientific or engi-
neering judgments. While the first round of the EPA's ambient air quality
standards generated little political debate, the more recent revisions are causing
intense political interest both in the White House and in Congress. 29 7 On the
other hand, the EPA's recent technology-based standard for steam electric power
plants has also received a great deal of political attention, 29 8 as did its recent regu-
lation requiring that lead be phased out of gasoline.
While it seems reasonable to surmise that most technology-based standards,
which are directed at narrow industrial categories, will not achieve the high polit-
ical profile of media-quality-based standards for toxic substances that could affect
the health of millions, it is impossible to draw that conclusion from the available
evidence. In any event, one could equally plausibly argue that the most effective
political review is the low-key suggestion by a member of the agency's appropria-
tion committee at the behest of an important constituent who is lagging behind his
competitors in installing the technology that the EPA proposes as the basis for a
technology-based standard. 299
5. Equy. In addition to its great concern for practicality and economic effi-
ciency, this country has always exhibited an often countervailing concern for
equity. 3° ° Although pollution control has not raised questions of fairness or equity
with nearly the frequency and forcefulness of many other social programs, impor-
tant equity issues do reside under the surface of the pollution control debate.
effluent limitations hearings are generally of the "paper hearing" variety. See Stewart, supra note 182, at
731.
296. This is apparently the conclusion of many of the commentators. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 9,
at 12-13, 186; B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 374, 406.
297. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Verkuil,Jawboning Admins-
tratwve Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980); Letter from Robert J.
Ranch, Environmental Defense Fund attorney, to Douglas Costle, Legal Times of Washington (1979); see
also Iron and Steel Offtials Object to EPA Draft Particulate Impact Analyss, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 29, 1982, at 11-
12.
298. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 183, at 1542-43; Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressure on Coal
New Source Performance Standards-And Breaks, 9 EcoLoGY L.Q. 67, 83-91 (1980).
299. For an interesting example of very critical political review by a Congressman at the behest of
constituents who were ahead of their competitors in installing pollution control technology and therefore
wanted the EPA to enforce more stringent standards, see Hearings on EPA Regulatory Delay Impact on Industry
and State Environmental Programs: Connecticut Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
300. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
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These concerns can also have an impact on the choice between the media-quality-
based and technology-based approaches.
Any health and environmental standard that does not achieve very close to
zero risk will over time shift wealth from those who are harmed by the discharge of
hazardous substances to those who benefit thereby. As we have seen, the tort
system rarely forces the beneficiaries to compensate the losers. 30' For many pol-
luting activities, the class of beneficiaries-the consumers of manufactured prod-
ucts-overlaps with the class of losers. Much of the chemical industry probably fits
within this category of activities for which the winners and losers are largely coter-
minous. There are, however, exceptions to this more-or-less equitable arrange-
ment. Workers in the chemical industry generally receive higher exposures than
other consumers. 30 2 Moreover, scientists are increasingly able to isolate groups of
people who, because of genetic factors, are at a higher risk of contracting disease
from low exposure to chemicals than the rest of the population. 30 3 The EPA has
made an effort in promulgating its national ambient air quality standards to iden-
tify groups of unusually susceptible persons and to protect a large proportion of
them from harm. 30 4 OSHA, too, has written special provisions into its standards
to protect sensitive workers. 30 5
The media-quality-based approach can address these inequities directly. 30 6 As
the ambient standard is lowered the disparity weakens. The technology-based
approach, however, does not address this equity concern at all because it does not
dwell on the quality of the receiving media. In the workplace, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act's combined media-quality-based and limited technology-
based approach adequately addresses the worker/consumer inequity by requiring
the receiving media to be free of significant risks, but it allows the inequity to creep
back in when it is infeasible to protect susceptible populations.
Any health and environmental standard that directly or indirectly requires
large capital expenditures can create interfirm inequities. 30 7 Professors Leone and
Jackson have recently undertaken pathbreaking economic studies on the interfirm
301. See supra text accompanying notes 65-92.
302. There is a large literature on this particular inequity. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB
(1978); C. GERSUNY, WORK HAZARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 143 (1981) ("If there can be no such
thing as a riskless society then the distribution of these risks is a matter of grave importance. Are the risks
faced by the Rockefellers of this world similar to the risks faced by the manual labor force?"); J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES (1973); R. ScoTr, MUSCLE AND BLOOD (1974).
303. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE PREVEN-
TION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1982); McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 50, at 1010-12.
304. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980);
National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978). There is less evidence that
the EPA takes this approach in promulgating its hazardous emissions limitations under section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981).
305. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 (1981) (arsenic); id. § 1910.1025 (lead); id. § 1910.1045 (acrylonitrile); see
Rothstein, Employee Selecton Based on Susceptibility to Occupatzonal Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983).
306. Media-quality-based standards can also address interspecies inequities directly. The secondary
ambient air quality standards are intended to do this, but the fact that harm to other species is encom-
passed within the term "human welfare" indicates that the standard-setter is to take an anthropocentric
approach toward setting these standards.
307. See Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (small
petroleum refiners and large petroleum refiners disagree over proper standard for lead gasoline additive).
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impacts of capital-intensive health and environmental requirements. 30 8 From this
standpoint the technology-based approach may be less "equitable" than the
media-quality-based approach. The technology-based approach groups an
industry into various categories and subcategories and prescribes the same effluent
limitation for all firms within a given category or subcategory, many of whom
compete with one another in product markets. While this approach may at first
glance appear equitable because it treats equals equally, 30 9 it may appear inequi-
table from the standpoint of the individual sources within a given category. Some
may have to undertake greater capital expenditures than others, and (perhaps
more importantly) some will have to defer capital investments in production
capacity to a greater extent than others. 3t0
Technology-based standards for many industries are calculated with reference
to the best performers in a given category. The best performers at the time that
the standard is promulgated will necessarily face lower cleanup costs than the
poorer performers. All of these factors will operate to the competitive advantage
of some firms and to the detriment of others.311 This shift in the relative positions
of the competing firms may have very little effect on the product market. How-
ever, if the cost increase forces marginal firms out of the product market, the regu-
lation will certainly appear inequitable to them,31 2 and the net result could be less
competition and artificially high prices. Moreover, if a substantial proportion of
the "marginal" 31 3 firms are smaller firms with smaller income streams and less
access to capital, the result rnay appear inequitable from a populist, small busi-
ness-oriented perspective. 3 14
A related interfirm inequity of the technology-based approach is the disparity
308. See Leone & Jackson, supra note 98.
309. This is not precisely true to the extent that an individual source may secure a variance. See E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 123 n.10 (1977); Clean Water Act § 301(c), 33 U.S.C
§ 1311(c) (1976).
310. For a detailed explanation of how regulation-induced deferral of capital investments in produc-
tion capacity can disproportionately harm a firm in comparison to its competitors, see Leone & Jackson,
supra note 98, at 234-39.
311. Leone and Jackson demonstrate the effect of the "best practicable technology" standards under
section 301 of the Clean Water Act on the competitive positions of firms in the pulp and paper industry.
Id at 254.
312. The shutdown of marginal firms need not appear inequitable to the rest of society. In a sense, to
the extent that such firms were surviving because they were able to put the costs of doing business off on
others, their demise is well-deserved. They may have been forced out of business by the market in any
event. See id at 257; Letter from Alvin L. Aim to Joe G. Moore (Feb. 6, 1976), reprinted in National
Commission on Water Quality, Final Report 44-45 (1976) ("Few industries face the threat of plant closures
and many of those plants which are projected to close down rather than invest in pollution control equip-
ment are those which could not remain economically viable over the next decade in the absence of water
pollution control."); see also Economic Analysis Hearzngs, supra note 224, at 1220 (statement of Robert K.
Davis).
313. In using the term "marginal" here, I mean marginal with respect to income flow and large and
immediate regulation-induced capital expenditures. In this sense it is more likely that small firms fall into
this category.
314. This argument has been raised in the political debates. See HISTORY OF TiE WPCA AMEND-
MENTS, supra note 184, at 1355 (statement of Sen. Nelson); National Commission on Water Quality, Final
Report 17 (1976). It probably also explains why Vice President Bush ordered the EPA to re-examine its
lead phase-down rule immediately prior to the date that it became effective for both large and small
refiners. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 512 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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in treatment usually afforded to new firms and existing firms. 31 5 Virtually all true
technology-based standards set separate requirements for new sources. This prac-
tice is justified to the extent that retrofit costs for existing plants are much larger
than the costs of designing pollution control into a new plant.3 16 The distinction
also has greater political attractiveness because the potential owners of new sources
are not always as well repesented in the political debates. It is easy for a political
body to load the burden of pollution control onto sources that do not exist. The
disparity will, however, appear inequitable to the new source owner after the stan-
dard has been promulgated. Moreover, the new source/old source distinction has
the considerable practical disadvantage of discouraging existing firms from
retiring inefficient and heavily polluting old plants and replacing them with newer
and more efficient equipment. 3 17
The media-quality-based approach can create similar interfirm inequities. To
the extent that media-quality-based standards are implemented through tech-
nology-based implementation techniques, the same interfirm inequities exist. If
the agency allocates the pollution reduction load in accordance with historical use,
the interfirm inequities should be reduced because the pollution reduction
required will not depend upon the performance of the best among a category of
competitors. The historical allocation approach does, however, put new sources at
a disadvantage relative to existing sources when the available increment of pollu-
tion has been consumed. A stringently implemented nondeterioration policy will
create a similar new source/old source inequity.
3 18
Implementing a media-quality-based approach through incentive-oriented
techniques, such as charges and marketable permits, will also create inequities
among existing sources in areas where the media-quality-based standards are
exceeded, because any regulation-induced cleanup will have some impact on the
relative competitive positions of the existing firms. 3 19 This should not, however, be
equivalent to the impact of a technology-based standard because any particular
source will have the flexibility to implement its own optimum pollution control
technology. Moreover, a firm can cushion the impact of an incentive-based alloca-
tion scheme by paying the charge or purchasing pollution rights out of short term
revenues and thereby avoiding the deferral of capital investments in production
capacity. Finally, incentive-oriented techniques do not distinguish between new
and old sources. Both classes pay the same for an equivalent amount of pollution.
315. See B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 405.
316. See generall Huber, The Old-New Diviswn in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REX'. 1025 (1983).
317. See id at 1073. Ackerman and Hassler suggest that the large differential between the stringent
new source performance standards for coal-fired steam electric power plants and the sulfur dioxide removal
requirements for old sources under the state implementation plans had the net effect of increasing the
amount of acid rain over that which would have resulted from a less stringent NSPS. See Ackerman &
Hassler, supra note 183, at 1522-25.
318. A stringent PSD policy would preclude any construction of new sources in areas that are already
clean. In practice, the PSD policy allows new sources if they can demonstrate that they are beneficial
overall and if they implement the best available technology. See Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Polcy in
Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IoWA L. R EV. 643. 645 (1977 ). Th is
creates the same new source/old source inequity that exists in a technology-based system.
319. See Leone & Jackson, supra note 98, at 239.
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6. Technological Advance. The policy-oriented economists are right to insist that
policymakers recognize that health and environmental protection requires trade-
offs. We cannot have as much health and as many environmental amenities as we
might like without sacrificing other important material resources. Nevertheless,
the economy and technology are not static. Advances in technology can bring
about changes that greatly diminish the agony of some tradeoffs. Pollution control
problems that today appear intractable may disappear tomorrow with the advent
of new technology. Indeed, the possibility of technological advance is itself a
strong reason for abandoning the strict economic approach, which in practice
often reduces to a static assessment of the costs and benefits of regulatory require-
ments under existing technological constraints. The government can, of course,
encourage technological advance by directly funding engineering and environ-
mental research. Government can also encourage technological progress by
molding its regulatory requirements to give private firms, operating under compet-
itive conditions, an incentive to conduct their own research and development
efforts. 320 Congress might, for example, decide to "force" technology by pre-
scribing requirements that are capable of being met only through the implementa-
tion of newly evolving or nonexistent technologies. 32 1 Alternatively, Congress
might attempt to "nudge" technology by making it very expensive for sources to
pollute. The ability of a regulatory approach to encourage technological advance
might therefore influence the choice between the media-quality-based and tech-
nology-based approaches.
The technology-based approach, when it is functioning properly, can effec-
tively force companies to install technologies that other companies with similar
production processes and wastes already use. When the regulatory entity can
point to a competitor that is using a technology, it can justifiably insist that the
laggard install the same or equivalent technology. 322 Technology-based standards
can thus bring all of the firms in an industrial category up to the level of its best
performers, and this upgrading activity can in theory be initiated quite rapidly. 323
Technology-based standards are likely to be even more effective in forcing new
sources to implement the best of existing technology, because it should be easier to
design an existing technology into a new plant than to retrofit it into an existing
plant.
When the regulatory entity cannot point to an existing plant that has success-
fully implemented a technological innovation, it can attempt to rely upon innova-
320. For a complete discussion of the choice between technology-based standards and media-quality-
based standards and "technology-forcing," see RADIAN CORP., CASE STUDIES OF AIR POLLUTION CON-
TROL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS (1980) (Final Task II Report to the National Commission on Air Qual-
ity); La Pierre, supra note 187; see also Comment, supra note 224.
321. See supra note 268 and accompanying text; cf Renken v. Harvy Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 169 (D.
Or. 1963) (nuisance case in which court was impressed by the fact that competitor had installed existing
technology).
322. Technology-based standards that are based upon technologies already in operation within the
relevant category are much more likely to survive judicial review. See La Pierre, supra note 187, at 823.
323. See American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C.Cir.), cert. dsmssed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976);
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
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tive technologies in the "pilot plant" or "demonstration" phase of development for
new source standards and for standards that take effect in the future. Technology-
based standards can also force the transfer of technologies from one industry to
another with similar processes and wastes. We have seen, however, that the EPA
has not been especially successful in persuading reviewing courts of the rationality
of standards that are based upon innovative techniques and technology
transfers. 324
The technology-based approach has the further capacity to impel an entire
industry forward by requiring firms to install or retrofit nonexistent technologies
that are projected to be available in the near future. The courts, however, have
been very reluctant to allow the EPA to impose technology-based requirements on
the basis of this sort of "crystal ball" inquiry. 325
Technology-based standards, in sum, can "press" existing firms toward existing
technologies, and they can probably "force" new sources to implement the best of
existing technologies and perhaps, if the agency is especially careful in preparing
its support documents, force new sources to implement new technologies that are
just on the horizon. 326 In theory this limited technological advance can be accom-
plished rapidly and with little risk of unsympathetic judicial review. In practice,
however, the EPA's technology-based standards have not been rapidly imple-
mented, and they have not fared well in the courts. This result may be curable
with experience, but the EPA's recent mixed record in securing judicial approval
of its new source performance standards under the Clean Air Act does not warrant
optimism on this score.
It seems clear that the technology-based approach cannot induce real techno-
logical change. It can at best bring the laggards into line with the leaders; it
cannot effectively force the leaders to innovate. 327 Indeed, the leaders have a posi-
tive disincentive to invest in research and development toward new pollution con-
trol technologies. If a more expensive but less polluting new technology is
developed, that firm's own new sources may have to apply it.328
The media-quality-based approach has a greater potential to stimulate techno-
logical advance, but only if the right implementation techniques are adopted. If
the regulatory entity implements the media-quality-based approach with tech-
nology-based standards, then little real innovation can be expected. The agency
will make optimistic assumptions about the ability of existing technologies to meet
324. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
325. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
326. Extensive case studies done for the National Commission on Air Quality have concluded that the
EPA's new source performance standards have induced technological advance in several industries. See
RADIAN CORP., supra note 320. Another study of sulfur dioxide removal from copper smelters and electric
power plants has likewise concluded that technology-based standards have induced research and develop-
ment investment in those industries with the largest investments being directed toward new sources. Com-
ment, supra note 224.
327. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 82; La Pierre, supra note 187, at 805; Comment,
supra note 224, at 1727.
328. See Econonmic Analysis Hearings, supra note 224, at 1192 (testimony of Michael McClosky, Executive
Director, Sierra Club); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 18, at 63; La Pierre, supra note 187, at 774;
Comment, supra note 224, at 1727.
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the ambient media-quality standards and the standards will continue to be
exceeded or, at best, incremental progress toward attainment may result. The his-
torical and political allocation techniques are also unlikely to stimulate innovation
or even to push existing sources toward the best existing technology. Unfortu-
nately, few, if any, health and environmental agencies go beyond these standard
tools for implementing a media-quality-based approach.
Forceful implementation of the media-quality-based approach could stimulate
innovation in geographical areas where media-quality-based standards are
exceeded as long as there is a firm deadline for attainment of the standards. If the
sources in those areas were assured that they in fact faced shutdown if the stan-
dards continued to be exceeded after a given period of time, then they would have
a very large incentive to develop pollution control technology prior to the dead-
line. However, the incentive hinges entirely upon the credibility of the shutdown
threat. In the past, the threat has not been credible. The threat is largely unavail-
able to OSHA because it cannot close down too many employers without under-
mining the purpose of the standard-that is, safe and healthful employment. The
threat of shutdown from the EPA is in theory somewhat more credible, but histori-
cally it has proved just as empty. The EPA's vinyl chloride experience aptly dem-
onstrates the agency's reluctance to promulgate media-quality-based limitations at
near-zero levels if doing so threatens a substantial portion of a vital industry.329
The states that are charged with implementing the national ambient air quality
standards seldom prescribe emissions limitations that cannot be met by existing
technology, even when failure to do so means that the ambient air quality stan-
dards will be exceeded past the relevant deadlines. Even if the EPA or a state
adopted a hard line, it is not clear that a court would not accept an individual
company's economic and technological feasibility claims in reviewing the reasona-
bleness of the individual limitation 330 or in framing relief in an enforcement
action. 33 1 Finally, footdragging industries know that failing all else, they can
return to Congress and appeal for an extension of the deadline, as many industries
successfully did in 1976 and may do again in 1984. With the threat of sanctions or
shutdown thus reduced to low comedy, a firm has very little incentive to invest in
new pollution control technologies. Indeed, a firm that took seriously its apparent
obligations and invested in research and development would probably suffer real
economic harm at the hands of its more cynical and less obedient competitors.
A pollution charge or marketable permit allocation technique, by contrast, can
stimulate pollution control innovation beyond that necessary to rise to the per-
formance level of the best in the industry. Since every unit of pollution under
either of those allocation schemes is a costly item, every source has an incentive to
329. See supra text accompanying note 214; see also Doniger, supra note 214, at 563-64, 572; La Pierre,
supra note 187, at 793-94.
330. In many states a source may challenge a state-ordered emissions limitation on economic and
technological infeasibility grounds in state court. Courts have held individual requirements invalid on this
basis, even though it means in practice that another source must face even more stringent limitations or,
more likely, that the media-quality-based standard will not be met sufficiently rapidly. See Menzel v.
County Util. Corp., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1126, 1128 (E.D. Va. 1979).
331. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
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develop pollution reduction technologies, 332 thus creating a market for innovative
firms that develop pollution control devices. 333
The incentive-oriented techniques are, however, no panacea. The charge must
be set sufficiently high to provide a realistic incentive to innovate. Research and
development is costly and risky; it will not be undertaken unless the firm is per-
suaded that it will ultimately pay for itself in reduced payments for fees or in sales
of permits. 334 Unfortunately, the relationship between financial rewards and
research and development decisions in a firm is not well understood. The imple-
menting agency will therefore lack the ability to predict with much accuracy
whether a particular charge will provide the threshold incentive to send research
and development funds into pollution control rather than into style changes and
new product lines. 335 In addition, a fee or permit that is sufficiently costly to send
a clear signal to firms may be so expensive that it threatens the financial integrity
of a large segment of the regulated industry, in which case the agency will face
precisely the same pressure from the regulated firms to lower the fees that it now
faces to lower its standards and extend its deadlines. Congress is unlikely to enact
a fee or permit allocation scheme without a provision for judicial review. Judicial
review of the level of the fee or the number of permits will involve many of the
same issues that typify judicial review of technology-based standards, and the
courts are likely to be equally sympathetic to claims of economic infeasibility.
If a sufficiently stringent charge or permit scheme can be put into place, it will
probably be more efficient and effective in bringing about real technological inno-
vation than the studied brinksmanship of the current technology-based tech-
niques. Still, a media-quality-based incentives scheme would only operate until
pollution reductions sufficient to reach the media-quality-based standard were
implemented. 336 At that point the incentive to innovate should disappear, at least
until a new source entered the area and forced the regulatory entity to inaugurate
the charge mechanism once again. One remedy to this uneven incentive structure
is to have the charge operate independently of media quality. This could be done
on the moral premise that no one has a "license to pollute," or on the more real-
istic theory (in the context of the chemical industry) that thresholds for the effects
of toxic substances are so difficult to identify, if they exist at all, that it is worth
society's while to keep dischargers of such substances under constant pressure to
develop new pollution control technology.
332. Economic Anal'ysis Hearings, supra note 224, at 1193 (testimony of Michael McClosky); id. at 1188
(testimony of Robert Haveman); F. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 34; A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note
18, at 24-25, 90-91; B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 375.
333. See Burby, White House Plans Push for Sulfur Tax Despite Strong Industig Opposition, 4 NAT'L J. 1663,
1667 (1972); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 400.
334. See B. MITNICK, supra note 46, at 375; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 399-40 1.
335. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 399-400.
336. The marketable permit scheme would continue to provide incentives to reduce pollution so long
as a market existed for the permits. One obvious source for such a market, once the media-quality stan-
dard is met, is potential new sources. A firm that cleans up more will have more permits available to sell to
new sources. Another source is existing sources that can save in maintenance and operating expenses by
turning off their pollution control devices. However, it is entirely possible that this remote incentive will
have little impact on a source in an area that meets the media-quality-based standards. In any event, this
is an academic question for the chemical industry, where markets are unlikely to develop in the first place.
[Vol. 46: No. 3
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATION
VI
A SUGGESTED SYNTHESIS
From the foregoing it would appear that neither the media-quality-based
approach nor the technology-based approach has a clear. advantage as a candidate
for health and environmental regulation of the chemical industry. The media-
quality-based approach stumbles on its inability to draw clear links between media
quality and particular sources in the environmental context, and it is stymied in
both the environmental and worker health contexts by the failure of the scientific
community to predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy the health effects of
low dose exposures to chemical substances. In any event, administrative bodies
apparently face irresistible pressures to convert the media-quality-based approach
into a technology-based approach in the context of nonthreshold pollutants and to
implement media-quality-based standards through technology-based allocation
techniques in other contexts.
The technology-based approach is attractive to implementing agencies because
it maximizes their discretion in determining the regulatory targets and because it
simplifies enforcement. The technology-based approach allows the regulator to
motivate laggard companies without threatening the economic viability of whole
industrial sectors. Yet, this approach is difficult to implement because reviewing
courts seem somewhat less hesitant to search for the implementing agencies' ana-
lytical mistakes and to remand standards for corrections. The technology-based
approach requires the regulatory entity to rely upon easily challengeable assump-
tions about the future of industrial and economic growth and the rate of techno-
logical development that are perhaps too facilely evaluated by judges.
Furthermore, the agency and the public are placed at a great knowledge disadvan-
tage with respect to the regulated industries. The technology-based approach
requires the decisionmaker to acquire an extensive familiarity with the processes,
products, and by-products of the regulated industry that must come, largely on
faith, from the industry itself. Under the media-quality-based approach, which
focuses more on toxicology than technology, the sides are more evenly matched.
Additionally, the technology-based approach does not address inequities as effec-
tively as the media-quality-based approach. Finally, the technology-based
approach is incapable of inducing private investment into innovative technolog-
ical solutions to pollution problems that can bypass some of the more difficult
societal trade-offs and send society farther on its way toward its nonutilitarian
health and environmental goals.
Since both approaches have important strengths and weaknesses, it is possible
that the best overall regulatory strategy consists of some optimal combination of
both approaches. The following section will offer some suggestions for a sensible
combined strategy for regulating the chemical industry. These rather modest and
somewhat tentative recommendations reflect the perhaps conservative viewpoint
of one who is not especially dissatisfied with the current statutory arrangement
and who is wary of untried proposals for radical change.
Congress was, in my opinion, wise to reject the narrow balancing approach to
setting health and environmental goals. These goals are too important to be left to
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the manipulations of a cloistered corps of policy analysts stuck to a schizophrenic
paradigm. The absolutist "cleanup" goal will never be achieved in the real world,
but with adequate incentives for technological development we can increasingly
approach it. As a society we are better for the effort. The balancing goal is set too
low. We can become too easily satisfied with a "optimal" steady-state where lives
and environmental amenities circulate into and out of the system and are com-
pared to and replaced by electric toothbrushes, push button windows, and other
frivolous commodities yet to be imagined. The same intellectual energy that pro-
duces thneeds33 7 and creates markets for them can be channeled toward devel-
oping technologies capable of enhancing the workplace and of preserving the
environment.
I am convinced that the new source/existing source distinction is a good one.
Installing pollution control technologies into new facilities is very often less expen-
sive than retrofitting them into old ones. 338 Moreover, entire production processes
can be designed for new plants that recycle wastes and thereby reduce overall
discharges. The regulatory entity should be allowed to guide the future, even if it
cannot correct all of the mistakes of the past.
The major disadvantage of stringent technology-based new source performance
standards is the incentive that they provide to firms to extend the life of existing,
more polluting sources. Stringent controls on existing sources can reduce this
incentive, but the flexibility that agencies have to consider costs in prescribing
standards for existing sources normally ensures that the incentive to delay remains
alive. Another way to reduce this incentive is to require something less than the
very best on-the-horizon technology for new sources. A somewhat lower tech-
nology-based standard for new sources would make the shift toward new tech-
nology less expensive, and it would provide the regulated firms with a greater
degree of certainty that the pollution control technology identified by the regula-
tory entity would in fact work.
The regulatory entity could further reduce the disincentive to build new facili-
ties by implementing a charge system for new and existing sources. If a firm must
pay for every unit of pollution that it discharges and if it can reduce pollution by
installing new production and pollution control technologies, then the reduced
charge provides an incentive to make capital expenditures on new facilities.
Indeed, the regulatory entity could go farther and set the charge at just the level
that would induce the changeover to new facilities. In practice, however, such a
technology-based charge would be even more difficult to implement than a tech-
nology-based effluent limitation, because it would require the regulatory entity to
know the details of the investment decisions of the regulated sources as well as the
economics of their production and pollution control processes. The regulatory
337. See DR. SEUSS (T. GEISEL), THE LORAX (1971).
338. Congress recognized the problems created by the technology-based new source performance stan-
dard: "It may be that in most instances, the technology for elimination of discharge of pollutants from new
sources can be achieved on a considerably more reasonable basis than for existing sources." 118 CONG.
REC. 33,697 (Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie). But see Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 183, at
1529-30 (arguing that a better course would be to design plants with possible modifications in mind instead
of modifying existing plants).
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entity would be even more at the mercy of the regulated firms for crucial informa-
tion under a technology-based charge system. If the regulatory entity underesti-
mated the charge necessary to induce the desired technology in a particular
category, the new source opportunity would be lost, and the agency would in prac-
tice have to wait for the next generation of new sources for another change to
induce pollution control technology in that category.
A better solution might lie in a combination of technology-based standards and
stringent media-quality-based charges. Since the toxic products and by-products
of the chemical industry are likely to lack accepted thresholds of toxicity and since
our knowledge of environmentally caused diseases is in any event so weak, the
overall media-quality goal should be to reduce exposure as much as possible. This
charge would therefore be assessed for every unit of pollution. The charge would
eliminate the need for the agency to undertake the almost impossibly difficult sci-
entific and value judgments that are inherent in setting an acceptable level of
media quality. The zero-discharge goal would rarely be reached, because at some
point it will be cheaper to pay the charge than to reduce the discharge. But the
incentive to reduce would always remain.
Since the effect of a charge on capital investment and research and develop-
ment decisions is so indirect and so poorly understood, the charge standing alone
may not be acceptable to proponents of a cleaner environment and workplace.
The charge system could therefore be supplemented with a system of technology-
based new source standards. The standards would ensure that when firms do shift
to new production and pollution control technologies, they will implement the
desired first-level technology. The standards need not, however, require untried,
on-the-horizon technologies. Rather, the new source technology should be a tech-
nology that the implementing agency is confident can be implemented by new
sources within the category. This would almost certainly enhance the agency's
ability to survive judicial review, and it would avoid the risk, which must be in the
minds of most reviewing courts, that the agency will mandate the implementation
of a "white elephant" technology. Finally, the agency should have greater
flexibility to prescribe technology and, if necessary, production processes and oper-
ating techniques for new sources, rather than relying exclusively upon effluent lim-
itations based on the processes and techniques that its engineers identify. The
minor degree of added flexibility that sources receive when the regulatory entity
prescribes limitations rather than actual technologies is, in the opinion of the
author, far outweighed by the distracting and ultimately senseless disputation that
occurs over whether a particular technology is capable of producing a particular
level of pollution control in the waste stream and over excursion and upset provi-
sions in standards and permits. 339
The new source standards/charge system proposed here would offer a contin-
339. Effluent limitations will still be necessary for enforcement purposes for discontinuous processes
and for other technologies for which the knowledge that the installed pollution control technology is opera-
tional does not guarantee that it is not being circumvented. Effluent limitations will also be useful when a
new source proposes to install an innovative technology capable of even greater pollution reduction than
the prescribed new source technology. To verify the greater efficacy of the proposed technology, the
Page 159: Summer 19831
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
uing incentive to develop pollution control process and technologies even after the
firm complies with the technology-based standards. Under the mixed strategy sug-
gested here, the charge must be paid for every unit of pollution, whether it comes
from a new or an existing source. Owners of new sources can rest complacently
upon compliance with new source standards only if they are willing to pay for such
pollution as survives the installation of the new technology. Whereas the pure
technology-based approach is inclined to push sources to the limits of today's tech-
nology and freeze it there, the mixed strategy suggested here would force new
sources to meet a threshold technological burden and provide continuing incen-
tives to do even better.
As a further refinement of the mixed strategy suggested here, the charge could
vary from pollutant to pollutant depending upon the relative toxicity of and expo-
sure to the pollutants, thus adding to the incentive to control the pollutants likely
to do the most harm. This would require more information and necessitate higher
administrative costs, but it would further the cleanup goal, and, to the extent that
it could be validated, it would produce a more equitable system in which dis-
chargers of more harmful pollutants must pay more than dischargers of less
harmful pollutants. While current risk assessment techniques are thoroughly inca-
pable of accurately quantifying the risks posed by individual chemicals in partic-
ular workplace and environmental contexts, they may be appropriate for the
cruder task of segregating chemicals into a few distinct categories. Different
charges could then be assessed for different categories. 340
The chief disadvantage of a categorization approach is that it may precipitate
sharp debates about the appropriate categorization of a particular chemical that
may ultimately result in time consuming administrative and judicial proceedings.
It is, in the author's opinion, a close question whether the advantages of a categori-
zation scheme outweigh this significant disadvantage. While the scheme would
seem to be a very sensible approach, it may in fact never get off the ground. If the
regulatory entity were to delay implementation of the entire mixed approach until
categorization disputes were resolved, the categorization attempt would probably
not be worthwhile. The EPA's experience with regulating hazardous discharges
into water under section 311 of the Clean Water Act 341 offers little comfort here. 342
agency must know the performance capacity of the chosen technology. Otherwise, a source could propose
as an innovative technology one that is really less effective than the prescribed technology.
The best solution is probably to allow the EPA to promulgate effluent limitations based upon identified
technologies but eliminate from the standard-setting hearing the issue of whether the identified technology
can achieve the prescribed emission limitation. At the individual permit hearing, the individual source
could be allowed to demonstrate that the identified technology, installed in its plant, will not meet the
prescribed limitation or that it has an innovative process that will do even better than the prescribed
limitation. In either case, a new effluent limitation would be set for the individual plant.
340. See, e.g., Ruff, supra note 9, at 342. Agencies have attempted to use risk assessment techniques to
categorize chemicals according to toxicity in the past. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of
Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5205 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990.112 (1982));
see also Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n v. Costle, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2014 (W.D. La. 1978).
341. Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976);see Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n v. Costle, 11
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2014 (W.D. La. 1978).
342. The EPA attempted an elaborate categorization scheme to characterize substances according to
toxicity for purposes of defining "hazardous discharge." The listing and categorizing process itself con-
sumed several years and a huge amount of agency resources. The standard was overturned by a federal
[Vol. 46: No. 3
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATION
While the charge might be media-quality-based in the limited sense of varying
from category to category, it should not be media-quality-limited. The charge
setter should not seek to achieve any particular degree of media quality in the
receiving waters short of zero exposure. The technology-based new source stan-
dards should ensure that reasonable efforts are being made to achieve clean
receiving media; this is as much as the current media-quality-based approach
seems capable of achieving in any event. The charge should be set at a level which
will provide a strong inducement to clean up beyond what might be established as
an "acceptable" level of media quality under a balancing approach. This attitude
would implement the two strong policies underlying the prevention of significant
deterioration approach to new sources. First, it recognizes the absolutist position
that no pollution is really acceptable to society. All of it must be paid for. Second,
it recognizes that the huge uncertainties involved in assessing the risks of toxic
chemicals mean that we can never be sure that a given level of media quality is
really safe enough. Sources should be under constant financial pressure to develop
technologies for pollution reduction. The predictable response of some environ-
mental purists that this response is merely a "license to pollute ' 343 is elevating
rhetoric over substance. It is a matter of practical politics that new sources of
pollution will be allowed to discharge toxic substances into the workplace, the
water, and the air, and that most old sources will not be forced out of business. We
can strive toward justifiable absolutist cleanup goals by decrying the construction
of new sources and thereby tacitly accepting the discharges of existing sources, or
we can pursue those goals more sensibly through a mixed system of technology
requirements and charges that insists upon the installation of some reasonably
available control technology and that encourages the development of even better
technology through a system of stringent charges.
The mixed strategy is also adaptable to existing sources. As previously dis-
cussed, the charge system should be implemented with respect to existing sources
to encourage pollution reduction and to reduce the disincentive to convert to new
production processes that technology-based new source standards provide. The
question remains whether technology-based requirements should be imposed upon
existing sources in addition to the charge. The case for technology-based require-
ments is somewhat weaker for existing sources for which any new technology
requirements must be retrofitted. Nevertheless, a good case can be made for tech-
nology-based requirements in areas in which media quality is poor and for sub-
stances for which adequate media-quality-based standards are impossible to
promulgate. In both cases the regulatory entity faces strong practical pressures to
convert media-quality-based standards into a technology-based implementation
district court because the agency's rule was insufficiently detailed in its prescriptions, Manufacturing
Chemists Ass'n v. Costle, 11 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 2014 (W.D. La. 1978), and Congress ultimately
amended the statute to give the EPA authority to adopt its cruder approach.
343. See HISTORY OF WPCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 184, at 1322 (statement of Sen. Muskie: "if
the degree of control achieved is adequate to implement effluent standards, the effluent fee is a useful
means to implement existing public policy-if less control is achieved, then the fee is a license to pollute");
Burby,supra note 333, at 1665 ("The National Association of Manufacturers believes that taxes on effluents
and emissions represent an unmanageable, uneconomic, and negative approach and in principle would
allow polluters to continue to adversely sue our environment by payment of a tax.").
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approach. It might be more straightforward to acknowledge this tendency forth-
rightly and prescribe technology-based requirements in the first place. The chem-
ical industry meets the second of these two preconditions especially well. The
large uncertainties that surround attempts to assess health and environmental
effects of most chemical substances produced by the chemical industry argues
against any media-quality-based standard other than zero. Since the societal cost
of zero discharge for most existing sources is ultimately unacceptable, the next best
regulatory alternative is to require existing sources to do the best that they can.
This will, of course, entail all of the disadvantages of technology-based standards,
including the likelihood that not all of them will survive stringent judicial review.
However, society will at least assure that "best efforts" are being made toward its
absolutist goals. Moreover, the charge will reinforce upon the existing sources
society's conviction that any pollution is bad, and it should make the installation
of retrofit technologies less painful.
The novel issue in the mixed technology-based standards/charge approach will
be the level at which the regulatory entity sets the charge. The charge suggested
here is not intended to induce any particular level of media quality; nor is it meant
to induce the implementation of any particular degree of technological control.
The purpose of the charge is twofold-(l) to reinforce in a very pragmatic way
society's absolutist goals for worker health and the environment; and (2) to
encourage the development of more sophisticated pollution control technologies.
Neither of these purposes can be reduced to a concrete end point. Yet, if we
cannot know when we have sufficient reinforcement or when we have provided
adequate research and development incentives, how can we prescribe a dollar
charge per unit of chemical discharged? 344
Congress could simply articulate a broad goal for the charge, such as "suffi-
cient to encourage significant pollution reduction efforts" and leave the matter to
the discretion of the implementing agency and ultimately the reviewing courts.
This would make matters extremely difficult for the agency. It would be required
to resolve the contending forces generated by polluting sources who would rather
pay nothing and environmental groups who would desire very large charges. The
agency would then face the prospect of supporting its resolution of the question in
a reviewing court, because it is highly unlikely that Congress would delegate such
an important and open-ended question to an agency without providing aggrieved
parties an avenue for judicial review. This approach toward setting the charge
would thus rely heavily upon administrative and judicial discretion. Whether or
not one supports this approach would largely depend upon the extent to which one
has faith in the current agency and judicial personnel.
The questions of adequate goal reinforcement and research and development
incentives are, however, not so much technical as political questions. Once society
344. Most charge proponents advocate fixing the charge per unit of pollution at the level of environ-
mental harm caused by that unit of pollution. See, e.g., Rosenthal, The Federal Power to Protect the Environ-
ment: Available Devices to Compel or Induce Desired Conduct, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 436-39 (1972). This is
merely the utilitarian ideal as implemented through a charge system. We have seen how this goal is
impractical and inappropriate.
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has invested in up-to-date technologies for all existing sources and has ensured that
new sources will likewise implement reasonable technological controls, the ques-
tion of the additional expense that society will impose on polluting conduct is in a
real sense the question of society's willingness to sell workplace disease and envi-
ronmental harm at the margin. Once we have done all that we reasonably can to
stop workplace and environmental harm with today's technologies, how much
shall we charge polluters for the right to discharge toxic substances?
Congress may be the more appropriate institution to make this sensitive collec-
tive decision. Congress could therefore specify in advance a sum that the charges
must produce on a yearly basis and leave it to the implementing agency to ensure
that the charges for the discharge of various chemicals are set at the level capable
of producing that sum by the end of the year.345 This sum could be collected in a
separate fund, called the "pollution control research and development fund,"
rather than made a part of general revenues. Under this approach workplace
hazards and environmental insults would. be allocated on the basis of the willing-
ness of society to sell, rather than willingness of the employers and polluters to
pay.3 4 6 Moreover, in setting the amount of this sum, Congress could turn the inev-
itable industry complaint, that we should not regulate until we know more about
the risks of pollution and the capabilities of technology, around on itself. If we
need to know more, then we should raise the level of the fund, and hence the level
of the charges, so that more research can be performed.
Unfortunately, the system does not compensate those members of society who
are especially harmed by the remaining pollution. The fund could be expanded in
concept to incorporate a compensation function as well as a research and develop-
ment function, but this would entail the creation of a complex fact-finding and
allocating mechanism that would largely duplicate tort and workers' compensa-
tion systems while not eliminating any of the practical difficulties, such as estab-
lishing causation, that befuddle those systems.
If the fund served only a research and development function, the strategy pro-
posed here could be even further simplified by giving the regulatory entity the
discretion to forego collecting the charge from any entity that could demonstrate
that it was expending an equivalent amount on its own pollution control or worker
safety research and development. The total annual amount of the fund would
reflect this sum, but it would not actually be transferred to the fund. The entity
would be required to show that the funds were in fact being spent on ways of
reducing pollution. In some cases manufacturing design research would fit this
description, especially if the research were directed toward minimizing raw mate-
345. Obviously, some flexibility will have to be designed into the system to take into account the large
uncertainties concerning investment decisions of private firms and the impact of those decisions on the
fund. In some years the charges set by the implementing agency may not reach the congressionally man-
dated target; in others it will exceed that target. The goal should be to reach the target over time.
346. To the extent that the benefits of a particular industrial activity are spread evenly throughout all
of society, the willingness of society to sell may roughly equal the willingness of society to pay because the
charge will be reflected in price increases. Yet, since very few products have price inelastic demand func-
tions, a charge cannot be passed on entirely to consumers. Shareholders will bear a part of the charge as
well. This should have the long term effect of moving both consumers and capital into less polluting
technologies.
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rial consumption and toward recycling technologies. The agency would have to
examine the manufacturer's case with some care, however, to avoid having the
fund sponsor product development or marketing research.
One objection that is continually raised to a charge system is that the govern-
ment will become addicted to the revenue that the charge brings in and will not be
willing to accept reductions in the charges as pollution is brought under control.
For a charge system grounded in the market paradigm, this is indeed a disadvan-
tage. For the nonmarket system proposed here, it is a less powerful objection.
Congress could re-evaluate the fund periodically and thereby reestablish the price
at which society is willing to sell worker, public health, and environmental ameni-
ties. Unless Congress agreed to lower the level of the fund, the agency would be
required to maintain it at the prescribed level despite the shrinking payments
attributable to the installation of pollution controls in existing sources. 347 Unless
new sources filled the gap in payments, the charge for each unit of pollution would
have to be increased as overall discharges are reduced. 348 The policy-oriented
economist will argue that this will ensure that at some point society is paying too
much per unit of pollution, and if the political representatives agree, the fund can
be reduced accordingly. But the cleanup advocate can respond that, to the con-
trary, society is merely engaging in constant efforts to develop technological solu-
tions to the worker health and pollution control problem. The incentive grows as
we get nearer to the ultimate cleanup goal.
The charge system advocated here thus resembles a budget for pollution con-
trol research, except that it is financed by the polluters on a "worst first" basis.
First priority upon the budget resources will go to the polluters themselves, so long
as they can demonstrate that the resources will in fact be spent upon research
relevant to workplace health or pollution control. The remaining funds will be
disbursed by the regulatory entity to other research and development-oriented
entities. There is, for example, a burgeoning mini-industry of pollution control
vendors that could benefit substantially from grants from the agency or from the
regulated companies.
The charge system would entail significant administrative costs, but it would
probably not be as expensive as the current system. The agency would have to
347. If each assessment were required to be made on the record after a hearing with judicial review,
the mixed technology-based-standard/charge strategy proposed here would have no hope of succeeding.
However, there is no need to provide for hearings or judicial review of the annual charge reassessments
because the risk of error is very small. While the probability of error in any given year is very high, any
error in one year can be corrected in the next. The agency's goal is to maintain a fund at a more-or-less
constant level over the years. There is no reason to make that level a talisman in any given year. Very
little harm can come to regulatees if the agency is off the mark in one year so long as it corrects for its
mistakes in the next year.
348. One important difficulty with the solution advocated here is the powerful incentive it offers to
the polluting industry as a whole to conspire against the agency. If the tax per unit of pollution is merely
raised as the total amount of effluent or emissions decreases, the industry as a whole has no incentive to
curtail emissions. The gross payout is the same for the whole industry, regardless of the level of pollution
abatement installed. Thus, the real incentive for an individual firm to install pollution controls is an
incentive to get the jump on its competitors. The industry thus will find itself in a kind of reverse tragedy
of the commons. By conspiring against the EPA, the industry could avoid this competition and avoid the
installation of controls.
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maintain a branch capable of constantly updating new source standards as tech-
nology evolves. The same branch could promulgate the initial existing source
standards, which should not have to be revised in the future. The agency would
also need an economics branch with the necessary expertise to establish the rele-
vant charges. An enforcement branch would be necessary to monitor the tech-
nology-based standards and the charge system for cheating. Finally, a research and
development branch would be necessary to allocate the fund. The agency would
not need a large risk assessment capability, and its technology assessment capa-
bility could shrink after it promulgated its standards for existing sources and its
first round of standards for new sources. In any event, the costs of administering
the suggested system would certainly be no greater than the administrative costs of
the present system.
The suggested strategy seems altogether fair and equitable from the standpoint
of the regulated firms. Since any discharge of a nonthreshold pollutant may be
regarded as harmful, it seems equitable to charge sources that discharge large
amounts of a substance more than a source that is discharging smaller amounts.
The fairness of the system is enhanced by its willingness to plow the charge directly
back into the research that will help reduce discharges. The firm's resources are
not necessarily expropriated; they are merely rechanneled into more beneficial uses
for which the firm would not otherwise expend resources. The regulatory entity
mandates "inefficient" technology-based standards in the first instance, but further
pollution control is brought about by each individual firm in a cost-effective way
using the results of fund-sponsored research as well as those of its own research.
VII
CONCLUSION
A society does not always achieve all of the goals that it sets for itself. But
reaching El Dorado is not always as important as the attempt. The United States
has set very high health and environmental goals for itself and it has launched on a
decade-long quest to reach those goals. Not surprisingly, we have failed. We have
failed in part because the goals were set too high and in part because some of us do
not share those goals and have hampered the quest. In the process, however, we
have learned a great deal about worker and environmental health and about ways
to reduce risks to health and the environment.
Despite a significant change in the political climate that inaugurated the
decade of the 1980's, there is little indication that Congress intends to retreat from
the goals set in the early 1970's. This is, in the author's opinion, encouraging. Yet,
while we should not abandon our ambitious goals, we can recognize the futility of
the media-quality-based approach insofar as it applies to most producers of the
chemical industry. The technology-based approach, while no panacea, can, in
combination with the charge system described here, keep us on the right path
toward the goals that we will probably never reach.
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